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ABSTRACT 
State, local, and tribal law enforcement (SLTLE) agencies play a significant role 
in homeland security. Their intelligence function supports their hometown and the 
nation’s homeland security. The New York City Police Department (NYPD) recognized 
that the same intelligence that secures the homeland is required to secure New York City. 
NYPD restructured its organizational structure and external business practices to acquire 
the requisite intelligence to secure NYC and in effect facilitated the nation’s homeland 
security. This thesis identifies NYPD’s intelligence practices as a smart practice that 
SLTLE agencies should adopt, scaled and tailored to their realities and needs, to secure 
their hometowns and to compound a national effort to secure the homeland. 
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 1
I. INTRODUCTION  
On September 11, the nation suffered the largest loss of life—2,973—on 
its soil as a result of hostile attack in its history. The FDNY suffered 343 
fatalities—the largest loss of life of any response agency in history. The 
NYPD suffered 23 fatalities—the second largest loss of life of any police 
force in history, exceeded only by [37] members of PAPD officers lost the 
same day. 
—National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Report (2004) 
A. PROBLEM 
The events of Tuesday, September 11, 2001, precipitated an examination of 
United States homeland security and raised the question: Why did the United States fail 
to prevent these acts? Intelligence failures at all levels of government were identified as 
the primary default. Commissions were launched, strategies and directives promulgated, 
legislation enacted, agencies were created, and existing agencies were transformed to 
develop an intelligence capability that might detect, deter, or mitigate future acts of 
terrorism. To those ends, the roles of state, local and tribal law enforcement (SLTLE) 
agencies were identified as an integral component of the nation’s homeland security. 
The New York City Police Department (NYPD) recognized that the events of 
September 11, 2001 presaged the Homeland Security Era, wherein unconventional and 
transnational threats presented a clear and present danger to New York City and a 
prescription for intelligence. NYPD identified its intelligence requirements as 
“information that is comprehensive and relevant to the Police Commissioner.” In 
addition, NYPD recognized a definitive intelligence requirement with implications for 
New York City that are global in scope. Police Commissioner Raymond W. Kelly refers 
to this particular intelligence as a “cop-to-cop relationship” with police agencies across 
the globe that informs NYPD about international matters that are pertinent to the security 




remain an outlier to agencies that might provide those requirements. To that end, NYPD 
transformed its organizational structure and business practices to acquire intelligence that 
might prevent future attacks. 
Simultaneously, federal and SLTLE agencies revolutionized their intelligence 
operations. A national intelligence enterprise that would integrate all levels of 
government and the private sector was promulgated. Those efforts were typically top-
down federal endeavors that subordinated SLTLE intelligence to federal perspective, 
governance, and coordination. Those efforts are detailed below. 
1. National Intelligence Reform 
The report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks ([9/11 Commission 
Report] 2004) diagnosed the failure of the United States intelligence community (IC) to 
share information as a systemic malady. It identified intelligence as the first line of 
defense in our nation’s security and recommended the integration of all foreign and 
domestic sources of information, resulting in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorist 
Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA) that: 
• Established the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) to 
oversee IC and to facilitate the exchange of information within IC;  
• Incorporated the Department of Homeland Security’s Office of 
Intelligence and Analysis into IC; 
• Redefined national intelligence to include foreign intelligence, domestic 
intelligence, and homeland security intelligence (HSINT); 
• Instituted the Information Sharing Environment (ISE): “an approach that 
facilitates the sharing of terrorism information.”1 
2. State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers 
In 2002, the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) identified 
inadequacies of the law enforcement intelligence process that, in part, led to the failure to 
                                                 
1 The Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 amended IRTPA and 
defined ISE as “an approach that facilitates the sharing of terrorism and homeland security information, 
which may include any method determined necessary and appropriate.” 
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prevent the tragic events of September 11, 2001. The recommendations of the IACP and 
others evolved into the state and major urban fusion center (FC) enterprise.2 Fusion 
centers are a “collaborative effort of two or more, federal, state, local, or tribal agencies 
that combines resources, expertise, and information with the goal of maximizing the 
ability of such agencies to detect, prevent, investigate, apprehend, and respond to 
criminal and terrorist activity” (U.S. Department of Justice [DOJ] & U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security [DHS] 2006). 
3. Department of Homeland Security Supports State and Major Urban 
Fusion Centers 
DHS supports FCs with field representatives, funding, training, and access to the 
Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN), a secured, web-based platform for 
sensitive but unclassified (SBU) information sharing between federal, state, local, tribal, 
private, and international partners. In addition, DHS provides FCs with access to the 
Homeland Security Data Network (HSDN) at 30 of the 72 centers. HSDN allows FC staff 
to move information and intelligence at the Secret level and permits access to the 
National Counterterrorism Center, a classified portal of the most current terrorism-related 
information. Moreover, in September 2009, DHS and the Department of Defense (DoD) 
announced an initiative to grant select FCs access to “specific terrorism-related 
information” resident on DoD’s Secret Internet Protocol Router (SIPRNet)—a secure 
network used to send classified data that will be accessible via HSDN (DHS 2009 and 
2010b; Riegle 2009). 
4. Interagency Threat Assessment and Coordination Group 
The Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 
established the Interagency Threat Assessment and Coordination Group (ITACG) to 
improve the sharing of information within the scope of ISE with state, local, tribal, and 
private sector officials, and ODNI, through the program manager of ISE (PM-ISE). 
ITACG’s Advisory Council and National Counter Terrorism Center Detail set and 
implement policy for the integration, analysis, and dissemination of “federally-
                                                 
2 State and major urban area fusion centers were previously known as state and local fusion centers 
(SLFCs). To maintain uniformity, the term state and major urban area fusion center (FC) will be used. 
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coordinated” information within the scope of ISE, including homeland security 
information, terrorism information, and weapons of mass destruction information.  
5. “Federally Validated” Information Sharing 
The National Strategy for Information Sharing: Successes and Challenges In 
Improving Terrorism-Related Information Sharing (2008) maintains that state, local, and 
tribal entities  
require access to timely, credible, and actionable information and 
intelligence about individuals and groups intending to carry out attacks 
within the United States, their organizations and their financing, potential 
targets, pre-attack indicators, and major events or circumstances that 
might influence State, local, and tribal preventive and protective postures 
(Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2008). 
The National Strategy encourages state, local, and tribal entities to foster a culture 
that recognizes the importance of fusing information regarding all crimes with national 
security implications, with other security-related information (e.g., criminal 
investigations, terrorism, public health and safety, and natural-hazard emergency 
response). Moreover, all levels of the federal system must share a common understanding 
of the information needed to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorist attacks that enables 
federal entities to work together to provide information in ways that better meet the needs 
of state, local, and tribal partners. That process includes integrating, processing, 
analyzing, and disseminating information gathered at the state and local level with 
federally gathered information. The National Strategy concludes that an integrated 
approach allows federal agencies to work together to produce and disseminate a 
“federally-validated perspective.” 
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6. SLTLE Agencies Have Allowed the Federal Government to Identify 
Their Intelligence Requirements and SLTLE Intelligence Gaps 
Remain Unfulfilled 
Notwithstanding the assertion that post–September 11, 2001 intelligence reforms 
are “national” efforts, they are typically top-down “federally governed,” “federally-
coordinated,” and maintain a “federally-validated perspective.”3 They fail to provide the 
comprehensive intelligence needs of SLTLE agencies. Instead, the reforms provide an 
avalanche of information, networks, and analytics that are not readily discernible and are 
often not relevant to SLTLE agencies.4 Moreover, the reforms do not establish national 
requirements or delineate what national resources are available to include SLTLE as a 
viable component of IC. Furthermore, no formal process exists for SLTLE to task IC with 
their intelligence requirements. Consequently, SLTLE agencies have allowed the federal 
government to identify their intelligence requirements, and SLTLE intelligence gaps 
remain unfulfilled.  
B. RESEARCH QUESTION 
1. What Policies and Procedures Are Necessary for SLTLE Agencies to 
Maximize Their Efforts to Detect, Deter, or Mitigate Future Acts of 
Terrorism? 
This thesis argues that three areas in SLTLE agencies’ intelligence practices and 
capabilities must be established in order to effectively detect, deter, and mitigate future 
acts of terrorism: 
a. Identification of intelligence requirements unique to the realties and needs 
of the agency-jurisdiction; 
b. Proactive evolution of existing relationships with IC, FCs, ISE, ITACG, 
Joint Terrorist Task Forces, and other agencies and persons;  
                                                 
3 In this context, “national” refers to the fifty states and territories of the United States and not per se 
the federal government of the United States. 
4 The Justice Research Association’s Information Sharing Systems: A Survey of Law Enforcement 
(2006) cites 266 separate systems that share information about crime and terrorism and that are currently in 
place or under development at the national, regional, and state levels. 
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c. Establishment of an intelligence capability that satisfies intelligence 
requirements that are not met by external sources. SLTLE agencies must identify the 
intelligence gaps that federal and other efforts leave—and fulfill them.  
2. NYPD-Intelligence Proposed as a “Smart Practice” 
This thesis offers NYPD’s intelligence enterprise as a “smart practice” for SLTLE 
agencies to identify and acquire their intelligence requirements to secure their respective 
hometowns and the homeland. The thesis argues that SLTLE agencies should adopt an 
NYPD-intelligence-like program, scaled and tailored to the particular realities and needs 
of their agency to identify and acquire their requisite intelligence. 
“Smart practice” is distinguished from “best practice” in that a smart practice 
describes an “interesting idea” embedded in some practice, while a best practice suggests 
that research and empirical evidence prove that the practice is best. Smart-practice 
research emphasizes that there is something clever inherent in the practice. It is this 
cleverness that the researcher must analyze, characterize in words, and appraise as to its 
applicability to the local situation (Bardach, 2009). 
C. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH 
It has been said that homeland security is in a “pre-paradigm phase” and that there 
is no conceptual agreement about what constitutes homeland security (Bellavita & 
Gordon, 2006). The homeland security community maintains that post–September 11, 
2001 homeland security requires unprecedented cooperation that supersedes all other 
concerns. 
NYPD’s post-September 11, 2001 transformation demonstrates that perceived 
barriers are a mindset and that interagency cooperation enhanced by independent 
initiatives can provide hometown-homeland security. Moreover, NYPD does so while 
maintaining its core crime-prevention role. Likewise, SLTLE agencies are charged with 
providing for the safety and security of their hometowns and should consider an adoption 




Furthermore, IC should reconsider the frontline role of SLTLE in the national 
intelligence and recognize particularly that the relationship between IC and SLTLE is 
interdependent.  
IC and the Homeland Security intelligence community have been the subject of 
presidential directives, commissions, legislation, government reports, and academia. 
Presently, all aspects of intelligence evoke great debate and might be served by the 
precepts of this thesis. It is likely that IC and the Homeland Security intelligence 
community will evolve further. This literature may provide insight into this normative 
organizational process and how understanding that process may facilitate intelligent 
intelligence. Furthermore, this research enhances baseline requirements for SLTLE 
intelligence and affords future researchers avenues for additional research, including an 
adaptation of NYPD’s intelligence program, SLTLE intelligence requirements, and the 
relationship of IC, the Homeland Security intelligence community, and SLTLE. Finally, 
NYPD’s post–September 11, 2001 transformation might help define and establish a 
homeland security paradigm.  
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Part one of this literature review identifies relevant sources concerning the roles, 
authority and capabilities of SLTLE elements of the Homeland Security intelligence 
community. While a de facto Homeland Security intelligence community predates the 
events of September 11, 2001, the review focuses on post–September 11, 2001 literature 
that circumscribes the Homeland Security intelligence community as defined in relevant 
legislation and government policies and strategies. Part two of this review identifies a 
parochial and mostly ad hoc pre–September 11, 2001 NYPD intelligence program and a 
post–September 11, 2001 transformation of the organization. 
1. Evolution of the Homeland Security Intelligence Community  
The National Strategy For Information Sharing identified state, local, and tribal 
governments as our nation’s first “preventers and responders,” critical to our efforts to 
prevent future terrorist attacks and to respond if an attack occurs. To that end:  
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They must have access to the information that enables them to protect our 
local communities. In addition, these State, local, and tribal officials are 
often best able to identify potential threats that exist within their 
jurisdictions. They are full and trusted partners with the Federal 
Government in our Nation’s efforts to combat terrorism, and therefore 
they must be a part of an information sharing framework that supports an 
effective and efficient two-way flow of information enabling officials at 
all levels of government to counter and respond to threats (Office of the 
Director of National Intelligence, 2008). 
The events of September 11, 2001 spawned a twenty-first-century Homeland 
Security intelligence community. It is an amalgam of federal, state, local, and private 
sector entities that share information and intelligence for their individual and collective 
security. It is historically rooted in pre–Revolutionary War constructs that gathered 
information and intelligence to secure the independence of rebellious colonies and 
thereafter to secure the safety and security of an emerging nation. 
The Homeland Security Act of 2002 tasked DHS with coordinating activities and 
improving information-sharing efforts among federal, SLTLE agencies, and the private 
sector. DHS characterizes the Homeland Security intelligence community as the 
organizations of the Homeland Security stakeholder community that have intelligence 
elements. The Homeland Security stakeholder community is all levels of government, the 
intelligence, defense, and law enforcement communities, private sector, critical 
infrastructure operators, and those responsible for securing the borders, protecting 
transportation and maritime systems, and guarding the security of the homeland. 
Furthermore, DHS characterized the DHS Intelligence Enterprise as all the component 
organizations within the department that have activities producing raw information, 
intelligence-related information, or finished intelligence (DHS, 2006).  
In the fall of 2001, IACP recommended the creation of a Criminal Intelligence 
Coordinating Council composed of SLTLE agencies that would establish guidelines in 
order to enable those agencies to fully participate with federal agencies to coordinate, 
collect, analyze, and appropriately disseminate criminal intelligence across the United 
States to make our nation safer. In response, DOJ authorized the formation of the Global 
Justice Information Sharing Initiative (Global) to develop an intelligence-sharing plan 
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that would emphasize better sharing of critical data among all law enforcement agencies. 
Global is a working group of local, state, and tribal law enforcement representatives that 
serves as a federal advisory committee to the U.S. Attorney General on justice 
information sharing and integration initiatives (DOJ, 2005). 
Global’s vision conceived The National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan (DOJ, 
2005) that established standards and guidelines for the development of a collaborative 
law enforcement intelligence function. The plan built upon an array of local and state 
information-sharing initiatives and promoted FCs. FCs are information-sharing 
enterprises designed to share information and intelligence within their jurisdictions and 
with the federal government. There are currently 72 DHS-designated FCs nationwide. 
DOJ and DHS’ Baseline Capabilities for Fusion Centers (2006) states that FCs 
incorporate the various elements of an ideal information and intelligence-sharing project 
that achieves a unified force among all levels of law enforcement agencies and public 
safety agencies such as fire, health, and transportation, and the private sector. 
“Fusion” refers to “the process of managing the flow of information and 
intelligence across all levels and sectors of government and private industry, and through 
analysis, provides meaningful intelligence” (DHS, 2008a). The concept of data fusion has 
emerged as the fundamental process to facilitate the sharing of homeland-security-related 
and crime-related information and intelligence. Data fusion involves: 
The exchange of information from different sources—including law 
enforcement, public safety, and the private sector—and with analysis can 
result in meaningful and actionable intelligence and information. The 
fusion process turns this information and intelligence into actionable 
knowledge. Fusion allows for relentless revaluation of existing data in 
context with new data in order to provide constant updates (DOJ & DHS, 
2006). 
The Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 
facilitated the FC network via mandated federal coordination, collaboration, cooperation, 
and directed grant funding. In addition, the act created the Interagency Threat Assessment 
and Coordination Group (ITACG) to improve the sharing of information within the scope 
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of ISE with state, local, tribal, and private sector officials, and establish the Director of 
National Intelligence, through the Program Manager of ISE (PM-ISE). 
John Rollins (2008) argues that the value proposition for fusion centers is that:  
By integrating various streams of information and intelligence, including 
that flow from the federal government, state, local, and tribal government, 
as well as the private sector, a more accurate picture of the risks to people, 
economic infrastructure, and communities can be developed and translated 
into protective action. 
Notwithstanding, Rollins concludes that “while many of the centers have 
prevention of attack as a high authority, little “true fusion” or analysis of disparate data 
sources, identification of intelligence gaps, and pro-active collection of intelligence 
against those gaps which could contribute to prevention is occurring.” 
John McKay (2008) maintains that “the benefit that would accrue to U.S. national 
security in having police records integrated in a strictly controlled fashion with sensitive 
federal data would be nothing short of remarkable.” However,  
Despite their loft claims, Federal officials are misleading you if they cause 
you to believe that fusion centers are actually “fusing” any data that 
interdepartmental systems in DOJ, DHS, or DOD are integrating anything 
but inconsequential records or that N-DEX or HSDN are systematically 
transporting data that is used by state and local police departments.5 
Bart R. Johnson (2009), acting undersecretary for Intelligence and Analysis at 
DHS and former colonel of the New York State Police Department and lead participant in 
Global’s initiatives, lauds the effectiveness of FCs in homeland security efforts. He 
acknowledged the recent efforts of the Colorado Information and Analysis Center 
(CIAC) that served as a funnel for all information and intelligence operations at the 
August 2008 Democratic National Convention. In addition, CIAC supported Denver FBI  
 
                                                 
5 N-DEx is an FBI Criminal Justice Information system that became operational on July 18, 2009. “It 
is a powerful authomated investigative tool that will provide LEA (Law Enforcement Agencies) with the 
ability to search, link, analyze and share information such as incident/case reports, arrests, booking and 
incarceration data, and parole/probation data on a national basis to a degree never before possible” (FBI, 
2010). 
 11
in the recent Najibullah Zazi terrorist case, and CAIC has partnered with New Mexico, 
Utah, and Wyoming to create a four-state regional monthly and yearly summary of 
suspicious activity.6  
Johnson noted the continued evolution of FCs and the fact that, by end of fiscal 
year 2010, all 72 FCs will have DHS personnel detailed thereto and will have access to 
HSDN. In addition, DHS is supporting the integration of fire and emergency service, 
public health and healthcare communities, critical infrastructure and key resource 
protection efforts, and cyber security into FCs. Johnson further noted the establishment of 
DHS’s Joint Fusion Center Program Management Office (JFC-PMO) and a National 
Fusion Center Program Management Office.  
In September 2009, Secretary of Homeland Security Janet Napolitano in her 
testimony to the Senate Committee on Homeland Security said that JFC-PMO will 
coordinate DHS’s support for FCs and will (among other things):  
lead a unified Department-wide [DHS] effort to develop and implement 
survey tools to ensure state, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies 
have the opportunity to define and identify the types of homeland security-
related information they need and the format in which they need it 
(Napolitano, 2009). 
The National Fusion Center Project Management Office will bring multiple 
agencies of the federal government and representatives of state, local, and tribal 
governments together to support FCs. DHS and FBI’s co-chaired National Fusion Center 
Management Group was developed to engage senior leadership from federal agencies and 
to “provide State and local partners a direct role in the federal interagency policy making 
process” (Johnson, 2009). In addition, the group will coordinate support for the 
Nationwide Suspicious Activity Report Initiative (NSI). NSI is an ISE-led initiative to  
 
                                                 
6 Najibullah Zazi, a legal permanent resident of the United States from Afghanistan, was arrested and 
indicted for conspiracy to use weapons of mass destruction (explosives) in the United States. As alleged in 
the indictment, Zazi had received detailed bomb-making instructions in Pakistan. Zazi allegedly purchased 
components of improvised explosive devices and had traveled to New York City on September 15, 2009, in 
furtherance of his criminal plans (Mueller, 2010). On February 22, 2010, Zazi pleaded guilty to conspiracy 
to use weapons of mass destruction against persons or property in the United States, conspiracy to commit 
murder in a foreign country and providing material support to al-Qaeda (DOJ, 2010a). 
 12
integrate federal, state, local, and tribal law enforcement organizations in a standardized 
approach to gathering and analyzing terrorism-related Suspicious Activity Reports 
(SARs) (Johnson, 2009). 
Randol (2009a) noted that a second-generation SAR initiative, ISE SAR 
Functional Standard Version 1.5, redefined suspicious activity as “observed behavior 
reasonably indicative of pre-operational planning related to terrorism or other criminal 
behavior.” That clarification and other First Amendment provisions drew praise from 
opposition groups, particularly the American Civil Liberties Union’s National Security 
Policy Counsel. Moreover, SAR stakeholders, ISE, DOJ, DHS, IACP, and others are 
participating in training and pilot initiatives in furtherance of NSI. SAR evaluations and 
training were conducted at 12 FCs, and an initial version of SARs was provided to 4,000 
officers in the Washington D.C., area prior to the 2009 presidential inauguration.  
Additionally, a DHS–Attorney General led task force responded to a May 27, 
2009 presidential memorandum to review current SBU information. The Task Force 
reviewed a Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI) framework for terrorism-related 
information within ISE that included consultations with state, local, and tribal partners; 
privacy and open government organizations; and Congress. The task force concluded that 
a single, standardized framework for marking, safeguarding, and disseminating all 
executive branch SBU information is required to further the goals of: 
• standardizing currently disparate terminology and procedures (represented 
by over 107 distinct SBU regimes); 
• facilitating information-sharing through the promulgation of common and 
understandable rules for information protection and dissemination; and 
• enhancing government transparency through policies and training that 
clarify the standards for protecting information within the framework. 
The task force recommended expanding the CUI initiative to encompass all SBU 
information to achieve a simple, concise, and standardized CUI framework that would 
facilitate information sharing (DHS et al., 2009).  
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In 2010, Attorney General Eric Holder, in a speech at the Fourth National Fusion  
Conference said of FCs: 
Instead of pursuing a narrow, ideological approach to fighting terrorism, 
combating crime, and protecting the safety of our people, today’s Justice 
Department is committed to being flexible, pragmatic and aggressive. This 
approach is working. By focusing on improving communication and 
collaboration, we’ve helped to prevent hundreds of crimes and to protect 
even more lives. 
The backbone of this effort is the combined work of thousands of FBI and 
other federal agents, state and local police officers, Department of 
Homeland Security officials, and intelligence experts around the world. 
Every day, they work to prevent terrorist attacks and combat crime. This 
work—your work in our fusion centers—helps keep us safe. 
2. NYPD’s Intelligence Enterprise 
NYPD has historically maintained an intelligence enterprise to detect and deter 
threats that might hazard the city. It is rooted in NYPD’s predecessor agency, the 
Metropolitans, who maintained a proactive intelligence program during the American 
Civil War. Superintendent John Kennedy of the Metropolitans forbid arms shipments to 
the South, investigated death threats against president-elect Abraham Lincoln, and 
infiltrated organizations sympathetic to the South. During World War I, Police 
Commissioner Arthur H. Woods formed special service squads to infiltrate networks of 
German saboteurs and sympathizers. NYPD established other special service squads and 
enjoyed special relationships with elements of IC throughout the nation’s history 
(Lardner & Reppetto, 2000).  
On January 1, 2002, newly appointed NYPD Police Commissioner Kelly was 
presented with an unprecedented operating context for local policing in America—
unconventional and transnational terrorism. Terrorism was not new to Kelly. He had been 
commissioner for the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, and he is a combat veteran of 
the Vietnam War. Kelly assessed the Intelligence Division (ID) to be an escort service. 
Moreover, he knew NYPD “couldn’t rely on the Federal government; we’re doing all the 
things we’re doing because the federal government isn’t doing them. It’s not enough to 
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say that it’s their job if the job isn’t being done,” Kelly said (Horowitz, 2003). Kelly 
transformed NYPD into a policing enterprise that combines traditional police operations 
with nontraditional intelligence and counterterrorism operations. He revamped ID, 
created a new counterterrorism bureau, and made counterterrorism the job of every 
member of the department.  
Kelly’s first acts included recruiting David Cohen as Deputy Commissioner of 
Intelligence and Frank Libutti as Deputy Commissioner of Counterterrorism. Cohen, a 
35-year veteran of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) served in a variety of capacities 
including Director of Operations and Deputy Director of the Directorate of Intelligence. 
The 9/11 Commission credited Cohen for his role in establishing the Bin Ladin unit and 
for his focus on that threat when few others in the government were paying attention. 
Libutti, a former Special Assistant for Homeland Security at the Department of Defense, 
served as a lieutenant general and commander of the U.S. Marine Corps forces in the 
Pacific. He is a combat veteran of the Vietnam War and was a member of the Office of 
Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff (New York City Office of the Mayor, 2002a and 
2002b). 
a. Intelligence Division 
Commissioner Kelly told Deputy Commissioner Cohen that “the 
Intelligence Division is responsible for the ground-up work of terrorism,” but he did not 
provide a playbook. Cohen said that “it was like putting tires on a speeding car” and that 
there were times in the first months when the whole NYPD intelligence division felt like 
“a gaggle of guys chasing things around” (Dickey, 2009a). He initiated an extensive 
expansion and reorganization of ID that included aggressive no-bounds information 
collection, the culling of a unique ethnographic and linguistic capability, the meshing of 
civilian intelligence analysts and street cops, legislative initiatives, and a robust public-
private outreach.  
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b. International Liaison Unit  
Cohen wanted NYPD to establish its own unique intelligence enterprise 
that could contend with IC, and particularly FBI. His resume and security clearance 
provided the department with both access to information and intelligence that was 
previously unavailable and an insider’s appreciation of IC. To that point, Cohen said that 
“there is no such thing as information sharing, there is only information trading.” He 
approached Commissioner Kelly with the idea of stationing personnel overseas to learn 
the operational, social, and technological signatures, not just of bomb makers now, but of 
any dangerous group. Cohen, a veteran of the federal government, knew his plan was 
certain to irritate CIA, FBI, and the Department of State in one fell swoop (Sheehan, 
2008; Miller, 2007).  
In 2003, ID established the International Liaison Unit (ILU) to partner 
with local police and intelligence agencies and respond when terrorist acts occur. ILU 
does not take part in investigatory activity. It tours crime scenes, takes photographs, and 
asks questions of police officials, and relays what it learns back to NYPD. Typically, 
NYPD shares what it learns with FBI and its law enforcement partners and in tear-line 
fashion (declassified) with NYPD Shield, a police-private security program with over 
6,000 members (Kelly, 2009a). ILU is subsidized by the New York City Police 
Foundation.7 R.P. Eddy (2008), executive director of the Center for Policing Terrorism, 
Manhattan Institute for Policy Research, made clear the need for such an endeavor: 
Looking at the intelligence picture through the reality of the homegrown 
threat, we need to shift our paradigm from believing we have to solve for 
simply how to get intelligence and training from DHS (or other Federal 
entities) to state and locals, and instead recognize most of the intelligence 
relevant to state and locals simply is not being collected federally. There 
are not huge buckets full of magic intelligence sitting in federal SCIFs 
[Sensitive Compartmentalized Information Facility]that will solve all the 
puzzles of big city police. 
                                                 
7 The New York City Police Foundation Incorporated is a nonprofit organization that was established 
in 1971 by business and civic leaders as an independent organization to promote excellence in the NYPD 
and to improve public safety in New York City (New York City Police Foundation, 2010).   
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c. Ethnographic and Linguistic Capabilities  
Cohen recognized that NYPD’s language and ethnographic capabilities 
would invigorate the department's intelligence enterprise. He leveraged the department’s 
foreign language programs and enlisted members of the service proficient in “critical 
languages.” The department identified over 700 certified linguists in 50-plus foreign 
languages, many of whom were foreign born. NYPD’s language and cultural capabilities 
facilitated the department’s intelligence initiatives, particularly the Cyber Intelligence 
Unit that visits the world of real and would-be terrorists. In effect, they are undercover 
cyber cops whose linguistic skills and cultural orientation enable them to penetrate 
heretofore exclusionary cyber-domains that are rife with real and would-be terrorists 
(Kelly, 2004; NYPD, 2005  and 2009a; Bloomberg, 2008).  
d. Fusion of Intelligence Analysts with Street-Smart Detectives  
ID created a unique platform for municipal policing—a cadre of 
intelligence analysts culled from IC, the military, foreign-policy think tanks, academia, 
recent Ivy League graduates—and teamed them up with street-smart detectives. Cohen 
said of the relationship: 
An analyst will tell you what's important about what you're doing. What 
are the subtleties? What should you be looking for in addition to what 
you've already found? And it's the combination of the two that is 
extraordinarily powerful. And the appetite comes with the eating. The 
more they work together, the more they want to work together. It's been an 
absolute wonder to watch (Dickey, 2009a). 
The analysts research local, national, and international matters and 
produce a range of highly sensitive intelligence reports; they also provide strategic and 
tactical support to the department’s law enforcement, intelligence, and counterterrorism 
operations.  
e. Legislative Initiatives  
NYPD’s intelligence program went largely unchecked until Handschu, et 
al. v. Special Service Division, et al. (1971) challenged the department’s surveillance and 
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investigative practices directed at political organizations. Handschu alleged that NYPD’s 
intelligence gathering practices—infiltration, electronic surveillance, dossier collection, 
and improper dissemination of collected information—infringed upon the plaintiff’s First 
Amendment rights. In 1985, NYPD assented to a court decree with the United States 
District Court for the Southern District of New York. The decree, the Handschu 
Guidelines, prohibited NYPD from investigating political organizations absent a criminal 
predicate. Moreover, the decree established the Handschu Authority, consisting of the 
First Deputy Commissioner, Deputy Commissioner of Legal Matters, and a civilian 
mayoral appointee to approve investigations of political organizations, the use of 
undercover officers in those investigations, and to review the records of investigations 
alleged to violate constitutionally guaranteed rights and privileges.  
In the aftermath of September 11, 2001, NYPD evaluated the impact of 
the Handschu Guidelines on the need to proactively investigate terrorism and concluded 
that “the prevention of future attacks requires the development of intelligence and the 
investigation of potential terrorist activity ‘before’ an unlawful act occurs” (NYPD, 
2004). In 2003, New York City made an application to the district court to modify the 
Handschu Guidelines and eliminate the restrictions imposed therein. Cohen argued that 
existing FBI guidelines provided sufficient constitutional protections and that:  
Given the range of activities that may be engaged in by members of a 
sleeper cell in the long period of preparation for an act of terror, the entire 
resources of the NYPD must be made available to conduct investigations 
into political activity and intelligence-related issues (Dwyer, 2007).  
U.S. District Court Judge Charles Haight, Jr. agreed and effectively 
removed the Handschu restrictions, affording NYPD greater latitude in its intelligence 
enterprise. Currently, NYPD operates under the Modified Handschu Guidelines, which 






Commissioner of Intelligence. The Handschu Authority retains its authority to review the 
records of investigations alleged to violate constitutionally guaranteed rights and 
privileges (NYPD, 2004).8  
f. Counterterrorism Bureau 
The Counterterrorism Bureau (CTB) is the primary local authority 
defending against terrorist attacks in New York City and was the first of its kind in the 
nation. CTB’s mission statement includes developing innovative, forward-looking 
policies and procedures against the threat of international and domestic terrorism in New 
York City. CTB compliments ID and parents the NYPD element of the New York–Joint 
Terrorism Task Force (NYC-JTTF), NYPD Shield, and other units. 
(1) New York Joint Terrorist Task Force. Commissioner Kelly 
knew NYPD could not duplicate the FBI’s infrastructure, financial and human resources, 
and national JTTF and intelligence network. He tasked Deputy Commissioner Libutti 
with “packing” NY-JTTF with NYPD detectives who would be under his supervision. 
Libutti used his influence and inside contacts to raise NYPD’s representation in NY-
JTTF from 16 to about 130. Moreover, Cohen had great contacts in CIA and was able to 
work out a “special relationship.” Kelly said of the operating picture:  
So we're getting it [intelligence] through the JTTF, we're getting it through 
other federal sources. So, were we in the loop? Yes. And when we weren't 
in the loop we complained. [He smiled.] And we had enough clout to stay 
in the loop (Dickey, 2009a).  
In 2003, Libutti was named Undersecretary for Information and 
Analysis at the Department of Homeland Security. Michael Sheehan was named as 
Libutti’s replacement. Sheehan is a prior Department of State (DoS) Coordinator of  
 
 
                                                 
8 Subsequent motions have been made by the plaintiff regarding the application of the Modified 
Handschu Guidelines particularly with regard to surveillance and videotaping protesters. Judge Haight has 
maintained the department’s right to monitor the activities of political groups absent a criminal predicate 
with the approval of the First Deputy Commissioner of Intelligence. Notwithstanding, NYPD has altered its 
procedures for surveillance and videotaping of protesters (NYPD, 2004).  
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Counterterrorism and U.S. Ambassador at Large for Counterterrorism (NYPD, 2003). 
The 9/11 Commission report recognized that Sheehan’s early and persistent warnings 
about the Taliban during his tenure at DoS had been largely unheeded.  
(2) Public-Private Liaison.  In 2005, Deputy Commissioner 
Sheehan informed Kelly about an FBI program called INFRAGUARD, a national effort 
designed to reach out to the private sector. Sheehan said the program had merit and that 
NYPD should take the department’s existing public-private initiatives and reshape them 
into an overarching counterterrorism program. NYPD established NYPD Shield, an 
umbrella program of department initiatives that promotes collaboration between the 
police and the private sector. It recognizes that since the 2001 attacks against the World 
Trade Center, other plots have been thwarted and that the city must maintain its guard. 
Shield actively solicits security and terrorism-related information from its private-sector 
partners and provides them with information and training specific to their industry and 
geographic needs. Shield emphasizes that this partnership is the cornerstone in defending 
the city and that the key to its success is a two-way flow of information (Sheehan, 2008, 
NYPD Shield, 2010).  
g. NYPD’s Meeting with FBI “Justified the Very Legitimacy of 
NYPD’s Independent Counterterrorism Operation” 
In 2006, a rift between the department and the FBI was reaching a head. 
NYPD’s intelligence endeavors did not endear the department to the FBI. The quarrel 
culminated in a meeting between Commissioner Kelly and FBI Director Robert Mueller 
at which NYPD was afforded an opportunity to explain its intelligence program. As a 
result, Mueller conceded that the FBI had things to learn from NYPD. Sheehan concludes 
that this remarkable concession “justified the very legitimacy of NYPD’s independent 
counterterrorism operation”(Sheehan, 2008).  
E. HYPOTHESIS 
This thesis hypothesizes that the evolution of an NYPD-intelligence-like 
paradigm for SLTLE would generate a national enterprise to effectively detect, deter, and 
mitigate terrorism and crime in the United States.  
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The National Intelligence Estimate: The Terrorist Threat to the US Homeland 
concludes that: 
The US Homeland will face a persistent and evolving terrorist threat over 
the next three years. The main threat comes from Islamic terrorist groups 
and cells, especially al-Qa’ida, driven by their undiminished intent to 
attack the Homeland and a continued effort by the terrorist groups to adapt 
and improve their capabilities (Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence, 2007). 
Moreover, ODNI’s Annual Treat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community 
for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (2010) “judged” that “al-Qa’ida 
maintains its intent to attack the Homeland—preferably with a large scale operation that 
would cause mass casualties, harm the US economy, or both.”  
The current asymmetric threat requires a synergistic national effort that 
recognizes that hometown and homeland security are inextricably linked. In order to 
prevent, detect, and mitigate terrorist attacks, federal, state, local, and tribal governments 
must recognize each other’s perspective and roles, and acknowledge each is a partner 
with value to add. To that end, this thesis will explore how the events of September 11, 
2001, engendered new roles for SLTLE. It will analyze divergent policy options for 
SLTLE intelligence with the purpose of recommending an adoption of NYPD’s 
intelligence program, scaled and tailored to the realities and needs of the organization as 
the preferred policy option for SLTLE agencies. The thesis will analyze how NYPD’s 
intelligence enterprise evolved and how NYPD implemented its processes into the 
department’s architecture to secure New York City. It will explore how SLTLE agencies 
might adopt tenets of NYPD’s intelligence program, scaled and tailored to the needs of 
their agency to secure their hometowns and the homeland.  
F. METHODOLOGY 
1. Analysis of the Evolution of Policing and Intelligence in the United 
States 
The thesis will analyze the evolution of policing and intelligence in the United 
States and will examine how historical events acted as catalysts for the transformation of 
both policing and intelligence, in particular SLTLE intelligence. 
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2. Case Study of NYPD’s Intelligence Program 
A case study of NYPD’s intelligence program will examine how NYPD’s 
organizational structure was redesigned to counter the threats imposed by the events of 
September 11, 2001. It will offer NYPD’s intelligence enterprise as a “smart practice” 
that SLTLE agencies might tailor to the unique characteristics of their organization in 
order to acquire intelligence for their hometown and the nation’s homeland security.  
3. Analysis of CompStat  
The thesis will analyze NYPD’s CompStat program: how it evolved, reduced 
crime in epic proportions, and facilitated the post-September 11, 2001, NYPD 
intelligence enterprise. CompStat is a management program that identifies problems and 
measures the results of its problem-solving activities. It is a process that considers an 
organization holistically and accentuates accountability at all levels. In essence, it is a 
crime-control strategy that emphasizes accurate and timely intelligence, rapid 
deployment, effective tactics, and relentless follow-up and assessment (Bratton, 1996; 
NYPD, 1998, Maple & Mitchell, 1999). The analysis will demonstrate that a lack of 
information-sharing, cooperation, collaboration, communication, and accountability 
limited the effectiveness of pre-CompStat NYPD.  
NYPD adjusted its overarching strategy, reconfigured its organizational structure, 
developed lateral processes to support that structure, established metrics that supported 
the strategy, and empowered its workforce to reduce crime and enhance the quality of life 
in New York City. The thesis will consider how crime reduction facilitated NYPD’s 
transfer of personnel from conventional law enforcement assignments to counterterrorism 
and intelligence units. Moreover, it will demonstrate how NYPD’s traditional crime 
prevention and community engagement bolstered the department’s post–September 11, 
2001, intelligence enterprise.  
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4. Exploration of CompStat Diffusion as a Model for NYPD-Intelligence 
Diffusion 
Diffusion is a process by which an innovation spreads. The thesis will explore 
how, as in the case of CompStat, the tenets of NYPD’s intelligence enterprise might 
diffuse and be adopted by SLTLE agencies in the context of their particular needs. In 
1994, NYPD implemented CompStat (NYPD, 1998). Thereafter, the principles and 
practices of CompStat were diffused widely and rapidly to local police departments and 
later to other public service organizations and have been proposed as a counterterrorism 
strategy.  
NYPD is the nation’s largest, and by any means the most exceptional, police 
department (Silverman, 1999; Henry 2003, Willis, Mastrofski, & Weisburd, 2003). This 
thesis assumes that NYPD, and particularly NYPD’s intelligence enterprise, are unique 
and nearly incomparable to any other SLTLE agency. New York City is also a unique 
place that is arguably without comparison. It has been heralded as a leading global city 
that exerts influence over worldwide commerce, finance, international affairs, culture, 
fashion, and entertainment (Sassen, 2001). Moreover, much has been said to the effect 
that what is done in New York City is so uniquely tempered to the city, that what works 
in that city might not work anywhere else. Notwithstanding, New York City is an 
extraordinary place whose practices have spread.  
G. METRICS  
Every organization has a different definition of success. Metrics identify measures 
for enterprise, business unit, team, and individual performance. They serve to clarify the 
vague terms used in vision statements that appeal to our emotions, pride, and sense of 
belonging, turning them into concrete directives that appeal to our needs for measurable 
accomplishment and progress (Galbraith, Downey, & Kates, 2002).  
Intelligence metrics are elusive because the goal of counterterrorism is “nothing,” 
no attack. Intelligence processes lend themselves to inductive qualitative research that 
explores particular instances and occurrences in order to draw conclusions about the 
entire enterprise. Qualitative researchers concern themselves with general questions about 
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phenomena they are studying. They do not, however, limit themselves to loosely defined 
research problems. Rather, as qualitative researchers gain understanding of the 
phenomena under investigation, they become increasingly able to ask “specific questions 
and formulate specific hypotheses” (Leedy & Ormrod, 2005).  
To that point, the thesis examines select foiled terrorist plots in New York since 
September 11, 2001, vis-à-vis the counterterrorism and intelligence efforts of NYPD—
not as empirical evidence of a successful intelligence program, but rather to provide 
insight and facilitate qualitative analysis and evaluation of NYPD’s intelligence 
enterprise.  
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II. THE ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION OF POLICING IN 
AMERICA 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Vincent E. Henry (2003) observes that treatises on policing and police 
management often refer to the notion of a police culture whose values, rituals, and 
behaviors communicate information and shape the behavior of its members. Moreover, in 
terms of understanding organizational change, those treatises characterize the police 
culture as a singular and static entity that remains constant and inflexible. Henry 
concludes that the opposite is true: “The [police] culture exists in a constant state of 
evolution as it responds to innumerable forces and factors within the agency as well as 
outside it.” 
The events of September 11, 2001, revolutionized American policing and 
particularly the national intelligence role of SLTLE agencies. American policing is the 
cumulative product of historical forces that periodically redefined the policing enterprise. 
The emergent intelligence role of SLTLE agencies is best understood in the context of the 
evolution of SLTLE agencies and their transformative role in American society. To that 
end, this chapter delineates the genesis and evolution of American policing.  
B. GENESIS OF AMERICAN POLICING 
Local governments provided the first police services in colonial America and 
mostly followed the English system. The sheriff apprehended criminals, served 
subpoenas, and collected taxes. Collecting taxes was his primary concern, and law 
enforcement was a low priority. Large cities typically had constables and a night watch 
who reported fires, maintained street lamps, effected arrests, eliminated health hazards, 
and walked the rounds. The activities of the night watch and constable were mostly 
reactive in nature. Rather than acting proactively to prevent crime, they simply responded 
to reports of crime and other innocuous behavior. 
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Sir Robert Peel, former prime minister (1834–35 and 1841–46) and home 
secretary of the United Kingdom, is known as the father of modern policing. Peel 
maintained that “the basic mission for which the police exist is to prevent crime and 
disorder” (Jones, 2004). His seminal Principles of Policing first prescribed what is now 
considered to be the preeminent form of policing in America, community-oriented 
policing: 
The Police, at all times, should maintain a relationship with the public that 
gives reality to the historic tradition that the police are the public and the 
public are the police; the police being only members of the public who are 
paid to give full-time attention to duties which are incumbent upon every 
citizen in the interest of community welfare and existence. (Jones, 2004)  
The Metropolitan Police Service of London (MPS), the first full-time uniformed 
police force, was established in 1829. Peel, then home secretary of Britain, is credited 
with its early development and especially its centralized military orientation and 
emphasis on prevention. NYPD, established in 1845, was the first full-time police force 
in the United States and, like most police forces in America, followed the MPS model. 
Notwithstanding, American policing from its inception varied from the MPS model in 
one critical area; in accord with American governance (i.e., federalism), American 
policing was and is decentralized. Currently, there are 17,876 local, state, and tribal 
police agencies in the United States (DOJ, 2004). That number illustrates the 
decentralized nature of American policing and is a definitive factor in the current state of 
policing in America. 
C. POLITICAL ERA OF POLICING 
In what became known as the political era of policing, police assumed their 
authorization and resources from local political leaders, who freely wielded political 
patronage. Consequently, the police became an extension of different political factions, 
rather than an extension of city government. Society recognized the need for a police 
force but was unable to define its role. Police departments were as likely to be involved 
in social services—soup kitchens, immigration services, and welfare—as they would be  
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in crime prevention and order maintenance. While police departments were ostensibly 
centrally organized, primitive communications and transportation caused even the most 
centrally organized organizations to devolve into small-scale departments.  
Police officers were typically recruited and selected by political leaders who used 
them as an extension of their power. That selection typically reflected the racial and 
ethnic composition of the neighborhood and invariably led to greater insularity and 
discrimination against outsiders. The strategy integrated police into neighborhoods where 
they were generally supported by the citizens. It was believed that the system prevented 
crimes or solved crimes when they occurred and helped to contain riots. However, 
intimacy with community and political leaders and a decentralized organizational 
structure with its inability to provide supervision of officers gave rise to police corruption 
(Kelling & Moore, 1988).  
D. REFORM ERA OF POLICING 
1. Politics Was Rejected as the Basis of Police Legitimacy, and Law Was 
Established as the Principal Basis of Police Authority 
The corruption, brutality, and ties to political machines of the political era of 
policing led to calls for change. The late nineteenth century saw a series of reform 
initiatives that triggered the reform era of policing. Politics was rejected as the basis of 
police legitimacy, and law was established as the principal basis of police authority. 
Police were viewed as law enforcers who used little or no discretion. Activities that drew 
the police into solving other kinds of community problems were identified as social work. 
Significantly, the 1967 President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration 
of Justice ratified this orientation and reconceptualized the police as part of the newly 
identified criminal justice system. The larger social role that the police had was 
supplanted by the criminal justice system; the job of the police was to arrest criminals 
and to present them to the system for processing (Kelling & Moore, 1988).  
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2. Systematic Management and Technology  
Political reformers were greatly influenced by Frederick W. Taylor’s The 
Principles of Scientific Management (1911) that maintained that ordinary men properly 
organized so as to efficiently cooperate under systematic management would remedy 
inefficiency. Taylor held that the best management is a true science, resting upon clearly 
defined laws, rules, and principles as a foundation. Moreover, the fundamental principles 
of scientific management are applicable to all kinds of human activities.  
Technology played a large role in the reform era: radio and telephone 
communications and the widespread use of the automobile facilitated centralized 
dispatch, mobile response, and ultimately the reach of the police. IACP recognized the 
potential value in tracking national crime statistics and developed what would become the 
FBI’s Unified Crime Report (UCR). UCR is a nationwide crime reporting system that 
collects offense information for Part 1 crimes 9 and is the primary measurement of crime 
in the United States of America (Kelling & Coles, 1997).  
3. The Myth That the Primary Activity of the Police Is Law 
Enforcement Simply Proved to Be Too Far from Reality to Sustain 
The reform strategy was to a degree successful; it integrated its strategic elements 
into a coherent paradigm. If police did not attend to other problems and could focus their 
efforts on prevention of crime, their effectiveness could be improved. The strategy was 
impartial and minimized the discretionary excesses that characterized the political era. 
The same reforms that offered police efficacy, however, alienated the citizenry and would 
prove incapable of adapting to a rapidly changing world. The cumulative effect of four 
factors resulted in a collapse in police efficiency: 1) crime rose exponentially during the 
1960s and 1970s; 2) fear rose rapidly and its nexus to crime was not fully realized; 3) the 
civil rights and anti-war movements challenged the legitimacy of the police; 4) the myth 
that the primary activity of the police is law enforcement simply proved to be too far 
from reality to sustain (Kelling & Moore, 1988).  
                                                 
9 Part 1 crimes are murder and nonnegligent manslaughter, forcible rape, aggravated assault, burglary, 
larceny-theft, motor vehicle theft, and arson.  
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E. COMMUNITY POLICING ERA 
1. Community Policing 
Community policing (CP) is the aggregate product of reform efforts that sought to 
integrate the efficacy of the reform era of policing with the engagement of the community 
that typified the political era of policing. Currently, CP is considered the dominant form 
of policing in America. The Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Police 
Service (2009a) defines community policing as:  
A philosophy that promotes organizational strategies, which support the 
systematic use of partnerships and problem-solving techniques, to 
proactively address the immediate conditions that give rise to public safety 
issues such as crime, social disorder, and fear of crime. 
Community policing recognizes that police rarely can solve public safety 
problems alone and encourages interactive partnerships with relevant stakeholders: 
public, other government agencies, legislative bodies, prosecutors, probation and parole, 
public works departments, neighboring law enforcement agencies, health and human 
services, child support services, ordinance enforcement, and schools, community member 
groups, nonprofits, private businesses, and media.  
2. Foot Patrol and Broken Windows 
Community policing might be rooted in the popularity and effectiveness of foot 
patrol. James Q. Wilson and George L. Kelling’s seminal “Broken Windows” (1982) 
observed that, while fear of crime is very real, fear of disreputable, obstreperous, or 
unpredictable people—panhandlers, drunks, addicts, rowdy teenagers, prostitutes, 
loiterers, and the mentally disturbed—is more pervasive.  
Foot patrols established a sense of public order. Research suggested that while 
foot patrol had little or no effect on crime, it reduced fear, increased citizen satisfaction 
with police, improved police attitudes towards citizens, and increased the morale and job 
satisfaction of police. Moreover, foot patrol put patrol officers in a unique position to 
access information that might otherwise be unavailable. That information could be used  
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by the police to significantly increase their effect on crime. Police discovered that citizens 
appreciated police concern and also provided useful information, often about problems 
that the police were not aware of (Kelling & Moore, 1988). 
Wilson and Kelling concede that foot-patrol-induced “order” might have little to 
do with fear of violent crime. Notwithstanding, research found that people “assign a high 
value to public order, and feel relieved and reassured when the police help them maintain 
that order.” They conclude that “disorder and crime are usually inextricably linked, in a 
kind of development sequence.” Wilson and Kelling’s unrepaired broken window theory 
concludes that a community will fall into disorder if order is not maintained; an 
unrepaired window in a building leaves a passerby with the impression that no one cares 
and that breaking other windows in the building might be acceptable and even fun. 
Similarly, untended behavior and disorder might be construed as an invitation to crime. 
Whether or not the invitation is accepted and crime flourishes, residents will think that 
crime is on the rise and will modify their behavior as though crime were on the rise. As a 
result, the area “is vulnerable to crime.” Wilson and Kelling conclude that crime control 
begins at the bottom with the seemingly innocuous and victimless elements of societal 
behavior.  
3. Problem-Oriented Policing 
Herman Goldstein’s “Improving Policing: A Problem Oriented Approach” (1979) 
introduced problem-oriented policing (POP). POP calls for the police to take greater 
initiative to deal with problems rather than resigning themselves to living with them and 
their attendant challenges. Goldstein found that the police were particularly susceptible to 
the means-over-ends syndrome. They placed more emphasis on their improvement efforts 
than on the substantive outcome of their work. Goldstein raised the question, What is the 
end product of policing? He aptly concluded that this is no easy task given the 
“conglomeration of unrelated, ill-defined, and often inseparable jobs that the police are 
expected to handle and a belief that the primary job of the police is law enforcement. 




substantive definition existed. He found that policing requires that the police deal with a 
wide range of behavioral and social problems that arise in a community and that the end 
product of policing consists of dealing with these problems.  
Goldstein concluded that problems are the essence of police work and are the 
reason for having police agencies. He defined problems as “the incredibly broad range of 
troublesome situations that prompt citizens to turn to the police, such as street robberies, 
residential burglaries, battered wives, vandalism, speeding cars, runaway children, 
accidents, acts of terrorism, even fear.” Goldstein proposed a systematic process for 
inquiring and resolving problems. The focus of that approach called for resolving 
problems, rather than living with them. It would require police expertise, a partnership 
with the community, and public agencies. Goldstein concluded that these efforts improve 
community relations and police morale.  
F. HOMELAND SECURITY POLICING AND INTELLIGENCE LED 
POLICING 
Homeland security policing is an evolution of CP. The events of September 11, 
2001, set in motion the homeland security era and a fundamental shift in American 
policing. In addition to their core crime-prevention role, SLTLE agencies assumed a 
prominent role in the nation’s homeland security. Police officers embedded in the 
community are the first line of defense against crime. They invariably know what is 
wrong with a given setting by knowing what is right. The same phenomenon holds for 
members of the community; anything out of the ordinary is suspect and warrants further 
observation and inquiry. CP initiatives nationwide nurture a relationship with the 
community to identify and report unusual or suspect circumstances and in effect reduce 
crime and raise the quality of life in our communities.  
Homeland security policing is predicated on that same relationship. However, in 
the context of terrorism, knowing what is right within a given setting is not as simple. 
Many terrorists live seemingly unremarkable lives, and predictors are not readily 
identifiable. The counterterrorism taxonomy prescribes a new criterion of seemingly 
innocuous behaviors and conditions that are suspect. Knowing what those behaviors and 
conditions are requires an appreciation of the threat, training, and an unprecedented spirit 
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of cooperation. Homeland security policing moves the police from defense to preempt the 
attack rather than just arresting the perpetrators afterward (Silber & Bhatt, 2009). 
Moreover, homeland security policing is premised on an understanding that 
terrorism is inherently criminal in nature and that intelligence and information sharing 
might prevent an attack. To that end, a new policing strategy, intelligence-led policing 
(ILP) is evolving in the U.S.10 ILP is predicated on the idea that effective intelligence 
operations can be applied equally well to terrorist threats and crimes in the community 
(Peterson, 2005). It integrates elements of CP and POP into the criminal intelligence 
process. ILP is an emerging component of homeland security policing and will be 
discussed in greater detail in Chapter III. 
                                                 
10 Intelligence-led policing originated in the United Kingdom. The 1993 Audits Commission and the 
1997 Her Majesty’s Inspector of Constabulary Report found that the police were spending too much time 
responding to crime and too little time targeting offenders. The reports advocated increased use of 
intelligence, surveillance, and informants to target recidivist offenders so that police could be used more 
effectively in fighting crime (Ratcliffe, 2008). 
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III. INTELLIGENCE  
A. NYPD INTELLIGENCE 
1. The Role of SLTLE in the National Intelligence 
Sun Tzu (403-221 B.C.E./1993) concludes that battle conditions are complex 
systems that are rich in information. The commander’s wisdom must be supported by 
direct access to persons who serve him as eyes on the site-specific conditions and who 
enable him to anticipate the outcome; “to be reliable, information must be first hand.” 
Prior to the events of September 11, 2001, SLTLE intelligence was typically limited to 
criminal intelligence, and the national intelligence was the purview of the federal 
government. The events of September 11, 2001 convinced policy makers at all levels of 
government that SLTLE is a vital element of the national intelligence. 
2. The Role of NYPD in New York City’s Hometown and the National 
Intelligence 
The events of September 11, 2001 impressed upon NYPD that the same 
intelligence that provides for the security of the homeland is essential for the security of 
the city. NYPD’s intelligence enterprise challenged the conception of SLTLE 
intelligence. It is best understood as a post-September 11, 2001 evolution of SLTLE 
intelligence that assumed the challenges of homeland security. NYPD cooperated, 
coordinated, and collaborated with IC, the homeland security intelligence community, 
and public-private partnerships on its own terms and concurrently maintained an 
independent intelligence apparatus to acquire its intelligence. NYPD intelligence is 
information that is comprehensive and relevant to the police commissioner and includes 
elements of the national intelligence with implications for New York City, a global cop-
to-cop relationship with other police agencies, and criminal intelligence. To comprehend 
NYPD’s intelligence enterprise it is necessary to characterize the meaning and processes 
of intelligence and particularly how variant categories of intelligence constitute NYPD’s 
intelligence. 
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B. WHY INTELLIGENCE?  
The 9/11 Commission Report (2004) describes the events of September 11, 2001 
as a day of “unprecedented shock and suffering,” concluding that “the nation was 
unprepared.” The report raises the questions of how this happened how we can avoid 
such tragedy again. It identified “watch listing,” “information sharing,” and “connecting 
the dots” as narrow symptoms of a disease. It concluded that, in each of its examined 
cases, no one was able to draw relevant information from anywhere in the government 
and that this amounted to “lost opportunities.” The 9/11 Commission reviewed 2.5 
million pages of documents, interviewed 1,200 persons in 10 countries, held 19 days of 
hearings, and took public testimony from 160 witnesses. Those endeavors produced 
information, from which the commission identified lessons learned: 
1. [There exists] an enemy who is sophisticated, patient, disciplined, and 
lethal [that] rallies broad support in the Arab and Muslim world by 
demanding redress of political grievances, but its hostility toward us and 
our values is limitless. Its purpose is to rid the world of religious and 
political pluralism, the plebiscite, and equal rights for women. It makes no 
distinction between military and civilian targets. Collateral damage is not 
in the [enemy’s] lexicon. 
2. The institutions charged with protecting our borders, civil aviation, and 
national security did not understand how grave this threat could be, and 
did not adjust their policies, plans, and practices to deter or defeat it.  
3. [There exist] fault lines within our government between foreign and 
domestic intelligence, and between and within agencies.  
4. [There exist] pervasive problems of managing and sharing information 
across a large and unwieldy government that had been built in a different 
era to confront different dangers.  
The information in the report’s 567 pages is an account of what is known of the 
events and circumstances of September 11, 2001. Conventional wisdom concludes that 
knowledge, and in the best circumstance foreknowledge, facilitates prevention or 
mitigation of that which one does not want to happen. 
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C. WHAT IS INTELLIGENCE? 
Information and intelligence are seemingly simple terms that are often mistakenly 
used interchangeably. The adage “information is power” is self-evident: information 
facilitates human endeavor. Mark M. Lowenthal (2009) maintains that information is 
“anything that can be known, regardless of how it is discovered.” Intelligence refers to 
“information that meets the stated or understood needs of policy makers and has been 
collected, processed, and narrowed to meet those needs.” Succinctly, all intelligence is 
information; not all information is intelligence. 
Intelligence is a complex concept that affords situational awareness, insight, and 
strategic advantage. It is typically tempered by happenstance and the vicissitudes of 
humanity. Sun Tzu counsels the war fighter to understand circumstances as the 
consequence of a dynamic process of organically related, mutually determining 
conditions that are correlative and interdependent. He admonishes the wise commander to 
maintain reliable and timely chih or foreknowledge. Carl Von Clausewitz (1832/1993) 
characterizes intelligence as “every sort of information about the enemy and his country.” 
He maintained that “the general unreliability of all information presents a special problem 
in war: all action takes place so to speak, in a kind of twilight, which like fog or 
moonlight, often tends to make things seem grotesque and larger than they really are.” 
Clausewitz’s “fog of war” metaphor is often used to demonstrate the ambiguity of 
information and its relevance to the battlefield. Intelligence is best understood in the 
context of that metaphor and an appreciation of the intelligence cycle or process.  
D. THE INTELLIGENCE CYCLE 
The traditional intelligence cycle (Figure 1) is an iterative process consisting of 
five steps: planning and direction, collection, processing, analysis and production, and 
dissemination.  
Planning and direction involves the management and identification of 
intelligence requirements. Collection is the gathering of raw data to meet intelligence 
requirements. Processing refers to the conversion of raw data into a format that an  
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analyst can use. Analysis and production describes the process of evaluating data for 
reliability, validity, and integration into a meaningful whole. Dissemination is presenting 
the product to the intended audience.  
However, the depiction of the intelligence cycle is not entirely accurate. While it 
provides a means for helping managers and analysts deliver a reliable product, it assumes 
that the steps will proceed in the prescribed order and that the process will repeat itself 
continuously; it does not address elements that may influence the movement of the cycle, 
positively or negatively. It is assumed that the intelligence cycle provides a means for 
managers and analysts to systematically examine the elements of the process and their 
relationships (Johnson & Johnson, 2005). 
Lowenthal notes that most discussions of the intelligence process end with 
dissemination. He concludes that two essential phases remain: consumption and 
feedback. Policy makers are not blank slates or automatons that are compelled compelled 
to consume intelligence. Instead, the policy maker decides whether or not to act in 
accordance with the intelligence. Lowenthal notes that the intelligence community rarely 
receives feedback from the policy community. He concludes that the policy maker’s use 
of the intelligence should be conveyed to the provider to make appropriate adjustments 
and improvements and that the failure to provide feedback is analogous to the policy 
maker's inability or refusal to define requirements. 
Lowenthal’s intelligence cycle (Figure 2) is a multilayered process that 
demonstrates how in any one intelligence process, complexities arise: the need for more 
collection, uncertainties in processing, results of analysis, and changing requirements. 
These instances cause second and third intelligence processes. The intelligence process is 














Figure 1.   The Traditional Intelligence 
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Figure 2.   The Intelligence Cycle: Multilayered 
E. NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE  
American intelligence predates the nation’s independence when committees of 
correspondence shared information and intelligence to sever the colonies from English 
dominion. American government was built upon the principles of democracy, the 
Enlightenment, and an aversion to autocratic and intrusive governance. Through much of 
its history, the United States saw little need for a peacetime intelligence enterprise and 
relegated intelligence on an ad hoc basis to the military and various government agencies. 
However, the advent of World War II dismissed the notion that two oceans and two 
friendly borders would provide the nation’s security and served as the impetus for a 
national intelligence program. During World War II, the newly created Office of 
Strategic Services, military intelligence, and certain government agencies operated as a 
de facto intelligence community.  
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In 1947, the National Security Act created a structure for the U.S. intelligence 
community (IC) and created the nation’s first peace time intelligence agency, the Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the National Security Council to coordinate national 
security in the executive branch. IC was designed to meet the challenges of the Cold War 
and especially the Soviet threat. It remained largely unchanged for 57 years. 
The 9/11 Commission found that IC was trapped in a Cold War milieu. It 
concluded that one of the largest challenges in preventing terrorism was traversing the 
foreign-domestic divide and recommended transformative change. To that end, the 
Intelligence Reform and Terrorist Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA) created the Office of 
the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) to oversee IC11 and redefined national 
intelligence to include foreign intelligence, domestic intelligence, and homeland security 
intelligence (HSINT). IRTPA defined the national intelligence as: 
All intelligence, regardless of the source from which derived and 
including information gathered within or outside the United States, that—
(A) pertains, as determined consistent with any guidance issued by the 
President, to more than one United States Government agency; and (B) 
that involves—(i) the development, proliferation, or use of weapons of 
mass destruction; (ii) threats to the United States, its people, property or 
interest; or (iii) any other matter bearing on the United States national or 
homeland security.  
In government, and particularly in intelligence, we assent to a certain amount of 
ambiguity. National intelligence as a holistic enterprise seemingly affords latitude for 
elements of IC and homeland security intelligence community to singularly and 
collectively provide intelligence to secure our homeland and respective hometowns. 
Notwithstanding, national intelligence is an ideal that has not been realized and this is 
particularly the case with respect to SLTLE agencies. To understand the national  
 
 
                                                 
11 IC is a sixteen-member community that works within its specific mission as well as in an integrated 
fashion. IC currently includes Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence, Air Force Intelligence, Army 
Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, Coast Guard Intelligence, Defense Intelligence Agency, 
Department of Energy, Department of Homeland Security, Department of State, and Department of the 
Treasury, Drug Enforcement Administration, FBI, Marine Corps Intelligence, National Geospatial 
Intelligence Agency, and Navy Intelligence.  
 40
intelligence as an enterprise and the roles of SLTLE agencies therein, it is necessary to 
identify the singular elements of the national intelligence and particularly how they 
impact hometown and homeland security.  
1. Foreign Intelligence 
The National Security Act of 1947, as amended by IRTPA, defines foreign 
intelligence and its defensive counterpart—counterintelligence—respectively as:  
Means relating to the capabilities, intentions, or activities of foreign 
government or elements thereof, foreign organizations, or foreign persons, 
or international terrorist activities. 
Information gathered and activities conducted to protect against 
espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations 
conducted by or on behalf of foreign governments or elements thereof, or 
foreign persons, or international terrorist activities. 
The National Security Act was enacted in the wake of World War II and the 
abuses of Gestapo-like intelligence services and a concern for American civil liberties. 
Foreign intelligence would be the purview of the CIA, and domestic intelligence would 
be the realm of the FBI. In spite of this, certain elements of foreign and domestic 
intelligence intrinsically fuse. To those ends, CIA would be granted limited domestic 
operational authority. Moreover, the scope of FBI’s mission, and particularly its 
extraterritorial jurisdiction, affords the FBI a qualified foreign intelligence capability.  
2. Domestic Intelligence  
Domestic intelligence is a nebulous term that connotes spying on one’s own 
citizens. It raises the issues of privacy, civil liberties, and other public concerns. 
However, internal security threats (i.e., subversion, espionage, and terrorism) require that 
all nations maintain a domestic-intelligence capability. To that end, agencies of the 
federal, state, and local governments routinely and exceptionally collect and assess 
information about people residing in and visiting the United States. The events of 
September 11, 2001 and the resultant homeland security era are a clarion call for 
increased intelligence, particularly domestic intelligence. It is an emerging enterprise that  
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warrants grave consideration, cautious implementation, and mechanisms that ensure civil 
rights, due process, and justice. Significantly, there is no consensus on what constitutes 
domestic intelligence.  
Jackson et al., (2009) define domestic intelligence as: 
Efforts by government organizations to gather, assess, and act on 
information about individuals in the United States or U.S. persons 
elsewhere that is not necessarily related to the investigation of a known 
past or criminal act of specific criminal activity. 
Jackson et al. note that intelligence has been integrated into domestic law 
enforcement and public safety agencies as part of the phrase “intelligence-led policing” 
(ILP). Notwithstanding, ILP is typically limited to information gathering and analysis for 
crime prevention and response activities. 
Jackson et al. conclude that the major difference between intelligence approaches 
and law enforcement is that the former is more investigatory in nature, with an emphasis 
on preventing future events, while the latter is less constrained by legal requirements and 
is more exploratory in nature. Moreover, intelligence operations proactively seek to (1) 
identify individuals or groups that might be planning violent actions, and (2) to gather 
information that might indicate changes in the nature of the threat to the country more 
broadly.  
Stephen Marrin (2003) maintains that domestic intelligence entails the 
“acquisition of information from domestic sources to protect domestic or homeland 
security.” He argues that the study of foreign intelligence can be applied to domestic 
intelligence to provide insight into how the federal government’s new domestic 
intelligence will likely increase. Marrin presumes that the roles and missions of domestic 
intelligence will likely increase for two distinct reasons:  
a. The purpose of foreign intelligence is to acquire information necessary to apply 
governmental power with greater precision; as the need for application of government 
power increases, so does the need for intelligence. Likewise, domestic intelligence 
agencies and programs will apply government power to counter domestic threats. As 
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threats, and particularly those threats enabled by advanced technological capabilities rise, 
the need for domestic intelligence will increase correspondingly. 
b. The scope of foreign intelligence missions expanded from national security 
concerns to foreign policy support. Similarly, domestic intelligence capabilities created 
for homeland security purposes will expand to support generic law enforcement. 
Marrin concludes that the threat to civil liberties can be countered through the 
incorporation of overlapping procedural guidelines and oversight mechanisms.  
3. Homeland Security Intelligence  
Homeland security intelligence (HSINT) is an amorphous concept and is not 
statutorily defined. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 defined homeland security 
information as:  
Any information possessed by federal, state, or local agency that (a) 
relates to the threat of terrorist activity (b) relates to the ability to prevent, 
interdict, or disrupt terrorist activity (c) would improve the identification 
or investigation of a suspected terrorist or terrorist organization (d) would 
improve the response to a terrorist act. 
Charles Allen (2005), former Undersecretary of Intelligence and Analysis at DHS, 
characterized HSINT as “a blend of traditional and non-traditional intelligence that 
produces unique and actionable insights, takes its place alongside the other kinds of 
intelligence as an indispensable tool for securing the nation.”  
David L. Carter (2009) maintains that HSINT integrates the order maintenance 
function of law enforcement with an all-hazards approach to threats within an emerging 
homeland security framework. He notes the emergence of a broad range of activities that 
could be encompassed by HSINT, in particular the Fire Service Intelligence Enterprise 
and Public Health Medical Intelligence. Carter concludes that, while there are gray areas 
within this framework, the key factor is for state and local police agencies to focus on 
threats posed by hazards that have implications for responsibilities for public safety and 
order maintenance. He defines HSINT as: 
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Collection and analysis of information concerned with noncriminal 
domestic threats to critical infrastructure, community health, and public 
safety, for the purposes of preventing the threat of or mitigating the effects 
of the threat.  
Carter recognizes that HSINT presents many challenges because it is not purely 
criminal, yet addresses responsibilities that law enforcement agencies have to manage in 
their communities.  
Marc A. Randol (2009b) cites former Director of National Intelligence John 
Negroponte’s conclusion that even if there is one unified intelligence discipline, there are 
three different dimensions of intelligence—foreign, military, and domestic. He argues 
that under this school of thought, HSINT could become another dimension of intelligence 
that is distinct in some manner, yet overlaps with the aforementioned dimensions. In the 
diagram below, Randol offers the domestic intelligence dimension, “under a broad 
understanding of the term,” as including the role SLTLE and the private-sector entities 
play in collecting, analyzing, and disseminating information and intelligence within their 
respective areas of jurisdiction or industries. 
 
 
Figure 3.   Homeland Security Intelligence (Source: Randol, 2009) 
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DHS (2006) asserts that its intelligence-and-information-sharing activities provide 
valuable, actionable intelligence and intelligence-related information for and among the 
national leadership, all components of DHS, its federal partners, state, local, territorial, 
tribal, and private sector customers. DHS ensures that information is gathered from all 
relevant DHS field operations and is fused with information from other members of IC to 
produce accurate, timely, and actionable intelligence products. DHS (2009) notes the 
establishment of the Homeland Security Intelligence Support Team to ensure that 
frontline personnel receive timely and relevant intelligence. Moroever, DHS’s Office of 
Intelligence and Analysis developed the Homeland Security State and Local Community 
of Interest which allows intelligence analysts across the country to share sensitive 
homeland security intelligence information and analysis on a daily basis. 
FBI (2008) incorporates Executive Order 12333, U.S. Intelligence Activities Part 
1 Goals, Directions, Duties, and Responsibilities with respect to United States 
intelligence efforts:12 
The United States intelligence effort shall provide the President, the 
National Security Council, and the Homeland Security Council with the 
necessary information on which to base decisions concerning the 
development of foreign, defense, and economic policies, and the 
protection of United States national interests from foreign security threats. 
All departments and agencies shall cooperate fully to fulfill this goal. 
Moreover, IC, “consistent with applicable Federal law and with the other 
provisions of this order, and under the leadership of the Director, as specified in such law 
and this order shall … take into account State, local and tribal governments and, as 
appropriate, private sector entities information needs relating to national and homeland 
security.”  
                                                 
12 Executive Orders 12333, United States Intelligence Activities, December 3, 1981, as amended by 
Executive Orders 13284 (2003), 13355 (2004), and 13470 (2008). 
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F. CRIMINAL INTELLIGENCE 
The National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan (DOJ, 2005) cites a speech of 
former President George W. Bush, in which he said:  
All across our country we'll be able to tie our terrorist information to local 
information banks so that the front line of defeating terror becomes 
activated and real, and those are the local law enforcement officials. We 
expect them to be part of our effort; we must give them the tools necessary 
so they can do their job.  
The plan recognizes the inherent nexus of crime to terrorism and presumes that a 
coordinated collection, analysis, and appropriate dissemination of criminal intelligence 
information across the United States will make our nation safer. It notes that this effort 
requires an understanding of the phrase criminal intelligence and characterizes it as the 
“combination of credible information with quality analysis information that has been 
evaluated and used to draw conclusions.” Moreover, criminal intelligence results from 
the intelligence process involving planning and direction, information collection, 
processing/collation, analysis, dissemination, and significantly, reevaluation of 





Figure 4.   The Criminal Intelligence Cycle (Source: The National Criminal Intelligence 
Sharing Plan) 
The criminal intelligence cycle mirrors the overarching dimensions of the 
traditional intelligence cycle and Lownethal’s multilayered processes. Carter (2009) uses 
the term law enforcement intelligence synonymously with criminal intelligence and 
defines it as “the product of an analytic process that provides an integrated perspective to 
disparate information about crime, crime trends, crime and security threats, and 
conditions associated with criminality.” He cites a confidential interview of an FBI 
Directorate of Intelligence official who said: 
In the law enforcement/national security business, [intelligence] is 
information about those who would do us harm in the form of terrorist acts 
or other crimes, be they property or violent crime. … [The FBI Directorate 
of Intelligence] produces “raw” (or equivalent intelligence) and “finished” 
intelligence products (those that report intelligence that has had some 
degree of analysis).  
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Carter concludes that those responsible for the intelligence function need to 
understand these differences (i.e., raw and finished intelligence) and apply policies and 
practices that are most appropriate for the types of intelligence being produced and 
consumed.  
In addition, Carter identifies the criminal predicate required for the retention of 
criminal records—reasonable suspicion that an identified person(s) has or is about to 
commit a crime. In practice, law enforcement agencies collect information on individuals 
where no criminal predicate exists. Those cases require a criminal predicate assessment 
to determine the status of the collected information—whether it will be retained in a 
permanent file or temporary file.13 Distinctly, the noncriminal intelligence cycle is not 
constrained by a criminal predicate and is more tentative in nature. 
G. INTELLIGENCE-LED POLICING 
The National Strategy For Homeland Security (Office of Homeland Security, 
2007) defines intelligence-led policing (ILP): 
Management and resource allocation approach to law enforcement using 
data collection and intelligence analysis to set specific priorities for all 
manner of crimes, including those associated with terrorism. ILP is a 
collaborative approach based on improved intelligence operations and 
community-oriented policing and problem solving, which the field of law 
enforcement has considered beneficial for many years.  
The National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan maintains that ILP is a core 
objective and defines it as the collection and analysis of information to produce an 
intelligence end product designed to inform police decision making at both the tactical 
and strategic levels.  
                                                 
13 28 CFR Part 23—Criminal Intelligence Operating Policies provides procedural guidance for the 
management of criminal intelligence systems that is consistent with constitutional guarantees. The federal 
government cannot legally mandate it. However, 28 CFR Part 23 is a requisite for certain law enforcement 
grant funding and has been recommended by the National Criminal Intelligence Strategy and the Law 
Enforcement File Guidelines as a best practice. Information that meets the criminal predicate may be 
entered into the criminal intelligence records. Information with other than the criminal predicate is filed 
temporarily and will be purged after a “reasonable time” as defined by agency policy (Carter, 2009).  
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Carter (2009) maintains that there are differing views of ILP. There is no manual 
of practice for ILP because like community policing, it must be tailored to the 
characteristics of the individual agency. He characterizes ILP as: 
An underlying philosophy of how intelligence fits into the operations of a 
law enforcement organization. Rather than being simply an information 
clearinghouse that has been appended to the organization, ILP provides 
strategic integration of intelligence into the overall mission of the 
organization. 
Marilyn Peterson (2005) concludes that one of the critical lessons of 9/11 is that 
intelligence is everyone’s job and that a culture of intelligence and collaboration is 
necessary to protect the United States from crimes of all types. Peterson synthesizes 
several current law enforcement strategies in the United States, including community-
oriented policing (COP) and problem-oriented policing (POP). She concludes that, in 
order for agencies to develop an ILP capability, they must blend intelligence and POP, 
build stronger police-community partnerships, blend strategic intelligence and police 
planning, institute information-sharing policies, and build analytic support for police 
agencies. 
Jerry Ratcliffe (2008) holds that intelligence has traditionally been used by police 
departments for case support and not for strategic planning and resource allocation. He 
concludes that “the move from investigation-led intelligence to intelligence-led policing 
is the most significant and profound paradigm change in modern policing.” Ratcliffe’s 3i 
Model of ILP (Figure 5) is a conceptual model that interprets the criminal environment, 





Figure 5.   Intelligence-Led Policing (Source: Jerry Radcliffe’s Intelligence-Led 
Policing) 
The interpretation of the criminal environment is an active activity wherein the 
criminal intelligence analyst canvasses intelligence from contributors and hunts down the 
information by interviewing investigating officers and debriefing handlers of confidential 
informants.  
Ratcliffe concludes that the end state of ILP is an attempt to reduce the effects of 
criminality, through prevention and disruption or by effectively deploying the criminal 
justice system. The caveat of ILP is that, for crime reduction to result, decision makers 
must bring about an impact on the criminal environment; they must direct resources 
effectively in order to have a positive impact on the criminal environment. 
NYPD employs a variant of ILP—CompStat—a multilayered approach to 
policing that considers an organization holistically and accentuates accountability at all 
levels. It is a four-step process to crime reduction that includes: (1) accurate and timely 
intelligence, (2) rapid deployment, (3) effective tactics, and (4) relentless follow-up and 
assessment. CompStat strategically directs an organization’s efforts to reduce crime, 
reduce the fear of crime, improve the quality of life, and better manage the department. It 
integrates the principles of conventional policing with CP, POP, and accountability 
(Maple & Mitchell, 1999; Bratton, 1996). CompStat will be discussed at length in 
Chapter V.  
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H. NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT’S INTELLIGENCE  
New York City Police Department intelligence is synergistic and proactive, real-
time, actionable intelligence. It is global in scope and subsumes elements of the national 
intelligence, criminal intelligence, CompStat, and what Commissioner Kelly refers to as a 
“cop-to-cop relationship” between police agencies around the globe. Deputy 
Commissioner of Counterterrorism Richard Falkenrath’s 2009 testimony to the 
Washington Institute for Near East Policy asserted that the foundation of NYPD’s 
counterterrorism and intelligence program is “to essentially fill the gaps that are left by 
the federal government.” It expounds the circumstances that both dictate and validate 
NYPD’s intelligence enterprise:  
And that is not a knock on the federal government: that is a commentary 
about our system of government. And our system of government, the 
federalism system, gives the federal government only those powers 
expressly conferred to it by the Constitution or by an act of Congress. 
Everything else lies with the states or their subunits, the cities. … I think 
it’s important to understand where the NYPD fits in. The NYPD has 
something called plenary police power. It’s a broad-ranging authority to 
maintain public order and enforce the law and keep the citizenry safe. The 
federal government has no such authority. The federal government’s law 
enforcement authority is very specific. There are certain crimes, there are 
certain offenses which the federal government has the authority—in some 
cases, preemptive authority—to investigate. But really nowhere outside of 
specific federal reservations like airports or ports or courthouses or the 
White House or Congress, really nowhere out in America does the federal 
government provide day-to-day security and day-to-day policing and 
responsibility—and our system of government that lies at the local level. 
Alain Bauer (2007), noted criminologist at the Sorbonne and scholar in residence 
at NYPD, notes that the department has adapted to the threat and moved from defense to 
preemption. Bauer concludes that law enforcement must move out of a “culture of 
reaction, retrospect, and compilation” to a stage of forward thinking that might enable 
early detection of the threats and dangers of the modern world. Roger Cressy, the 
principal deputy to the counterterrorism chief at the National Security Council from 1999 
to November 2001 said that local law enforcement is best placed to gather ground-level 
intelligence and that “only when you combine that which you are getting at the federal 
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level will you create a holistic picture of the threat. NYPD has done that and is a model 
for the major metropolitan cities to follow” (Linzer, 2008). 
NYPD precinct commander and former member of the Intelligence Division’s 
International Liaison Unit, Brandon Del Pozo (2007), argues the need for a proactive 
municipal intelligence program to counter the threat of terrorism. Del Pozo has observed 
that prior to September 11, 2001 municipalities were not overly concerned with terrorism 
and relied on the federal government for counterterrorism. In Figure 6, he depicts the 
inequitable flow of information upward to federal authorities and the scarcity of 
information that has historically worked its way back to local authorities.  
Del Pozo observes that three unique threats to New York City exist: an 
“outside/outside” threat, in which all activity occurs outside the city; an “outside/inside” 
threat, wherein some operations occur outside the city and others (i.e., reconnaissance) 
occur in the city; and an “inside/inside” threat that originates and occurs from start to 
finish within the city. Del Pozo concludes that all three threats speak to the need for 
NYPD to gather its own intelligence.  
 
 
Figure 6.   CIA-FBI-Local Information Exchange 
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I. ONE SHOULD BE ETERNALLY AND COMPREHENSIVELY 
VIGILANT  
Chapters II and III of this thesis illustrate a legacy of police, and particularly 
police intelligence, transformation in America. Historically, the police responded to 
forces that defined their role in society. Policing in the homeland security era is a 
continuum of that heritage.  
On July 30, 1916, a pier laden with thousands of tons of munitions destined for 
Britain, France, and Russia in their war against imperial Germany exploded with a force 
that scarred the Statue of Liberty and shattered windows in Times Square. Authorities 
soon concluded that the Black Tom incident was the work of German saboteurs seeking 
to destroy supplies headed from neutral America to Germany’s enemies (Warner, 2002). 
Two years prior to that event, on August 1, 1914, the day before Germany presented an 
ultimatum to Belgium that presaged World War I, NYPD Police Commissioner Woods 
formed a special service squad to deal with emerging threats. Special service squads were 
NYPD’s standard organizational response to unusual problems. Today, the FBI would 
have jurisdiction over such matters. At the time, the FBI was in its infancy, and law 
enforcement at the federal level hardly existed. In 1916, “NYPD had the country’s largest 
and most experienced detectives and filled the void” (Lardner & Reppetto, 2000). 
Commissioner Woods said of the events of July 30, 1916: 
The lessons to America are clear as day. We must not again be caught 
napping with no adequate national intelligence organization. The several 
federal bureaus should be welded into one, and that one should be 
eternally and comprehensively vigilant (Tunney & Hollister, 1919). 
Eighty-five years later, the 9/11 Commission (2004) affirmed Commissioner 
Woods’s appeal for an adequate national intelligence organization. IRTPA (2004) created 
ODNI to coordinate the activities of IC. Moreover, as was the case of the Black Tom 
incident and America’s homeland security concerns during World War I, the events of 
September 11, 2001 served as the impetus for another NYPD police commissioner’s 
vigilance and the creation of special service squads to secure New York City and the 
homeland. Chapter IV describes that vigilance and the special service squads that evolved 
into NYPD’s intelligence enterprise. 
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IV. THE NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT’S 
INTELLIGENCE ENTERPRISE 
A. THREE C’S: CONVENTIONAL CRIME PREVENTION, 
COUNTERTERRORISM, AND COMMUNITY RELATIONS 
The mission of the New York City Police Department is to enhance the 
quality of life in New York City by working in partnership with the 
community to enforce the law, preserve peace, reduce fear, and maintain 
order. The Department is committed to accomplishing its mission to 
protect the lives and property of all citizens of New York City by treating 
every citizen with courtesy, professionalism, and respect and to enforce 
the laws impartially, fighting crime both through deterrence and the 
relentless pursuit of criminals (NYPD, 2000). 
1. Three Cs 
Sir Robert Peel’s seminal premise for policing, “the basic mission for which the 
police exist is to prevent crime and disorder” is a prescription for police intelligence. To 
that end, NYPD collects, processes, analyzes, fuses, and disseminates intelligence to 
prevent crime, disorder, and terrorism. That process is both routine and nuanced. It melds 
internal and external processes and is best understood in the context of NYPD’s three Cs 






Figure 7.   NYPD’s Three Cs 
NYPD Commissioner Raymond W. Kelly has spoken of the department's mission 
and what he likes to call the three Cs: conventional crime prevention, counterterrorism, 
and community relations. Kelly said, “If there is a theme, it is that those things [three Cs] 
have to be given coequal status” (Steinhauer, 2003). The logic of the three Cs is that 
crime and terrorism enjoy a symbiotic relationship and that community engagement is a 
gateway to prevent, detect, deter, and mitigate both. It is a multifaceted undertaking to 
collect the department’s intelligence to impact criminal and terrorist operations. This 
chapter details NYPD’s intelligence program in conventional crime prevention 
operations, community affairs activities, and counterterrorism-intelligence operations.  
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2. NYPD’s Intelligence Process 
Precinct commanders are responsible for the safety and security of their 
commands.14 To that end, they require certain information and intelligence. Precincts are 
primarily structured to process criminal intelligence. Moreover, they acquire and process 
suspected law violations or persons or activities connected with major and special crime 
and suspected terrorist activity that warrants the attention of specialized units and 
external agencies. An elaborate citywide intelligence reporting system categorizes 
information and determines which unit or agency will process particular information.15  
The diagram below demonstrates how information is collected by NYPD and 
processed internally and externally to produce intelligence products. Information is 
typically received at precinct level and is entered into a number of databases and 
analyzed at precinct, patrol borough, and citywide levels. On other occasions, 
information is received by the Counterterrorism Hotline or collected by the Intelligence 
Division, Specialized Units, or the Joint Terrorist Task Force (JTTF). Major and special 
crime and terrorism information is forwarded to the Intelligence Division’s (ID) 
Operations Center. The center forwards major and special circumstances crime to the 
designated unit as depicted in the table below. Terrorism information is forwarded to the 
New York Joint Terrorist Task Force (NY-JTTF). NY-JTTF will review each terrorism 
lead and either accept the case or refer it back to ID.  
 
                                                 
14 NYPD’s patrol operations are administered by the Patrol Service Bureau (PBS), Transit Bureau 
(TB), and Housing Bureau (HB). PSB is divided into eight patrol boroughs that are subdivided into 76 
precincts. TB is divided into four transit patrol boroughs that are subdivided into 12 Transit Districts (TD), 
and HB is divided into three housing boroughs that are subdivided into nine police service areas (PSA). HB 
and TB commands operate under the direct command of a respective bureau chief. Notwithstanding, every 
TD and PSA is located within the geographical boundaries of a precinct. To that point, every complaint 
registered in a TD or PSA is included in the respective precinct’s complaint reporting system. Those 
complaints are the responsibility of the respective precinct and TD/PSA’s commanding officer. Hereafter, 
the terms “precinct” and “precinct commander” will represent precincts with the understanding that 
precincts superimpose TDs and PSAs. 
15 Major and special crimes includes ongoing criminal enterprises, organized auto theft, narcotics, 
vice, gang, enterprise corruption, bank robbery, hate crime, sex-related crimes, corruption of public 
officials, and other matters as determined by the police commissioner. 
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Figure 8.   NYPD’s Intelligence Cycle 
The inner circle of the diagram represents the precinct-level intelligence process 
that consists of criminal and related information that is processed, analyzed, and 
disseminated to patrol and other stakeholders. The second ring, the Intelligence Division, 
represents NYPD’s clearinghouse for all information, particularly major crime and 
terrorism information. ID forwards major-crime information to the designated unit as 
described in Table 1. The unit concerned will investigate and conduct its own 
investigative and analytical process that is typically augmented by ID.  
Simultaneously, ID will fuse and analyze all-source information and produce 
intelligence products for dissemination to appropriate stakeholders. The third ring, NY-
JTTF, operates under the jurisdiction of the FBI and maintains liaison with ID for certain 
matters. Typically, JTTF produces intelligence for internal use. In addition, NY-JTTF 
produces tear line products for law enforcement and appropriate stakeholders. 
Cumulatively and collectively, information mounts. The overarching strategy of NYPD’s 
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intelligence enterprise is to collect pertinent information and to analyze that information 
and ultimately to provide intelligence to appropriate stakeholders. 
Table 1.   Major and Special Crime Investigatory Unit Designation 
Suspected Crime     Investigatory Unit 
 
Vice (prostitution, gambling)    Vice Division 
Narcotics      Narcotics Division 
Organized auto theft     Auto Crime Division 
Organized crime information as it relates to   Business Integrity Commission 
the private carting industry, wholesale markets,   
off-shore gambling      
Sexual exploitation of children  Sexual Exploitation of Children 
Squad 
Gang related      Gang Unit 
Identity theft Organized Theft and Identity Task 
Force 
Hate crime      Hate Crime Task Force 
Bank robbery       Joint Bank Robbery Task Force 
Integrity and corruption of NYPD/public officials Internal Affairs Bureau (NYPD, 
2000, 2008a) 
 
B. CONVENTIONAL CRIME PREVENTION 
1. Criminal Intelligence Collection 
Precinct commanders are primarily interested in criminal intelligence. 
Accordingly, they plan and direct the collection of criminal information. NYPD focuses 
on the prevention of seven index crimes: murder, rape, robbery, assault, burglary, grand 
larceny, and grand larceny auto.16 Precinct commanders need to know all that is knowable 
about index and related crimes. The knowable might include the times, dates, locations, 
victim’s pedigrees, suspect descriptions, related 911 and 311 calls, and a host of other 
circumstances. Typically, the unknowns are who and why. The knowable is logically 
connected to the unknown and affords information that might lead to the unknown. To 
that end, precinct commanders direct the collection of the known circumstances of all 
crime and especially major crime in their particular commands. 
                                                 
16 The seven index crimes are predicated on the FBI’s Unified Crime Reporting System (UCR). 
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The Complaint Report (PD313-152) is the department’s primary tool for 
collecting information. It is a template for allegations of unlawful or improper acts or 
omissions or other conditions that necessitate investigation to determine whether an 
unlawful act or omission has occurred. NYPD emphasizes that proper preparation of the 
report is critical to the success of the department’s crime-fighting efforts. Officers are 
reminded that they are not report takers; they are conducting preliminary investigations. 
Most information is entered on a Complaint Report and is investigated at precinct level. 
Moreover, certain information requires notification to specialized units and is processed 
at precinct/specialized-unit level.  
2. Complaint Follow-Up 
a. Investigatory Process 
Complaint follow-up involves an investigatory process that includes 
interviewing suspects, witnesses, and concerned parties. It also involves an evidentiary 
process that includes photography, video, audio, forensics, and so forth, of related scenes. 
Significantly, suspects and prisoners provide the department with substantial information. 
They are, first and foremost, members of the community and often have detailed 
information about what is going on in the streets, and they might have a motivation to 
give this information to the police. Department policy requires that all persons arrested by 
the department are debriefed. Many debriefings have resulted in the registering of 
confidential informants (CI) and the acquisition information that has resulted in arrests, 
search warrants, and the seizure of contraband and evidence. That process is often 
iterative and progressive, i.e., the latter produces the former.  
b. Role of the Community, Other Government Agencies, and 
Private Agencies  
Routine police interactions with communal, government, and private 
agencies serve the department’s information needs.  
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c. Field Intelligence Officer 
Typically, a determination is made that “there is more to know.” To that 
end, precinct commanders direct specific information-collection efforts and oversee an 
analytic process to achieve insight into the known and unknown. ID details a Field 
Intelligence Officer (FIO) to each patrol-level command to enhance command level 
intelligence and to ensure that required information makes its way to ID. FIOs relate the 
command’s operating context to the commanding officer and ID’s Field Intelligence 
Coordinator. FIOs solicit and exchange information with all patrol, investigatory, and 
analytical units, as well as other FIOs and then follow up on intelligence matters 
afterwards. They conduct secondary debriefings and facilitate the CI and search warrant 
process. Moreover, FIOs attend community meetings and other forums, and they respond 
to major incidents in the field to gather timely information. The FIO’s task integrates the 
Department’s patrol and intelligence operations (NYPD, 2008a and 2008b). 
d. Analysis 
All known information is compiled, entered into a series of databases, 
analyzed, and disseminated to appropriate intelligence consumers. NYPD’s crime 
analysis is a three-tiered process that cumulatively synthesizes precinct, patrol borough, 
and ID analytics. Precinct crime analysis personnel assess all complaints with an 
emphasis on the seven major crimes. Each complaint is reviewed for accuracy, proper 
classification, investigatory status, and known circumstances. 
Crime analysis personnel confer with precinct detectives, community 
affairs officers, FIOs, and others to glean information that might be germane to particular 
complaints. All known information is contextualized, evaluated, and summarized in 
analytic reports. That intelligence provides the commanding officer with a clearer picture 
of his crime situation. It informs optimal deployment of personnel and resources and 
facilitates requests for additional personnel and resources from specialized units such as 
narcotics, vice, gang, patrol borough task force, anti-crime, and community affairs. 
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In addition, the respective patrol borough crime analysis unit reviews the 
precinct-level analysis and correlates it to patrol borough and citywide crime analysis. 
The purpose of the secondary analysis is to provide an overview of patrol borough and 
citywide crime, especially commonalities and patterns. In addition, that analysis provides 
patrol borough commanders with information that facilitates the most efficient 
deployment of borough personnel and resources.  
The third element of this process is an analysis of all known information, 
particularly information beyond the scope of the precincts and patrol boroughs such as 
citywide, national, and international crime by ID to identify citywide crime patterns and 
information that might be relevant to terrorism, organized crime, and other investigations.  
e. Dissemination 
Most information makes its way back to patrol via the daily platoon 
briefing and analytical reports and crime mapping that are available at the precinct's 
Crime Information Center.  
Moreover, the department’s Real Time Crime Center (RTCC) provides an 
NYPD Google-type search engine that was created to help investigators connect the dots. 
RTCC integrates 27 department databases and provides information and investigatory 
support to detectives investigating violent crime in real time (NYPD, 2007a; New York 
City Police Foundation, 2010).  
Nonetheless, certain information and intelligence, due to its sensitivity, 
confidentiality, security-value, or legal restrictions are not readily available to patrol. 
Typically, tear-line intelligence products—intelligence documents that separate 
categories of information that have been approved for release—are provided. In the event 
that restricted information is required for patrol, investigatory, or evidentiary purposes, 
that information is requested via ID or in certain cases directly to a specialized unit or 
outside agency.  
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f. CompStat 
NYPD’s criminal intelligence per se is guided by CompStat, a four-step 
process to crime reduction that includes accurate and timely intelligence, rapid 
deployment, effective tactics, and relentless follow-up and assessment. CompStat 
strategically directs an organization’s efforts to reduce crime, reduce the fear of crime, 
improve the quality of life, and better manage the department. It integrates the principles 
of conventional policing with CP, POP, and accountability (Maple, 1999; Bratton, 1996). 
CompStat is a variant of intelligence-led policing that facilitates the use of information 
and intelligence to detect, deter, and mitigate crime.  
This thesis describes in detail the evolution and mechanics of CompStat 
and particularly how the CompStat paradigm revolutionized policing in New York City 
and facilitated NYPD’s post–September 11, 2001 intelligence enterprise. That discussion 
is continued in Chapter V.  
C. COMMUNITY RELATIONS 
To foster positive and productive police-community relations by providing 
interactive community participation programs. We do this by identifying 
key stakeholders of the community by establishing communication with 
community leaders in the concerned area. We also gather intelligence, 
dispel rumors, disseminate accurate information and establish liaison with 
other agencies. 
–Mission Statement, NYPD Community Affairs Bureau  
The Community Affairs Bureau (CAB) plays an integral role in the department’s 
three-Cs strategy by raising community awareness through outreach and public service 
programs. Commissioner Kelly said of CAB’s counterterrorism role: “As the Police 
Department continues its dual mission of combating conventional crime and terrorism, 
the importance of community affairs in solidifying public support and cooperation with 
both missions has never been more important” (NYPD, 2006). CAB’s initiatives and 
programs foster partnerships with the community. Those relationships afford situational 
awareness and a sense of undetected issues that might become police problems if left 
unattended. CAB’s programs and initiatives are set out below. 
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1. The Community Partnership Program  
The Community Partnership Program (CPP) is part of NYPD’s legacy of 
community engagement, which was first formalized in the 1970s with Cop on the Block 
and Neighborhood Police Teams initiatives. CPP was introduced in 2007 to increase the 
number of positive contacts between police officers and the public. It partners 
probationary police officers with veteran officers and members of CAB and tasks them to 
openly engage in dialogue with neighborhood residents, community leaders, 
organizations, clergy, and youth, while performing their duties on patrol. To those ends, 
police officers tour commercial and religious facilities, schools, youth centers and 
community centers in their precincts. CPP endeavors to familiarize police officers with 
religious, business, school, youth, immigrant, and other concerns of their assigned 
precincts (NYPD, 2007b and 2009b). 
2. Precinct Community Councils 
Precinct Community Councils are forums that provide ongoing communication 
between the police and the community. Community members are invited to meet 
regularly with the precinct commanding officer to find solutions to public safety 
problems in their neighborhood. Additional community participation programs include: 
Civilian Observer Ride-Along, Civilian Observation Patrol, Citizens Police Academy, 
National Night Out, NYPD Internship Program, and the Multilingual Precinct 
Receptionist Program (NYPD, 2009b). 
3. The Youth Services Section  
The Youth Services Section is a compilation of educational and prevention 
programs that deter truancy and gang activity by reinforcing responsible behavior, 
enhancing self-image and promoting constructive engagement with the community. The 
section is intimately involved with the Police Athletic League (PAL), a not-for-profit 
organization that provides boys and girls with recreational, educational, cultural, and 
social programs. PAL’s website affirms its collaboration with NYPD: PAL “together 
with the NYPD and the law enforcement community, supports and inspires New York 
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City youth to realize their full individual potential as productive members of society 
(New York City Police Athletic League, 2010).  
4. The New Immigrant Outreach Unit  
The New Immigrant Outreach Unit serves as a link between the department and 
emerging immigrant communities. NYPD realizes that many new immigrants are not 
familiar with American customs or, in many cases, the English language. To that end, the 
unit conducts multilingual outreach programs that include presentations regarding 
department policies, programs, and services affecting new immigrant communities; these 
programs are directed to the community, the department, and outside agencies. This unit 
was tasked to reach out to certain communities, in particular, the Arab, Muslim, and 
South Asian communities that had had little or no interaction with the department. To 
that end, the unit established the NYPD United (soccer) and NYPD Cricket leagues. 
Jeff Thompson’s “The NYPD and Three C’s: Communication, Community and 
Cricket” (2009) concludes that the leagues provide a means for young males who might 
not otherwise have any interaction with the police to see the police in another light: as 
regular people who love the sport. Thompson, an NYPD police officer assigned to CAB, 
describes his job as “basically to make sure that people are happy. I look at individuals, 
groups, community organizations and private businesses to see if NYPD already has a 
relationship with them. If the answer is yes, I try to improve the relationship. If the 
answer is no, I try to figure out how to establish a line of communication based on 
understanding. NYPD decided that soccer and cricket might produce a favorable 
relationship with the Arab, Muslim, and South Asian communities. Thompson found that 
the leagues created new relationships and a sense of understanding. Thompson opines 
that “the best way to serve others is by getting to know them.” 
Appearing on NBC Nightly News and asked about NYPD Cricket, Police 
Commissioner Kelly said:  
The Department had historically reached out to young people through 
sports, but that had been through traditional American sports such as 
softball, basketball, and baseball. We wanted to reach into a different 
community, an emerging community. We decided to go to the sports that 
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they play and cricket is the sport that they play. I think that there is a much 
closer relationship, certainly between these young people that are playing 
and the police officers that are coaching and organizing. This is another 
way to reach a community, an emerging community in our city, this is the 
most diverse city and this program provides an inroad into a strong and 
vibrant community in our city (MSNBC, 2009). 
On August 10, 2009, Commissioner Kelly presided over the department’s annual 
pre-Ramadan conference. He was joined by department Chaplain Imam Khalid Latif and 
Inspector Michael Osgood, Commanding Officer of the Hate Crime Task Force. In 
attendance were members of NYPD Soccer, NYPD United, and the NYPD Muslim 
Officers Society. Kelly said:  
This is the most sacred time of the year for the Muslim faith—a time of 
self-reflection, devotion to god, and spiritual discipline. Our goal is to 
ensure that you are able to experience Ramadan in safety and in peace. 
We’re proud that New York is the most tolerant city in the world. But we 
don’t take this for granted. 
It was noted that, since 2002, NYPD has distributed guidelines to commanders 
that provide an overview of Ramadan and promote the education of precinct personnel on 
prayers and other activities taking place during Ramadan, including direct contact and 
visitation with local mosques (NYPD, 2009a). 
5. The Clergy Liaison Program  
The Clergy Liaison Program establishes working partnerships between the 
department and clergy to improve community relations. Applicants to the program are 
vetted for criminal backgrounds and confirmation of congregational or faith-based 
organization affiliation. Approved clergy and religious leaders receive specialized 
training from the department in topics including counterterrorism, hate crimes, domestic 
violence, and gang awareness. Members of the program are called upon to foster positive 
police-community relations. They are provided with firsthand information in crisis 
situations that might reduce fear and alleviate concerns. In return, they are asked 
firsthand for information that might facilitate police operations and provide for the 
wellbeing of the community.  
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6. Segregation of Community Relations from Counterterrorism and 
Intelligence 
Community relations present a significant challenge to policing. Similar to the 
relationship of a parent to a child, police impose limits and discipline on the community. 
Simultaneously, the police ask for the cooperation of the community to prevent crime and 
terrorism. To that end, NYPD purposely segregates its community-relations function 
from its counterterrorism operations. Deputy Commissioner of Counterterrorism Richard 
Falkenrath’s comments to the Washington Institute capture the department’s 
counterterrorism-community outreach posture:  
The counterterrorism deputy commissioner and the intelligence deputy 
commissioner are not responsible for community outreach. In part we 
don’t want to stigmatize the interaction with these communities, and if the 
counterterrorism deputy commissioner or the intelligence deputy 
commissioner go to a community meeting, it sort of sends the message 
that the reason we’re here is we think there’s a threat. And that’s not the 
message we want to send, because the vast majority of the people from 
these communities—the vast, vast majority—are no threat at all and 
simply want to live in peace and enjoy everything the city has to offer, 
which is a lot (Falkenrath, 2009). 
Lydia Khalil (2009) lauds the department’s relaxed community-relations approach 
to counterterrorism. Khalil notes that NYPD community liaisons are removed from the 
counterterrorism bureau. She concludes, “Ironically, it is this distance that has 
contributed to good community relations and the likelihood that individuals would be 
forthcoming with information when they do not suspect those with malicious intentions 
in their midst.” Khalil concludes with this assessment: “This hands off, easy going 
approach has proven to be more successful than the more obvious and convoluted efforts 
by other major international police forces, particularly in Europe.”  
CAB endeavors to achieve a higher level of trust and active citizenship and 
particularly a community that is apt to provide information essential to the safety and 
security of the city. It actively encourages concerned citizens to report suspicious persons 
and circumstances and provides the necessary reporting procedures. To avoid undue 
suspicion, CAB operates overtly and informs the community that information sharing is a 
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reciprocal practice. It clarifies department policy regarding police information pointing 
out that some police information is sensitive, confidential, or otherwise restricted by law 
and when that permissible information will be released to the public. Finally, CAB serves 
as the department’s subject-matter expert on community relations and provides liaison 
with all units to affect the department’s mission (NYPD, 2008a).  
D. INTELLIGENCE DIVISION  
To provide comprehensive and relevant information to the Police 
Commissioner in a timely manner. Conduct professional and judicious 
intelligence gathering surveillance. Interact with all law enforcement 
organizations to enhance the safety of the citizens of New York. Maintain 
the highest standards of integrity, proficiency, and originality while 
respecting the citizens we serve.  
–Mission Statement, NYPD Intelligence Division 
1. “We [NYPD] Have to Make Sure That We Get the Best Information 
As Quickly As We Possibly Can” 
New York Mayor Michael Bloomberg best described NYPD’s current threat 
status: “The world no longer stops at the oceans, our world goes every place, and we have 
to make sure that we get the best information as quickly as we possibly can” (Dickey, 
2009a). Similarly, former President George W. Bush said, “America is no longer 
protected by vast oceans. We are protected from attack only by vigorous action abroad 
and increased vigilance at home” (Office of Homeland Security, The White House, 
2003a). 
In 2002, Commissioner Kelly tasked newly appointed Deputy Commissioner of 
Intelligence David Cohen with building an organization capable of operating on an 
international scale that would be able to anticipate threats and act on that information. ID 
is a clearinghouse and analytic center for all-source information. Its diverse processes 
fuse all-source information and intelligence. 
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2. Daily Meeting of Commissioner Kelly and Deputy Commissioners of 
Intelligence and Counterterrorism 
ID’s process begins with a daily meeting of Commissioner Kelly and his Deputy 
Commissioners of Intelligence and Counterterrorism where all intelligence and 
counterterrorism issues and operations are detailed (Sheehan, 2008, Falkenrath, 2009). 
ID’s processes are multidimensional and reflect Lowenthal’s (2009) multilayered 
intelligence process. In any one intelligence process, issues likely arise: the need for more 
collection, uncertainties in processing, results of analysis, and changing requirements. 
These instances cause secondary and tertiary processes. It is complex and operates in 
reality—it is linear, circular, and open-ended at the same time.  
3. NYPD’s Intelligence Division 
ID is divided into the Public Security Section (PSS), Intelligence Operations and 
Analysis (IO and A), and the Municipal Security Section (MSS). PSS and IO and A 
coordinate the department’s intelligence process. MSS provides dignitary and executive 
protection and security at certain city and department facilities and will not be a subject 
of this thesis. This section will provide an overview of ID’s organization and will 
highlight its most prominent operations. 
a. Public Security Section  
The Operations Unit’s coordination center serves as a clearinghouse for 
criminal, terrorist, and other information. The center also operates the counterterrorism 
hotline to receive raw data and potential threats from the public. All leads are entered into 
the intelligence data system. This is the first element of ID’s analysis and fusion process 
wherein all-source raw data is characterized and cross-referenced. The unit assigns 
members of the Leads Investigations Unit and other resources to respond and conduct 
appropriate investigations. Significantly, the unit notifies the FBI’s New York-Joint 
Terrorist Task Force (NY-JTTF) about all terrorism leads. These circumstances are 
sensitive and are governed by internal department protocols and an NYPD-FBI MOU.  
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The FBI is the nation’s lead domestic authority for national security issues 
and has lead-prerogative.17 Just the same, the FBI has acknowledged NYPD’s 
considerable interest in national security issues as they relate to New York City. NYPD 
maintains a considerable number of personnel in NY-JTTF and an extraordinary, albeit 
sometimes contentious, relationship with FBI. In 2007, Cohen said of NY-JTTF, 
“Important decisions are no longer made alone,” adding, “It’s hard to overstate how far 
we’ve come from the animosity in the early days.” Cohen estimates that, although the 
FBI has the first right of refusal on tips and leads—35,000 have come in since the city set 
up its counterterrorism hotline five years ago—the NYPD has pursued almost two-thirds 
of them d (Miller, 2007). 
The Regional Intelligence Support Center (RISC) provides accurate and 
topical intelligence to federal, state, and local investigators in order to enhance 
investigations. RISC assists in the investigation of criminal cases and the apprehension of 
wanted individuals through analysis and dissemination of both raw intelligence and 
information procured from a broad array of data systems. The Sensitive Data Unit (SDU) 
maintains the department’s CI database that details their pertinent areas of expertise and 
knowledge and search-warrants history. SDU also maintains the Secure Automated Fast 
Event Tracking Network to deconflict department enforcement operations.  
The Terrorist Incident Prevention Unit investigates terrorism-related 
incidents to determine modus operandi and technologies employed by terrorists. It 
collects criminal and terrorism related information from all available sources. The unit 
surveys businesses to determine businesses, products, and services that are vulnerable to 
manipulation by terrorists to facilitate a terrorist attack and investigates criminal 
appropriation and misuse of materials and services that might abet an attack. 
Cumulatively, the unit fuses seemingly disparate information that taken as whole might 
indicate terrorism or other crimes. The unit also provides information and intelligence for 
the department’s counterterrorism programs.  
                                                 
17 The FBI’s authority is derived from the National Security Act, Executive Order 12333, and other 
executive directives. 
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b. Intelligence Operations and Analysis Section  
The Intelligence Collection Section gathers, evaluates, and transfers all-
source intelligence information to appropriate entities. It analyzes and links investigations 
that span precinct, borough, city, state, and international boundaries and conducts 
enforcement operations in support of ongoing intelligence collection and criminal 
investigations. The Field Intelligence Coordinator coordinates the activities of all FIOs 
and local borough investigative units to facilitate intelligence sharing and enforcement 
activity. The Special Intelligence Collection Coordinator manages the collection of New 
York City’s demographic trends, prison- and prisoner-related information, gang, 
narcotics, cyber and world wide web information, and myriad other information (NYPD, 
2008a).  
Notably, the Cyber Unit capitalizes on the department’s linguists, many of 
whom are foreign-born and Muslim, to penetrate heretofore exclusionary cyber-domains 
of extremists and would-be jihadists. The undercover cyber cops “chat” with would-be 
terrorists in their native languages. In a 2006 interview with Ed Bradley of CBS’s 60 
Minutes, one member of the unit remarked that they look for “information that will relate 
to New York City. The ultimate goal for us is not to allow anything else like September 
11 to ever happen again” (Schorn, 2006). 
c. The Liaison Activities Coordinator  
The Liaison Activities Coordinator initiates and maintains institutional law 
enforcement contacts and hosts liaisons from other agencies. Its most prominent unit—
the International Liaison Unit (ILU)—identifies and initiates contacts with the 
international law enforcement community. Cohen wanted NYPD police officers to be 
living overseas and working with police officers in those countries. He wanted NYPD 
officers to know their counterparts personally and to be able to cull from those ties the 
day-to-day and minute-to-minute operational details (Dickey, 2009a). ILU does not 
conduct investigations per se. They liaise with police and intelligence officials and collect 
information and intelligence from those officials and crime scenes. 
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ILU’s first posting was to Tel Aviv, Israel. NYPD wanted to know all that 
there was to know about suicide bombings. ILU sent a veteran homicide detective, 
Detective Mordehai Dzikansky to Tel Aviv, Israel, to learn from those who had the most 
experience with suicide bombings. Dzikansky is Jewish and keeps a kosher home. He 
spoke Hebrew and was the lead investigator in NYPD’s Torah Task Force that 
investigated the thefts of sacred Torah scrolls. Dzikansky accompanied Israeli forces to 
bombings and other incidents and has the distinction of having been on the scene of more 
suicide bombings than any other U.S. law enforcement official (Del Pozo, 2007; 
International Institute for Counter-terrorism, 2009; Intelligence3, 2009).  
Currently, NYPD seconds personnel to key international cities: London, 
England; Paris and Lyon, France; Madrid, Spain; Tel Aviv, Israel; Amman, Jordan; Abu 
Dhabi, United Arab Emirates; Singapore, Malaysia, Toronto and Montreal, Canada; and 
Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic. In addition, ILU and other units of NYPD have 
visited or had short postings to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba; Afghanistan; Bali, Indonesia; 
Germany; Kuwait; Malaysia; Pakistan; Singapore; Beslan, Russia; Manila, Philippines; 
Istanbul, Turkey; and Mumbai, India (NYC Police Foundation, 2009; Nussbaum, 2004). 
Cumulatively, the efforts of ILU provide Commissioner Kelly’s cop-to-cop relationship 
with police agencies across the globe, and it does so in real-time. ILU’s most prominent 
missions include those discussed below. 
(1) Mumbai, India Hotel Bombings, 2008. The terrorist attacks 
in Mumbai, India, on November 26, 2008, have been referred to as “India’s 9/11.” 
Mumbai is India’s commercial and entertainment center—its Wall Street, Hollywood, 
and Milan. It is a prosperous symbol of modern India—and a presumptive target for 
terrorists. Lashka-e-Taiba (LeT), an Al-Qaida associate, conducted an audacious and 
complex attack there that bewildered and overwhelmed Indian defense forces. The 
operation lasted over 60 hours and left at least 172 people dead and over 300 wounded.  
The attack was facilitated by offsite operational control that 
monitored media coverage and police operations. The terrorists conducted extensive 
reconnaissance and likely pre-positioned supplies. They traveled from Karachi, Pakistan, 
hijacked an Indian fishing trawler in the Arabian Sea, and made their way to Mumbai via 
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rafts. Multiple teams simultaneously bombed high-value targets, attacked responding 
police personnel, shot and stabbed innocent people indiscriminately, and took others 
hostage only to kill most of them later (Rabasa et al., 2009).  
NYPD decided that the Mumbai attacks had implications for the 
safety and security of New York City. To that end, ILU deployed a team of senior 
officers headed by Captain Brandon Del Pozo to Mumbai. Del Pozo had previously been 
stationed in Amman, Jordan, and had conducted a similar mission to Mumbai in the 
aftermath of the 2006 commuter-rail terrorist attacks there (Del Pozo, 2007).  
Del Pozo was able to provide NYPD with detailed information of 
the attacks in near real-time: commando-style attack, marine element, synchronized 
attacks, targeting of police stations and hospitals, targeting of high-profile hotels 
frequented by Westerners, use of police vehicles to conduct attack, preliminary ballistics 
revealed tight clusters and few high shots that are indicative of trained, disciplined, and 
proficient marksmen, familiarity with area, use of cell phones and other communication 
devices, and the identification of lead suspects. 
In response, NYPD immediately enhanced and redirected its 
counterterrorism operations and initiated an advanced firearms program that would train 
recruits and other members of the department in automatic weapons. NYPD determined 
that a Mumbai-like attack would exhaust Emergency Service Unit (ESU) personnel and 
that the department’s heavy-weapon capability would need to be expanded. To that end, 
NYPD established a Critical Incident Response Capacity (CIRC) to supplement ESU. In 
addition, NYPD updated its active shooter procedures and conducted extensive Mumbai-
like drills. In addition, NYPD considered the use of technologies that might block cell 
phone usage during a commando-style attack.  
By December 5, ID had produced an analysis, which it “shared 
with the FBI.” In addition, NYPD Shield, a public-private partnership, convened a special 
session of its members and briefed them. Del Pozo called the meeting to offer details 
from the investigation. During the conference call, NYPD posted photographs and maps 
to help the audience visualize the locations. Del Pozo identified one of the problems: 
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security officials in India were prepared for attacks with which they were familiar. Indian 
officials and private security had set up barricades and searched them for bombs, but they 
didn’t have armed guards to stop shooters and did not have a relative response protocol. 
NYPD distributed Mumbai Attack Analysis (NYPD, 2008d) to all NYPD Shield partners. 
The analysis contained an overview and details of the attack, still pictures of the locations 
targeted, attackers, and implications for New York City (NYPD, 2008d; Kelly, 2009a, 
2009b, and 2009c).  
(2) Jakarta, Hotel Bombings, July 17, 2009. 
• Synchronized bombings of JW Marriott and Ritz-Carlton Hotels, resulting 
in seven people killed and fifty injured. 
• NYPD Counterterrorism Division redirects counterterrorism assets and 
specifically critical response vehicles—police cars and officers—to 
Marriott, Ritz-Carlton, and other hotels in NYC “within 30 minutes of the 
attacks.” 
• NYPD ILU Lieutenant John Daly arrives in Jakarta. Working with local 
authorities, Daly is provided with a video that captures the bombers 
entering the hotel and the bomb detonation. 
• Lt. Daly calls NYPD Shield conference and provides an on-scene 
assessment (NYPD, 2009d). 
(3) London, England Terrorist Bombings, July 2005. 
• Four synchronized bombings –three on London’s underground public 
transport and one on double-decker bus, resulting in 56 deaths and over 
700 injuries. 
• Terrorist-planned and constructed devices in Leeds, England. Affirmed 
belief that terrorists typically produce bombing materials outside of target 
area, emphasizing the importance of regional security.  
• NYPD detective embedded in New Scotland Yard was able to give NYPD 
real-time information from New Scotland Yard’s command center. NYPD 
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used that information to deploy additional resources to New York City 
subways immediately.  
• Led to NYPD Transportation Container Inspection Program that deploys 
department personnel to subway and ferry terminals to randomly inspect 
packages. Department personnel also deploy trace-explosive detection and 
radiological detection devices at those locations (Sheehan, 2008, Dickey, 
2009a). 
(4) Madrid Train Bombings, March 11, 2004. 
• Ten synchronized explosions aboard four commuter trains, resulting in 
191 deaths and 1800 injured. 
• Report that transit workers saw terrorist in action prior to attack but did 
not report it because they thought the terrorists were petty criminals leads 
to reemphasis of “If you see something, say something” campaign. 
• Announcement of a general threat to subway systems worldwide. 
• Led to enhanced subway and commuter-rail patrols and initiatives 
(Dickey, 2009a; Sheehan, 2008; NYPD, 2009d). 
4. The Intelligence Analysis Section 
a. Fusion of Intelligence Analysts and Street-Smart Detectives 
ID created a unique platform for municipal policing—a cadre of 
intelligence analysts culled from IC, the military, foreign-policy think tanks, academia, 
recent Ivy League graduates—and teamed them up with street-smart detectives. Cohen 
said of the unique relationship: 
An analyst will tell you what’s important about what you’re doing. What 
are the subtleties? What should you be looking for in addition to what 
you’ve already found? And it’s the combination of the two that is 
extraordinarily powerful. And the appetite comes with the eating. The 
more they work together, the more they want to work together. It’s been 
an absolute wonder to watch (Dickey, 2009a). 
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Samuel J. Roscoff (2006), former director of NYPD’s Intelligence 
Analysis Section, identified ID’s analysis process as sifting and mining information from 
the department’s collection platforms to identify intelligence of the “utmost importance” 
to NYPD and to identify intelligence gaps. The gaps point out questions that have gone 
unanswered. NYPD thinks answers to those questions will further the department’s 
mission of protecting New York City from attack. ID sends their information and their 
questions back to the collectors. Roscoff said, “It’s as though we’re part of a 
correspondence in which information comes to us and we generate a set of requirements 
or questions and send them back to the collector to collect more information and 
intelligence and send it back to us and the process is repeated.” The Intelligence Analysis 
Section is focused on delivering products to two broad groups of consumers, the police 
commissioner and the senior decision makers in the department, and the collectors, 
particularly those in ID who benefit from ID’s analysis and will be able to do their jobs 
“more effectively and intelligently.”  
In effect, the Intelligence Analysis Section is a hybrid fusion center of 
disparate information and mindsets. The analysts fuse local, national, and international 
matters, produce a range of highly sensitive intelligence reports, and provide strategical 
and tactical support to the department’s law enforcement, intelligence, and 
counterterrorism operations. 
b. Radicalization in the West 
In 2007, ID released a controversial report, Radicalization in the West: 
The Homegrown Threat. The report, prepared by two senior NYPD intelligence analysts, 
Mitchell D. Silber and Arvin Bhatt, chronicles and analyzes the origins and development 
of 11 homegrown and international terrorist cells and provides an understanding of the 
radicalization process (Silber & Bhatt 2009). Silbur and Bhatt conclude that Al Qaeda–
inspired radicalization and jihadist ideology engenders homegrown terrorism and that the 
greatest threat is not from abroad, but from within. Moreover, most would-be terrorists 
are unremarkable men who live unremarkable lives. Notwithstanding, Silbur and Bhatt 
found that radicalization is a process that typically includes four distinct phases: 
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preradicalization, self-identification, indoctrination, and jihadization. Each phase has a 




Figure 9.   Radicalization (Source: Radicalization in the West (Silbur & Bhatt, 2009)) 
NYPD Assistant Commissioner for Intelligence Lawrence Sanchez 
described the report as “a guide to know what to watch for and how to interpret what you 
see.” However, critics said that the report was designed to be a road map for racial 
profiling and that NYPD focused on young Muslim men with no known criminal record. 
Muhsin Alidina, director of education services at the city’s largest Shiite mosque, the Al-
Khoeli Islamic Center in Jamaica, Queens, said, “I think the NYPD needs to be more 
sensitive.” Christopher Dunn of the New York Civil Liberties Union opined that focusing 
on behavior before it becomes criminal “seems to lay the groundwork for wholesale 
surveillance of Muslim communities without any indication of unlawful conduct.” Kelly 
said that constitutional safeguards were reviewed by the department’s lawyers, remarking 
that “I don’t think of this report as stereotyping. I don’t see that at all. I see it as a law 
enforcement tool” (Moore & Gendar, 2007). Cohen and Falkenrath (2010) concluded that 
IC “must give additional priority to the inspirational dimension of the Al Qaeda threat. 
This means identifying where radicalization is occurring before it metastasizes into 
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operational planning and finding the ideological sanctioners, who are now the ‘Pied 
Pipers’ of the Al Qaeda ideology.” Regardless, NYPD rereleased the report in 2009 with 
a statement of clarification that reads: 
The NYPD Report, “Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat” 
is exclusively focused on al Qaeda inspired and linked terrorism in the 
West. The twisted ideology that underpins this specific type of terrorism 
claims its legitimacy from an extremist misinterpretation of Islam. As a 
consequence, this particular type of terrorist ideology has historically 
found most of its supporters to be Muslim. 
Nevertheless, NYPD understands that it is a tiny minority of Muslims who 
subscribe to al Qaeda’s ideology or war and terror and that the NYPD’s 
focus on al Qaeda inspired terrorism should not be mistaken for any 
implicit or explicit justification for racial, religious or ethnic profiling. 
Rather, the Muslim community in New York City is our ally and has as 
much to lose, if not more, than other New Yorkers if individuals commit 
acts of violence (falsely) in the name of their religion. As such, the NYPD 
report should not be read to characterize Muslims as intrinsically 
dangerous or intrinsically linked to terrorism, and that it cannot be a 
license for racial, religious, or ethnic profiling.  
5. Herald Square Plot, 2004  
One of ID’s most noteworthy cases is the foiled Herald Square Plot of 2004. In 
2003, NYPD’s terrorism hotline received a number of calls about Shahawar Martin Siraj, 
a Pakistani national who worked at the Islamic Books and Tapes store in Brooklyn and 
reportedly was engaged in virulent anti-American tirades. ID learned that Siraj and James 
Elshafay, the nineteen-year-old son of an Egyptian father and Irish-Catholic mother, were 
plotting to blow up subway stations in Manhattan and police precincts in Staten Island.  
In October 2002, ID pulled Kamil Pasha from his recruit training at the Police 
Academy. Pasha, a pseudonym, was a Bangladeshi native, a Muslim, and an undercover 
NYPD police officer. He assumed residency in Bayridge, Brooklyn and frequented the 
Islamic Books and Tapes store and the mosque next door, the Islamic Society of Bay 
Ridge. Pasha befriended Siraj and listened as the would-be terrorist recounted 
aggressions against Muslims. Siraj told Pasha that he “hoped that Bin Ladin was planning 
something big in America.” 
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In July 2002, ID received suspicious reports about Osama Eldawoody, an 
Egyptian émigré with a degree in nuclear engineering. Eldawoody, it turned out, was 
unable to find work in his chosen profession and drifted from job to job. ID determined 
that Eldawoody did not amount to a threat. Moreover, Eldawoody complained about his 
treatment by ID. Notwithstanding, he offered to help NYPD on “important matters.” ID 
registered Eldawoody as a CI with potential and later directed him to check out Siraj.  
Eldawoody befriended Siraj and subsequently Elshafay. In the spring of 2004, 
Siraj’s diatribes elevated from grievances to action: he talked about real bombings. He 
mentioned subways but said that he did not know how to obtain bombs. Elshafay talked 
about bombing bridges. Eldawoody replied that he knew of a group, “the brotherhood,” 
who might be able to help. He reported the plotting and began to wear a wire. Siraj, 
Elshafay, and Eldawoody continued to make plans and conducted surveillance 
operations. They may have settled on the Herald Square Subway Station at Thirty-Fourth 
Street as a target. These were dangerous times for New York City. The city was still 
reeling from the 9/11 attacks and was preparing for the 2004 Republican National 
Convention.  
Instead of an attack, Siraj and Elshafay were arrested on August 27, 2004, and are 
currently serving jail sentences. At the time of their arrest, they possessed diagrams of the 
subway station and two maps of police stations and bridges on Staten Island (Falkenrath, 
2007; Dickey, 2009a; Sheehan, 2008; Silber & Bhatt, 2009). 
E.  COUNTERTERRORISM BUREAU 
In 2002, NYPD created the Counterterrorism Bureau (CTB) to “develop 
innovative, forward-looking policies and procedures to guard against the threat of 
international and domestic terrorism in New York City.” CTB was built upon the 
conclusion that New York City “remains number one on al-Qaeda’s target list” and that 
“the City could not rely solely on the federal government for its defense (NYPD, 2009e).  
CTB complements ID and includes the following units: NY–Joint Terrorist Task 
Force (NY-JTTF), Terrorism Threat Analysis Group (TTAG), and the Counter Terrorism 
Division, a subunit of CTB, that includes NYPD Shield, the Technology and 
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Construction Section, the training section, the Threat Reduction Infrastructure Section 
(TRIPS), Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and Explosives section (CBRNE), 
the Maritime section, and the Emergency Preparedness Exercise Section.  
1. New York–Joint Terrorist Task Force  
In 1980, NYPD and the FBI formed the first Joint Terrorist Task Force (JTTF) to 
combat international and domestic terrorism. The New York–Joint Terrorist Task Force 
(NY-JTTF) combines the street smarts of NYPD detectives with FBI’s expertise and 
national and international reach. NY-JTTF was the lead unit on the 1993 World Trade 
Center bombing, the 1998 U.S. embassy bombings in Tanzania and Kenya, and the 2000 
USS Cole bombing in Yemen. After the 9/11 attacks, NYPD increased the number of 
detectives and supervisors assigned to JTTF from 17 to 125 (NYPD, 2009d). 
NY-JTTF pulls together some 500 investigators, analysts, and other experts from 
44 different government agencies in the region. Represented are officials from law 
enforcement, homeland security, the military, and the intelligence community. The daily 
task—“protecting NYC, one of the country’s ultimate terrorist targets, from possible 
terrorist attack by global jihadists and by homegrown radicals inspired by their ideology” 
(FBI, 2004). 
Joseph Demarest, a twenty-one-year veteran of the FBI and a lead investigator of 
FBI’s PENTBOMB (FBI’s 9/11 investigation) is the current Assistant Director in Charge 
of the FBI’s New York Division. Demarest chairs a weekly NY-JTTF meeting where he 
typically begins by briefing the contingent on the FBI’s latest investigations and 
initiatives, turning the floor over to his case agents and analysts for the telling details. He 
then goes around the room, agency representative by agency representative, calling on 
each to share what they know and what they have going on in the week ahead (FBI, 
2007a).  
NYPD personnel are assigned to interagency counterterrorism squads (CTs) that 
are headed by an FBI Special Agent. CTs investigate domestic and international terrorism 
under FBI guidelines and a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between NYPD and 
the FBI. Leads are received by the Terrorist Call Center and are vetted for response. 
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Typically, a response team conducts a preliminary investigation to determine the validity 
of the lead and makes recommendations for further action. Leads deemed actionable are 
assigned to CTs that are organized geographically and functionally. The assigned CT 
conducts a comprehensive investigation that might lead to other crimes, money 
laundering, human trafficking, bank robbery, identity theft, white-collar crime, and 
others. Overlapping investigations are synchronized at command level with the caveat 
that terrorism investigations trump all others. Two of the more prominent and publicly 
known NY-JTTF investigations include the 2006 JFK Airport and the 2009 Riverdale 
Synagogue Plots. 
a. 2006 JFK Airport Plot 
In January 2006, NY-JTTF learned that there was a plot to attack JFK 
airport in New York City. In the course of 18 months, NY-JTTF identified the suspects 
and had an informant getting firsthand information from the suspects. In the course of the 
investigation, NY-JTTF learned that the suspects, Russell Defreitas, a U.S. citizen and 
native of Guyana; Abdul Kadir, a citizen of Guyana; Kareem Ibrahim, a citizen of 
Trinidad; and Abdul Nur, a citizen of Guyana, conspired to “destroy buildings, fuel tanks, 
and fuel pipelines at JFK airport with explosives.” Kadir and Nur were longtime 
associates of Jamaat Al Muslimeen, a radical Muslim group from Trinidad and Tobago 
that was responsible for a deadly coup attempt in Trinidad in 1990. The conspirators 
tapped into an international network of Muslim extremists and utilized the knowledge, 
expertise, and contacts of the conspirators to develop and plan the plot, and obtain 
operational support and capability to carry it out. They obtained satellite photography of 
JFK airport and solicited the financial and technical assistance of others to attack the 
airport. NY-JTTF arrested all four suspects, who are currently awaiting trial (DOJ, 2007; 
FBI, 2007b). 
b. 2009 Riverdale Synagogues and Air National Guard Base Plot 
In 2008, FBI informant Shahed Hussain informed his NY-JTTF handlers 
that the people he was dealing with wanted to “do jihad.” The suspects, James Cromitie, 
David Williams, Onta Williams, and Laguerre Payen, talked about Jash-e-Mohammed, an 
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FBI-designated foreign terrorist organization based in Pakistan, and their desire to attack 
certain targets in New York, including a synagogue in the Bronx and Stewart Air 
National Guard base in Newburgh. Cromitie asked the informant if he could supply 
surface-to-air guided missiles and explosives. The informant disingenuously replied that 
he could provide C-4 plastic explosives. The group conducted surveillance of its intended 
targets, the Air National Guard base and the synagogues.  
In May 2009, the informant provided the suspects with an inoperable 
Stinger surface-to-air guided missile and 30 pounds of inert C-4 explosives. He told them 
that he had gotten the materials from Jaish-e-Mohammed, an Islamic mujahedeen 
organization based in the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. In May 2009, the suspects placed 
cell-phone detonators on bombs made from the inert C-4 explosives in three separate cars 
proximate to the Riverdale Temple and Riverdale Jewish Center in the Bronx. The 
suspects returned to their cars and were reportedly heading to Stewart Air National Guard 
Base when members of NYPD’s Emergency Service Unit and NY-JTTF moved in with 
armored vehicles and arrested the suspects without incident. All four suspects are 
currently being held without bond and are awaiting trial (DOJ, 2009b). 
2. Terrorist Threat Analysis Group 
The Terrorist Threat Analysis Group (TTAG) is the department’s strategic 
analytical arm and is responsible for evaluating worldwide threats with a focus on 
implications for New York City. In addition, TTAG is tasked with policy and legislative 
initiatives. The unit is comprised of uniformed members of the service and civilian 
intelligence research specialists, all of whom have regional and functional (CBRNE, 
cyber, financial) responsibilities. TTAG examines local and global events from all-source 
materials and produces unclassified intelligence products that are disseminated to NYPD 
Shield and other partners.  
3. NYPD Shield  
NYPD Shield is the Department’s flagship partnership program with New York 
City’s private security managers. The private sector is intimately familiar with its own 
setting and is in the best position to distinguish anomalous conditions and behaviors that 
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deviate from the norm. Fused with other information, those circumstances might be 
pieces of a larger criminal and/or terrorist enterprise and provide an essential element of 
intelligence. 
Prior to September 11, 2001, NYPD engaged the private sector through the Area 
Police Private Security Liaison and other networks. NYPD Shield collects those efforts 
under one umbrella and serves as a clearinghouse for threat updates, industry-specific 
counterterrorism information, and other key counterterrorism information. It is a network 
of 6,000 private security managers that provides exclusive briefings at police 
headquarters and access to the program’s website via password. NYPD Shield actively 
solicits security and terrorism-related information from its private sector partners and 
provides them with information and training specific to their industrial and geographic 
needs. NYPD emphasizes that this partnership is the cornerstone in defending the city 
and that the key to its success is a two-way flow of information (Kelly, 2009a; NYPD 
Shield, 2010). 
a. Operation Nexus 
Operation Nexus is a nationwide network of businesses that are committed 
to preventing terrorism. NYPD has visited over 30,000 businesses to encourage owners 
and operators to be alert to anomalous behaviors, requests, or transactions. NYPD 
believes that terrorists may portray themselves as legitimate customers to purchase or 
acquire training or lease certain material or equipment that might be used to facilitate a 
terrorist plot; the businesses are thus an essential element of the department’s 
counterterrorism efforts (Miller, 2007; NYPD Shield, 2010).  
b. Operation Sentry 
Operation Sentry is an NYPD outreach program that recognizes that the 
September 11 attacks began not in New York, but in Portland, Maine and Boston. 
Moreover, the 1993 World Trade Center, 2005 London bombings, and others were 
developed outside of their immediate target areas. NYPD invited police chiefs within a 
200-mile radius of New York City to get “in the game” of counterterrorism. 
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Approximately 100 state and local law enforcement agencies partner with NYPD to 
identify, detect, and defeat threats and provide prevention and deterrence training. New 
Haven Police Chief Franciso Ortiz, a Sentry partner, said of the program, “It’s 
invaluable.” He now gets updates on regional threats as they unfold, as well as bimonthly 
sessions in New York, featuring the latest threat assessments and training courses on 
improving security at sensitive sites. “They’re helping us become better listening posts in 
Connecticut for New York” (Miller, 2007; NYPD, 2009g). 
4. Red Cell Operations 
“Red Cell Operations” is a military term that connotes mechanisms that test one’s 
own defenses. Typically, personnel are directed to form red cells or teams and are 
directed to devise plans and operations to test the security of defensive assets. 
Counterterrorism red cell operations are atypical and asset-specific. CTB uses red cell 
operations to test the city’s defenses and to gather information that might detect, deter, or 
mitigate terrorism. Operations Kaboom and Green Cloud are two such initiatives. 
a. Operation Kaboom 
In December 2005, Inspector Michael O’Neil assembled a small team of 
detectives and told them to put together a truck bomb capable of taking down a New 
York City skyscraper. O’Neil told them to operate covertly but to use open sources like 
the Internet. The team, members of CTB, travelled to upstate New York and 
Pennsylvania. They purchased 2,450 pounds of ammonium nitrate and packed it into a 
rental vehicle similar to the one used in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. Notably, 
the fertilizer distributor did notify the Federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and 
Explosives (ATF), who were informed that NYPD was conducting an exercise. CTB 
constructed an inert vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) and transported 
it to the police firing range in Rodman’s Neck in the Bronx where the device was 
disposed of (NYPD, 2008e; Sheehan, 2008). 
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b. Operation Green Cloud 
In June 2007, in response to increased use of chlorine gas in roadside 
attacks in Iraq, CTB launched Operation Green Cloud to assess the ease with which it 
could purchase chlorine. Chlorine is a hazardous and regulated toxic-by-inhalation 
chemical. NYPD Intelligence Research Specialist Elan Delozier assessed the hazards and 
potential weaponization of chlorine gas. She noted the historical use of chlorine gas, 
especially the increasing use of chlorine attacks by terrorist and insurgents in truck 
bombs. Furthermore, it was noted that Al Qaeda expressed an interest in acquiring 
chemical weapons and that Osama bin Laden had requested and received a fatwa 
(religious edict) for the use of chemical weapons against civilians. 
Detective Todd Metro’s CTB team conducted a clandestine operation to 
purchase a large amount of chlorine gas. The team established a phony business, replete 
with a webpage, off-site mailbox, phone number, storage location, and a contract with the 
city of New York to clean Erie Basin. Using a credit card, CTB purchased three 100-
pound chlorine cylinders and arranged for their delivery to the storage location. The 
chlorine was delivered without incident and was safely disposed of (NYPD, 2008f). 
Operations Kaboom and Green Cloud demonstrate how information and intelligence 
facilitate police counterterrorism operations and how those same operations provide 
situational awareness of the current operating environment.  
5. Counterterrorism Bureau’s Other 
CTB’s other units—the Technology and Construction Section, the training 
section, TRIPS, CBRNE, the Maritime section, and the Emergency Preparedness 
Exercise section, conduct myriad operations and share information with public and 
private enterprises. Collectively, they inform and instruct the department’s criminal, 
counterterrorism, and intelligence operations.  
F. THE NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT’S GRAND 
STRATEGY: THREE C’S  
Clausewitz (1832/1993) advocates the concept of a grand strategy for the 
prosecution of war wherein the key elements of society—the army, the government, and 
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the people—are amalgamated into a triad to achieve war’s ultimate goal—a political end. 
Similarly, NYPD’s Clausewitzian strategy, the three Cs, amalgamates the army (NYPD), 
the government, and the people to seek an end—the security of New York City.  
John M. Bryson (2004) concludes that the environments in which public and 
nonprofit organizations operate have become increasingly uncertain and interconnected. 
Moreover, these changes reverberate unpredictably and often chaotically and dangerously 
throughout society. Bryson argues that this phenomenon requires a fourfold response 
from public and nonprofit organizations and from the community. They must 
• Think, act, and learn strategically as never before; 
• Translate their insights into effective strategies to cope with their changed 
circumstances; 
• Develop rationales to lay the groundwork for the adoption and 
implementation of their strategies; 
• Build coalitions that are large enough and strong enough to adopt 
desirable strategies and protect them through implementation.  
NYPD’s Three Cs strategy is conventional policing adapted to the current threat 
environment. It is a vast undertaking that seeks to affect the department’s mission. Its 
forward strategies and programs have facilitated NYPD’s intelligence enterprise. Three 
Cs is predicated on the presumption that New York City remains number one on al-
Qaeda’s target list and that events like September 11, 2001 might be detected, prevented, 
or mitigated. It fosters and nurtures conventional and unconventional relationships and 
coalitions that are global in scope. Three Cs is an affirmative means for SLTLE agencies 
to realize their intelligence requirements to protect their hometowns and the homeland.  
NYPD’s Three C’s represents the department’s response to the events of 
September 11, 2001 and the homeland security era. Early and throughout NYPD’s 
history, the department found itself in a state of affairs that, according to conventional 
wisdom, the police had little or no control over. Notwithstanding, NYPD has a penchant 
for maverick policing and reform.  
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In 1970, New York Mayor John V. Lindsay, responding to widespread complaints 
of police corruption and misconduct, appointed the Commission to Investigate Police 
Corruption. As a result, newly appointed Police Commissioner Patrick V. Murphy 
imposed innovative and proactive integrity measures that held all department members, 
and particularly commanders, accountable. In 1990, Mayor David N. Dinkins, citing the 
importance of “the relationship of the community and the police” appointed Lee P. 
Brown as police commissioner. Commissioner Brown implemented a department-wide 
community policing initiative. Brown had developed Neighborhood Oriented Policing, a 
version of CP while chief of police in Houston, Texas. Brown returned to Houston in 
1998 as mayor and expanded Neighborhood Oriented Policing and an adaptation of 
CompStat (Purdum, 1989; Lardner & Reppetto, 2000; Henry, 2003).  
In 1994, NYPD faced another crisis –skyrocketing crime. NYPD countered crime 
with CompStat, a crime-reduction program predicated on intelligence, response, tactics, 
follow-up, and accountability at all levels. Chapter V expounds on the genesis and 
evolution of CompStat. 
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Information didn’t flow easily from one bureau to another. Each bureau 
was like a silo: Information entered at the bottom and had to be delivered 
up the chain of command from one level to another until it reached the 
chief’s office. There it would wait to be dealt with. Even when a memo 
finally arrived, there was a less-than-acceptable level of cooperation 
between bureaus. At some point, it seemed like one would call another and 
have to take a number, like a bakery.  
–Former NYPD Police Commissioner Bratton’s initial analysis of NYPD, 
1994 (Bratton, 1998). 
A. NEW YORK CITY, 1993 
In 1994, newly elected Mayor Rudolf W. Giuliani appointed William J. Bratton as 
commissioner of NYPD. Crime was at an all-time high. In 1993, 1927 people had been 
murdered and another 5,861 people had been shot in New York City. Bratton told Mayor 
Giuliani that the entire culture of NYPD needed to be transformed and promised that the 
department would dramatically reduce crime, disorder, and fear throughout New York 
City. He intended to create an organization whose goal was to control and prevent crime, 
not just respond to it. With a program that would come to be known as CompStat, Bratton 
challenged the conventional wisdom espoused by academics, sociologists, and 
criminologists that crime was caused by societal problems that were impervious to police 
intervention. Bratton countered, “The police can and do matter” (NYPD, 2002; Bratton, 
1998).  
B. COMPSTAT DEFINED  
NYPD’s Student Guide (2009f) defines CompStat as “a process employed by 
NYPD to strategically direct efforts to reduce crime, reduce the fear of crime, improve 
the quality of life, and better manage the Department.” However, as in the case of 
community policing, problem-oriented policing, and intelligence-led policing, CompStat 
has many meanings and interpretations and no official manual of practice. 
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Bratton (1998) characterized CompStat as a multilayered approach to policing, 
that considers an organization holistically and accentuates accountability at all levels. It 
integrates the principles of conventional policing with community policing, problem-
oriented policing, and accountability. Bratton’s “simplistic definition” of community 
policing incorporates what he calls the traditional three Rs—rapid response, random 
patrol, and reactive investigation—and merges them with the three Ps—partnership, 
problem solving, and prevention.  
Jack Maple, Bratton’s Deputy Commissioner of Crime Strategies, said that 
CompStat is a management program that identifies problems and measures the results of 
its problem-solving activities (Maple & Mitchell, 1999). In essence, it is a crime-control 
strategy that emphasizes accurate and timely intelligence, rapid deployment, effective 
tactics, and relentless follow-up and assessment. Ratcliffe (2008) characterized CompStat 
as an accountability process that seeks to empower mid-level commanders to seek a rapid 
response to emerging crime problems and hotspots. The central medium is crime 
mapping, where recent crime data are mapped, viewed, and discussed by police 
commanders. Giuliani (2000) said of CompStat, “It is an excellent system, but the core of 
it is the principle of accountability. Holding the people, who run the precincts, 
accountable for achieving what the public wants them to do, which is to reduce crime.” 
C. COMPSTAT AND NYPD’S INTELLIGENCE ENTERPRISE 
CompStat serves three purposes in this thesis. First, its predication is a striking 
analogue to the findings of the 9/11 Commission—dysfunctional bureaucracies tolerated, 
even facilitated a lack of cooperation amongst their constituent parts. In both cases, 
information was not shared, departments were not held accountable, and terrible things 
happened that might have been prevented. Second, CompStat’s success—crime 
reduction—facilitated NYPD’s large-scale transfer of personnel from traditional law 
enforcement tasking to intelligence and counterterrorism operations. Finally, the thesis 
identifies CompStat as a smart practice that diffused to other police agencies and, as such, 
might serve as a model for NYPD’s intelligence program to diffuse to other police 
agencies.  
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CompStat has been recognized as a major innovation in American policing. Police 
departments across the country have adopted CompStat-like programs at rates that far 
exceed the rate of innovations in other social and technological areas. CompStat’s 
emergence and diffusion reflects transformative change in American policing. To 
understand CompStat and its relevancy to NYPD’s intelligence enterprise, it is necessary 
to trace its genesis and evolution and particularly to examine how select tenets of 
CompStat were adopted from NYPD’s CompStat model by numerous police agencies.  
D. GENESIS OF COMPSTAT 
Bratton is the former head of NYPD, Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD), 
and Boston Police Department (BPD). He is a U.S. Army Vietnam War veteran and is a 
graduate of the FBI National Executive Institute. He was a Senior Executive Fellow at 
the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. Bratton is the author 
of Turnaround: How America's Top Cop Reversed the Crime Epidemic (1998) and 
several articles on varied aspects of law enforcement and counterterrorism.  
Bratton entered BPD in 1970 as a patrolman. It was a time of rising crime, social 
permissiveness, and racial tension in Boston and the nation. In 1972, BPD implemented 
the 911 system and radio communications and pulled many of its police officers off the 
streets. Bratton would later observe that the police had moved from preventing crime to 
responding to it. They measured police effectiveness in terms of the three Rs. Noted 
criminal theorist George L. Kelling called it “stranger policing.” As was the case in much 
of America’s policing experience at the time, the impartiality and technological and 
organizational reforms championed by the reform era of policing remedied inefficiency. 
Notwithstanding, the same reforms that offered police efficacy alienated the citizenry and 
would prove incapable of adopting to a rapidly changing world (Boston Police 
Department, 2010; Bratton, 1998; Kelling & Moore, 1988). 
In 1973, Robert di Grazi, a progressive police thinker with a mandate from the 
mayor to reform BPD, was named police commissioner. He hired civilian experts, mostly 
academics, to introduce new advanced policing ideas to an organization that was not 
receptive to change. One of di Grazia’s basic philosophies was that police workers should 
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be involved in the change process, and to that end he invited officers to be part of that 
process. Bratton volunteered and was part of a unit of cops and civilians who literally 
replanned BPD. Bratton was assigned to headquarters and was exposed to revolutionary 
new ideas in police theory and practice: neighborhood policing, problem solving, police 
discretion, systems, marketing, and the media. His experiences taught him to look beyond 
BPD and the police profession for new ideas (Bratton, 1998). 
E. EVOLUTION OF COMPSTAT 
1. Boston-Fenway Program 
In 1977, while a sergeant at BPD, Bratton was chosen to manage the Boston-
Fenway Program. It was an innovative neighborhood-policing project in one of Boston's 
most racially, culturally, and economically diverse areas. Assaults, drug dealing, 
prostitution, public drinking, and loud parties were not being dealt with effectively by the 
police, and rising crime threatened the vitality of this neighborhood. The program, a not-
for-profit consortium of businesses and private institutions, banded together to develop a 
partnership between private institutions, police, and the community to address the area’s 
deteriorating situation and to spur development.  
Bratton involved the community, corporations, city government, and academics, 
and embraced the media. He organized community meetings that included the patrol 
force as well as community-affairs officers to facilitate communication and information 
sharing. It turned out that “the police had one perception of the largest problem in an area 
and the neighborhoods had another one altogether.” The results of the meetings were a 
surprise: few people complained about violent crime, but they “were complaining about 
the so-called signs of crime, the constant irritants, filth in the street, and noisy parties.” 
Bratton developed the Neighborhood Responsive Plan that restructured the patrol 
force and the 911 system. He created maps that depicted crime-prone locations with 
color-coded dots that facilitated crime-prevention strategies, including the deployment of 
personnel and resources that might prevent criminal activity and improve the quality of 
life in those areas. The 911 system was customized to prioritize crimes in progress and 
assign non-emergency calls for service to neighborhood service police cars.  
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The Boston-Fenway Program worked; the police and the community effectively 
collaborated; crime declined; tourist, residents, and investment returned; and the 
proposed redevelopment was brought about (Bratton, 1998). 
2. “Billy Boards” 
Bratton advanced to the rank of superintendent and initiated an information and 
intelligence system called “Billy Boards,” 14 clipboards that codified and collated crime 
index, clearance rate, overtime, response time, personnel, sick time, deactivated calls, 
bureau statistics, district statistics, 911 calls, total calls, zero-car availability, homicide, 
and workload analysis. “Billy boards” were eventually installed in every police district in 
Boston. They provided a profile of the entire city and timely and accurate intelligence to 
be analyzed and acted upon quickly. In intelligence parlance, Billy boards served as 
early-warning mechanisms that afforded the commander situational awareness. 
3. Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority Police Department 
In 1983, Bratton was recruited to take over the much-beleaguered Massachusetts 
Bay Transportation Authority (MBTA) Police Department. It was a demoralized 65-
person force that had received a great deal of negative publicity. No one seemed to be in 
charge; ranking officers arrived at a crime scene and quietly asked, “What’s going on?” 
Department radios were old, beat up, and didn’t reach into or out of the subways. MBTA 
police had few cars, and the ones that they did have were typically dilapidated wrecks.  
Bratton showed up at crime scenes in uniform and “expected to be approached by 
the officer in charge and given a complete briefing.” He installed a $4 million 
communications system that enabled direct communications with other police 
departments and facilitated joint police efforts. He rode the trains, changed the 
department’s uniforms, got new vehicles, and changed the markings and logos on 
cruisers. Bratton gave MBTA police a new identity, and it worked. In three years, from 
1983 to 1986, an obscure “backwater” police department had lowered its crime rate by 27 
percent and was accredited by the National Commission on Accreditation for Police 
Agencies; MBTA ridership also went up (Bratton, 1998).  
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4. Metropolitan Police Service  
In 1986, Bratton was recruited to take over another troubled police department, 
the Metropolitan Police, a state agency responsible for parks, reservoirs, beaches, 
parkways, and highways. The Mets lacked everything: systems, equipment, 
accountability, procedures, protocols, and discipline. Bratton assembled a team of doers 
that came up with a plan of action that identified the department’s major strengths and 
weaknesses, defined its role with its parent agency, developed a written values statement, 
and implemented the changes needed to bring the organization into the modern world.  
Bratton made personnel changes and instituted his “Billy boards.” He acquired 
new equipment and a helicopter, established a uniform committee, and infused promotion 
ceremonies with deliberate pomp and circumstance. The Mets got results: they were 
having an effect on crime and were getting positive media coverage. In 1990, the Mets’ 
turnaround was so successful that the Massachusetts State Police wanted to and did take 
over the Mets (Bratton, 1998). 
5. Broken Windows and Community Policing 
In 1987, Bratton received the Police Executive Research Forum’s (PERF) Gary 
Hayes Award for turning around two different police forces and having an effect on 
crime. Bratton was attracted to PERF and other advanced centers of police thinking, 
including the Police Foundation and the Executive Session of Policing at Harvard 
University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government. Bratton was particularly drawn to 
James Q. Wilson and George Kelling’s “Broken Windows: The Police and Neighborhood 
Safety” (1982) and Kelling’s “Police and Communities: The Quiet Revolution” (1988), 
which advanced the broken-window theory and a return to community-problem solving. 
The broken-window theory concludes that social problems are best addressed 
when they are small, i.e., if you don't repair broken windows (problems) within a short 
time, other windows (other problems) are more likely to be broken (arise) in the 
proximate area. The windows are a metaphor for communal barriers, the sense of mutual 
regard, and the obligations of civility. When the barriers are lowered, it signals that no 
one cares. Wilson and Kelling held that "just as physicians recognize the importance of 
 93
fostering health rather than simply treating illness, so the police—and the rest of us—
ought to recognize the importance of maintaining intact communities without broken 
windows.” Bratton (1998) supported what Wilson and Kelling had written because he 
had already lived it; the Boston-Fenway Program convinced him of the approach.  
6. New York City Transit Police Department 
The New York City Metropolitan Transit Authority and its subsidiary, the New 
York City Transit Authority (NYCTA), hired Kelling and Bob Waserman to study the 
idea of merging the New York City Transit Police Department (NYTP) with NYPD. The 
New York City subway system was a horror: crime was skyrocketing, graffiti was 
rampant, ridership was dropping, and fear was pervasive. Kelling and Waserman 
concluded that a merger was not in the interest of NYCTA, rather, what was needed was 
a leader. They recommended Bratton.  
In 1990, Bratton was appointed chief of NYTP, a 4,000-person police department 
that patrolled the subways and bus lines. NYCTA wanted to reduce crime, disorder, fare 
evasion, and ultimately to restore confidence in the system. Bratton toured the subways 
and compared them to Dante’s Inferno. Homeless people and aggressive panhandlers 
were a pervasive element, and paying your fare seemed to be an option. He assembled 
another team of doers; people who knew the city, the transit system, and NYTP. Bratton 
rode the trains and talked to every transit cop he came across. NYTP were demoralized. It 
seemed that NYCTA had relegated them to protecting transit revenue; their radios didn’t 
work; their equipment and vehicles were shoddy; and when compared to the NYPD, they 
were second-rate. 
Bratton realized that the subways were broken windows incarnate. NYCTA had 
already conducted a graffiti campaign and had virtually wiped out graffiti on all trains. 
Despite this, surveys indicated that 20 percent of city residents thought that graffiti still 
existed in the subways. Moreover, the perception of crime in the subways far exceeded 
the actual crime rate. When asked what percentage of the city’s crime they thought was 
committed on the subways, respondents said 30–40 percent, when in fact only 3 percent 
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of the city’s crime occurred on the subway. To counter that perception, NYCTA 
conducted an advertising campaign to upgrade the image of NYCTA and NYTP.  
“Fare evasion was the biggest broken window in the transit system. We were 
going to fix that window and see to it that it didn’t get broken again,” Bratton said. About 
170,000 people evaded the fare every day. Massive fare-evasion sweeps were conducted 
day and night. It became evident that many of the arrestees were “exactly the ones that 
were causing other problems once inside the subway.” NYTP found that “one out of 
every seven persons arrested for fare evasion had an outstanding warrant for a previous 
crime” and one of 21 was carrying some type of weapon” (Bratton, 1998). 
Lieutenant Jack Maple, an aggressive street cop, with a reputation for innovative 
policing, submitted a ten-page document outlining ideas for reducing crime and 
improving NYTP to Chief Bratton. Maple was a key player on Bratton’s NYTP team and 
later served as NYPD Deputy Commissioner of Police Strategies. He had a million ideas: 
targeting fare beating, warrants, wolf-pack robberies, interrogation, interviewing, crime 
analysis, and coordinated deployment between detectives and plainclothes and uniformed 
officers.  
Maple had his own “crook-tracking system” that included “the charts of the 
future” that identified each of New York Transit Authority’s 430 subway stations and 
indicated the times, dates, locations, and the particulars of past crimes with color-coded 
dots. Maple’s charts were kin to Bratton’s “Billy boards” and were instrumental in the 
apprehension of some of the subway’s most prolific “criminals” (Maple, 1999). Like the 
Billy boards, Maple’s “charts of the future” served as an early-warning system for 
commanders. In two years (1990–1992) felony crime in the subway decreased by 22 
percent, fare evasion was cut in half, and ridership increased (Kim & Mauborgne, 2003).  
7. Back to Boston—Commissioner Bratton 
In 1993, Bratton was offered and accepted the position of police commissioner of 
the Boston Police Department. He implemented neighborhood policing, new and 
innovative training programs, and new technologies –computer case management, photo-
imaging, and online booking and fingerprinting capabilities.  
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Joan Brody, a former student of Kelling at Harvard’s John F. Kennedy School of 
Government was able to communicate with the White House. President William J. 
Clinton was pushing for a national crime bill that would put 100,000 police officers on 
the street. Bratton, representing American police chiefs, stood in the Rose Garden with 
President Clinton when the bill was announced. When the bill passed, BPD received 
significant funding (Bratton, 1998).  
F. NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT COMPSTAT 
1. Commitment to Crime Prevention 
In 1993, New York mayor-elect Giuliani offered Bratton the police 
commissioner’s job in New York City. Bratton assembled a start-up team to analyze 
NYPD from top to bottom. He found that NYPD was militarily oriented, with a strict 
chain of command, and concluded that the department had people bluffed. They were 
good at responding to crime; they just weren’t good at preventing it. Bratton was 
determined that his administration was going to commit itself to crime prevention.  
Bratton supported a proposal from John Linder, a confidante from NYCTA and 
BFD, that the New York City Police Foundation18 hire Linder’s firm to work up what he 
called a cultural diagnostic of NYPD: 
An analytical tool that determines the cultural factors impeding 
performance and the corrective values that must be employed as principles 
for organizational change. … To this end, the analysis defines the cultural 
assets; cultural obstacles to change; inherited operating culture; inherited 
core identity; and values that must guide revision of key organizational 
systems to institutionalize a new, high performance culture. 
Bratton agreed and persuaded the foundation to provide the funding. The results 
were striking: the study found that the basic aim of NYPD was not to bring down crime 
but to avoid criticism from the media, politicians, and the public. NYPD was structured 
to protect its good name rather than to achieve crime-fighting goals. Notwithstanding,  
 
                                                 
18 The New York City Police Foundation is a not-for-profit civic organization that was established in 
1971 by business and civic leaders to strengthen the services of NYPD and to improve public safety in New 
York City. 
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Giuliani and Bratton’s strongly-voiced support for the department had encouraged people 
throughout the organization, but they were waiting to see what Giuliani and Bratton 
would do (Bratton, 1998).  
2. CompStat Strategy  
Bratton and his startup team wanted to hit the ground running. Their first initiative 
was Strategy Number 1, “Getting Guns off the Streets of New York.” Simply stated, guns 
off the streets equates to less crime. To that end, NYPD adopted the mantra “Ask a 
Question - Solve a Crime,” and questioned everyone arrested in possession of a weapon 
in New York City. Arrestees were asked: Where did you get the gun? and Do you know 
anybody else with more guns? The department’s policy was to Just ask! The strategy 
called for arresting officers to turn arrestees into confidential informants (CIs) in order to 
get more guns and criminals off the street. It worked: guns and criminals were taken off 
the street, and violent crime started to decline (Silverman, 1999). 
Maple worked on the gun strategy and others. He doodled on napkins ideas about 
what police departments need to operate as an “undeterable force against crime” and 
captured the sin qua non of NYPD’s crime strategies (Maple & Mitchell 1999). To 
control crime we must at all times have:  
• Accurate and Timely Intelligence 
• Rapid Deployment 
• Effective Tactics 
• Relentless Follow-up and Assessment  
Bratton (1998) noted that Maple was an avid historian and drew an analogy from 
the Battle of Britain:  
Germany was getting ready to invade the British Isles. The British had 
fled Dunkirk and had only 450 Spitfires to protect their cities, while the 
Germans had thousands of bombers able to attack anywhere in England. 
However, the British had one thing the Germans didn’t: radar. Despite 
very few resources, the British knew where the enemy was. Using their 
radar information, they were able to mobilize the 450 Spitfires exactly 
against the German bombers.  
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Timely, accurate intelligence; rapid response; effective tactics, relentless 
follow-up—that’s what won the Battle of Britain and that’s how we were 
going to win the battle of New York.  
a. Accurate and Timely Intelligence: CompStat Report  
Bratton wanted a snapshot of what NYPD was doing on crime.19 At the 
time, NYPD compiled crime statistics for the FBI’s Uniformed Crime Reporting (UCR) 
system on a quarterly basis. That process informed the department about crime that had 
happened months ago when little or nothing could be done about it. Bratton wanted to 
know where NYPD was on crime on a weekly basis. More importantly, he wanted to 
know what NYPD was doing about it. To that end, NYPD created the weekly CompStat 
report that depicts citywide, patrol borough, and each precinct’s crime and enforcement 
statistics on a weekly, twenty-eight-day, and annual basis. The cover sheet of the weekly 
report (Table 2) depicts citywide crime for the week of 12/21/09–12/27/2009, the twenty-
eight-day CompStat period, and the year. It also provides a 2-, 8-, and 16-year 
comparison. Secondary reports detail shootings, arrests, and summonses.  
                                                 
19 Crime as used here refers to murder, rape, robbery, burglary, grand larceny, and grand larceny auto, 
as defined in the New York State Penal Law.  
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Table 2.   CompStat Report Vol. 16, No. 32 
 
 
An adjunct to the CompStat report is the commander profile report. 
Similar to Bratton’s “Billy boards” and Maples’s “charts of the future,” the report profiles 
each precinct’s population, demographics, personnel, civilian complaints, number of 
department vehicle accidents, sick rates, line-of-duty injuries, response times, overtime, 
domestic violence calls, and so forth. The report enhances the transparency of the 
department’s management and lets people inside and outside the department know how 
well they are performing in relation to others (NYPD, 1998). 
b. Rapid Deployment: “Be Informed—Be Aware—Be Part of the 
Team” 
The CompStat report is not per se intelligence; rather, it is a quantification 
of crime that affords an overview of the playing field—the streets of New York. 
Ancillary analytics identify the particulars of crimes and particularly clusters and 
patterns. Those analytics facilitate the deployment of personnel and resources. Precinct 
commanding officers are the department’s quarterbacks. They call the plays by 
coordinating the efforts of both precinct and specialty unit personnel. Teamwork is  
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critical. Knowing when, where, how, and who is committing what crimes, coupled with 
an intimate knowledge of the neighborhood, will disrupt criminal operations and 
apprehend perpetrators. 
c. Effective Tactics: “Failure to Plan Is Planning to Fail” 
Developing and implementing tactical plans requires an intimate 
knowledge of crime conditions. Tactics must be flexible to reflect changing conditions. 
Everyone concerned must know what is expected of him in terms of response. Moreover, 
everyone must understand the roles of all members of the team.  
d. Relentless Follow-up and Assessment: “What Gets Measured, 
Gets Done”  
Bratton instituted twice weekly crime-control strategy meetings or 
CompStat meetings at headquarters. CompStat meetings typically involve a patrol 
borough and its resident precincts, patrol service areas, and transit divisions. In addition, 
specialized support and enforcement units are brought in to demonstrate that they are 
facilitating the particular patrol borough.  
Individual precinct commanders are called to a lectern to present the state 
of their respective commands. They are typically questioned by the Deputy 
Commissioner of Operations, Chief of Department, and other high-ranking members of 
the department about crime and other exceptional conditions in their precincts. 
Specialized units and particularly the detective bureau are called upon to show how they 
are communicating and sharing information with individual precincts. All participants are 
called upon to demonstrate that they have identified their role in the precinct’s 
overarching strategy and are coordinating their efforts to prevent crime. Furthermore, 
similar meetings are held periodically at patrol borough and precinct level to ensure 
cross-unit coordination and information sharing.  
3. Strategies and Amazing Results 
Maples’s napkin doodlings are enshrined in CompStat lore and were successively 
incorporated into each successive strategy: 
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• Strategy Number 2: Curbing Youth Violence in the Schools and on the 
Street (1995) 
• Strategy Number 3: Drug Dealers out of New York (1995) 
• Strategy Number 4: Breaking the Cycle of Domestic Violence (1995) 
• Strategy Number 5: Reclaiming the Public Spaces of New York (1995) 
• Strategy Number 6: Reducing Auto-Related Crime in New York (1995) 
• Strategy Number 7: Rooting Out Corruption, Building Organizational 
Integrity in the New York Police Department (1995) 
• Strategy Number 8: Reclaiming the Roads of New York (1995) 
• Strategy Number 9: Bringing Fugitives to Justice (1996) 
• Strategy Number 10: Courtesy, Professionalism, Respect (1997) (NYPD, 
1998) 
The results were incredible: in 1994, NYPD reported 377,266 crimes, 52,994 (-
12.3%) fewer than in 1993, and 1582 murders, 345 (17.9%) fewer than in 1993 (NYPD, 
2002).  
4. Continued Success  
NYPD continues to practice CompStat. Three successor police commissioners, 
Howard Safir, Bernard B. Kerik, and current Commissioner Kelly have added their 
indelible touches and have perpetuated CompStat’s crime reduction legacy. 
In 2008, Mayor Bloomberg and Commissioner Kelly noted that, despite economic 
slowdown, crime continued to decrease citywide. They credited the men and women of 
NYPD, technological advances like the Real Time Crime Center (RTCC), legislative 
initiatives, and Operation Impact. RTCC integrates 27 databases and provides 
information and investigatory support to detectives investigating violent crime in real 
time. Legislatively, the city lobbied and achieved what amounted to the toughest gun 
laws in the country and has successfully sued out-of-state gun dealers who sold guns 
illegally. Operation Impact is a crime-suppression initiative that floods high-crime areas 
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with police officers and has achieved a 30 percent reduction in crime in those areas since 
the program began in 2003.  
CompStat lived up to its vision to reduce crime and improve the quality of life in 
New York City. In 2009, NYPD reported 104,462 crimes, 325,998 (-75.49%) fewer than 
1993, and 461 murders, 1,466 (-74.9%) fewer than 1993 (NYPD, 2002, 2008g, 2009h). 
Numerous other police agencies came to know of CompStat and its promise of dramatic 
crime reduction, and they emulated the practice en masse. CompStat is a smart practice 
that has diffused across the landscape of American policing. Similarly, NYPD’s 
intelligence enterprise might diffuse in like fashion. The following chapter discusses how 
CompStat diffused and provides a template for the NYPD intelligence program’s 
diffusion.  
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VI. DIFFUSION OF COMPSTAT  
Our problem is to learn why, given one hundred different innovations 
conceived of at the same time—innovations in the form of words, in 
mythological ideas, in industrial processes, etc.—ten will spread abroad 
while ninety will be forgotten.  
–Gabriel Tarde, 1903 
A. NYPD —THE NATION’S LARGEST AND BY ANY MEANS THE MOST 
EXCEPTIONAL POLICE DEPARTMENT 
This thesis argues that, like CompStat, NYPD’s intelligence enterprise might 
diffuse to other SLTLE agencies. It has been asserted that NYPD is the nation’s largest 
and by any means the most exceptional police department (Silverman, 1999; Henry 2003; 
Willis, Mastrofski, & Weisburd, 2003). Notwithstanding NYPD’s uniqueness, CompStat 
rapidly diffused to numerous police agencies. CompStat did not diffuse in “cookie-cutter” 
fashion; rather, police agencies observed the practices of CompStat and subsequently 
adopted elements of the process tailored to their particular realities, needs, and objectives. 
Likewise, SLTLE agencies might observe NYPD’s intelligence program and select 
elements thereof suited to their particular realities, needs and objectives.  
David A Klinger (2003) concludes that an understanding of the diffusion of 
innovation framework can enhance current understanding of criminal justice structure 
and operations beyond police anti-crime programs, particularly regarding where they 
might be heading in the future. To that end, this chapter examines the process of diffusion 
of innovation and its applicability to CompStat and NYPD’s intelligence enterprise. 
B. COMPSTAT: IMPETUS, EMERGENCE, AND DIFFUSION 
The impetus for CompStat was former New York City Police Commissioner 
Bratton’s effort to compel NYPD to adopt strategies that would reduce crime and 
improve the quality of life in New York City. CompStat evolved from management and 
crime-prevention theories and practices that had been successfully implemented by 
Bratton in several police departments. In 1996, CompStat earned the prestigious Harvard 
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John F. Kennedy School of Government's Innovations in American Government Award 
and was lauded as the “emerging police paradigm” and “perhaps the single most 
important organizational/administrative innovation in policing during the latter half of the 
twentieth century” (Walsh, 2001; Willis, Mastrofski, & Weisburd, 2003).  
The tenets of CompStat diffused rapidly: in 1999, 58.2 percent of all large police 
departments in the United States stated that they either used a CompStat-like program or 
intended to implement one (Weisburd et al., 2004).20 Furthermore, it has been proposed 
that the principles of CompStat should be integrated into counterterrorism strategies 
(McDonald, 2003; Kelling & Bratton, 2004; Henry, 2006; Gordon, 2007; Winski, 2008).  
C. DIFFUSION 
Everett M. Rogers (1962) defines diffusion as the process by which an innovation 
spreads. He maintains that there are four crucial elements of diffusion.  
1. The Innovation  
An innovation is an idea perceived as new by the individual; “it is the newness of 
the idea to the individual that determines his reaction to it.”  
2. Communication from One Individual to Another 
The essence of the diffusion process is the human interaction in which one person 
communicates a new idea to another person. The social relationships of the 
communicator and the person who does not know about the innovation have a great deal 
to say about both the telling of the innovation and the results of the telling.  
3. Adoption in a Social System 
While the decision maker may be influenced by others in his system, adoption is 
largely an individual decision by the decision maker. However, certain innovations may 
require a group decision. The norms of the social system and the status of the individuals 
in the system affect the diffusion of ideas. Not all members of a system play equivalent 
roles in diffusing ideas. Opinion leaders are individuals from whom others seek 
                                                 
20  A large police department is categorized as having 100+ sworn officers. A small police department 
has fewer than 100 sworn officers (DOJ, 2004). 
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information and advice and are most often members of the social system in which they 
exert their influence. A change agent is a professional person who attempts to influence 
adoption decisions in a direction that he feels is desirable.  
4. Adoption Over Time 
The adoption process is a mental process through which an individual passes from 
first hearing about an innovation to final adoption. There are five stages in the process: 
awareness, interest, evaluation, trial, and adoption. The adopter may either accept and 
continue the use of the innovation, accept and discontinue the use of the innovation, or 
reject an innovation. Innovativeness is defined as the degree to which an individual is 
relatively earlier in adopting new ideas than other members in his/her social system. 
Adopter categories represent the classification of individuals within a social system on a 
basis of innovativeness and include innovators, early adopters, early majority, late 
majority, and laggards.  
D. THE DIFFUSION OF HYBRID CORN—A DIFFUSION EXEMPLAR 
1. Successful Diffusion of a Rational Technique of Hybrid Corn 
 Bruce Ryan and Neal T. Gross’s (1943) empirical exposition of the rapid 
diffusion of the use of hybrid corn in the United States provides some factual knowledge 
of conditions attendant to the successful diffusion of a rational technique. Hybrid seed 
corn, a productive agricultural innovation, was first made available in 1928 or 1929, 
when a few experimenters became acquainted with it. By 1937, it had become a 
nationally important production factor. Between 1933 and 1939, acreage in hybrid corn 
increased from an estimated 40,000 to 24 million acres (about one-fourth of the nation’s 
corn acreage). 
2. A Good Economic Farm Practice 
The spread of the use of hybrid corn represents the successful diffusion of what 
“can almost unqualifiedly be called a ‘good economic farm practice.’ ” Ryan and Gross 
conducted a study in the summer of 1941 to ascertain the process through which hybrid 
seed was absorbed into the “techniways” of the Corn Belt. The study considered the 
setting for the adoption of the hybrid, the Depression, the Agricultural Adjustment Act, 
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and two droughts that reduced the amount of farm acreage and made a productive seed 
more favorable.21 The hybrid was promoted by commercial interests, and comparative 
yield tests were published. Moreover, the advantages of the hybrid were visible in 
account books; they showed up tangibly to every drought-wearied farmer in Iowa (Ryan 
& Gross, 1943). 
3. Hybrid Seed “Takes the Field” 
Ryan and Gross used two communities in central Iowa that totaled 323 farmers.22 
Figure 10 shows the comparative percentages of all operators first hearing of hybrid corn 
and the percentages first adopting it. Allowing a lag time of roughly five years between 
first knowledge and first adoption, some differences are worth noting. The modal 
frequency in knowledge came seven years after the first operator heard of the seed and 
the modal frequency in adoption occurred ten years after the trait was first accepted. The 
preliminary stages of diffusion were somewhat slower in terms of adoption than in 
knowledge; once the wave of adoption swelled, hybrid practically “took the field” in the 
space of four years (1936–1939) (Ryan & Gross, 1943). 
                                                 
21 The Agricultural Adjustment Act was one piece of President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s New Deal 
legislation. It was an attempt to balance supply and demand for farm commodities. The act offered 
government subsidies to farmers to not use part of their land for certain crops that included corn. 
22 Sixty-four of the operators had started farming since hybrid corn began its spread and were excluded 





Figure 10.   Percentage of Farm Operators First Hearing of Hybrid Corn and Percentages 
First Accepting It (Source: The Diffusion of Hybrid Corn (Ryan & Gross, 1943)) 
4. Adopters 
The early adopters provided a community laboratory from which neighbors could 
gain vicarious experience with some new seed over a period of time. Notwithstanding, 
despite the advantages demonstrated by community experience in hybrid, most operators 
insisted upon personal experimentation before complete acceptance. The majority of 
operators did not turn their corn acreage completely to hybrid; the mean hybrid planting 
for the operators was 12 percent of total corn acreage. Ryan and Gross found that 
neighbors were the predominant influence toward hybrid acceptance. They observed that 
the spread of knowledge and the spread of conviction are, analytically at least, distinct 
processes and in this case have appeared to operate in part through different although 
complementary channels (Ryan  and Gross, 1943).23  
Ryan and Gross recognized that the acceptance sequence of hybrid seed followed 
a bell-shaped pattern and that the cumulative frequency curve of acceptance is similar to 
                                                 
23 Forty-nine percent of operators cited salesmen as their earliest source of knowledge of the hybrid; 
14.6 percent of operators cited neighbors as their earliest source of knowledge of the hybrid; 45.5 percent 
cited neighbors as the most influential source of knowledge of the hybrid; 32.0 percent cited salesman as 
the most influential source of knowledge of the hybrid, of which two-thirds of the early adopters attributed 
their adoption of hybrid to the influence of salesmen and two-thirds of the later adopters attributed their 
adoption of hybrid to the influence of neighbors. 
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the S curve. However, the figure below demonstrates that the instance of diffusion did not 
follow a normal frequency distribution: there is a wide difference between expected 
behavior and observed behavior that is statistically highly significant (Chi squared = 
21.67, d.f.9.).24 
Ryan and Gross (1943) conclude that the normal frequency does not appear to be 
a concept closely adapted to this condition where pressures and reasons for adoption 
become increasingly acute with passing time. It seems doubtful if any theoretical pattern 
can adequately conform to situations involving all degrees of interaction and isolation 
and particularly to intra- as well as to inter-societal diffusion. “The twisting of 
sociological phenomena into the analytical framework of other fields is not only sterile, 
but may actually retard the development of useful sociological tools.” Moreover, “if there 





Figure 11.   Observed and Expected (Normal) Distributions of Farm Operators According 
to Year Hybrid Corn Was Accepted for Planting 
                                                 
24 The S curve reflects phenomena wherein learning curves display a progression from small 
beginnings that accelerates and approaches a climax over time and plateaus. The frequency differed from 
the normal curve in three ways: 1) the total time span was four years less than expected, 2) the expected 
frequencies are greater than that observed in the final years of acceptance and less than in the very early 
years, and 3) the expected frequencies are greatly concentrated at the mode and the two years following it. 
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E. THE DIFFUSION OF COMPSTAT  
Weisburd et al., (2004) observed that police leaders around the nation were 
interested in and willing to explore CompStat. They examined the widespread diffusion 
of CompStat across the landscape of American policing and asked why American police 
departments were adopting the CompStat model. In 1999, they surveyed a sampling of 
the small departments and 445 of the existing 515 large police departments in the United 
States to answer that question.25  
1. Large and Small Police Department Implementation 
Weisburd et al. found that CompStat models had been adopted widely across 
American police agencies. When asked whether they had implemented a CompStat-like 
program:  
• 11.1 percent of small departments and 29.3 percent of the large 
departments answered that their department had implemented a CompStat-
like program.26  
• 50.3 percent of the small departments and 58.2 percent of the large 
departments answered that their department had either implemented a 
CompStat-like program or were planning to do so.  
2. Year of CompStat Implementation 
Weisburd et al. asked departments when their CompStat program was 
implemented. As they expected and as the diagram below demonstrates; the large growth 
of implementation occurred after the New York program had begun to gain wide-scale 
publicity. A third of large departments had implemented a CompStat-like program within  
 
                                                 
25 In 1999, the U.S. Bureau of Justice Statics recognized 698 small police departments (50-99 Sworn 
officers) and 515 large police departments (100 +sworn officers). The response rate for the sample was 
85/100 of a random sample of 100 of 698 small police departments (85 %) and 445/515 of all large police 
departments (86.4%). It is noted that Weisburd et al (2004) is the only available research that delineates in 
like fashion the adoption of CompStat by police agencies. 
26 Weisburd et al., (2004) decided that since the number of small departments that had implemented a 
CompStat-like program was small, with noted exceptions, the examination of CompStat would be limited 
to large police departments.  
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10 years after NYPD’s implementation: “This is five years less than the fifteen-year 
period Arnold Grubler (1991) predicts it takes the quickly diffused technologies to 





Figure 12.   Year CompStat Implemented (Source: Weisburd et al. (2004)) 
Significantly, 18 departments of the large agencies sampled reported 
implementation “before” 1994, the year that NYPD introduced CompStat. It appears that 
in those cases, departments believed that they had implemented the essential “elements” 
of CompStat even before New York City’s model had become prominent.  
3. Innovation Adoption Curve 
Weisburd et al. compared the adoption of CompStat to other social or 
technological innovations. In the figure below, the researchers depicted the innovation 




Figure 13.   Innovation Adoption Curve for Large Police Agencies (Source: Weisburd et 
al., 2004) 
Using extrapolated data from the innovation adoption curve and assuming that the 
adoption of an innovation generally “follows a bell-shaped curve” when plotted as a 
frequency distribution, they developed the cumulative adoption curve of Figure 14.27 
Based on this distribution and allowing saturation to include all police departments in the 
sample, the researchers estimate a 90 percent saturation level between 2006 and 2007. If 
the adoption of CompStat-like programs were to follow the growth rates in the data, the 
researchers concluded that CompStat would rank among the most quickly diffused forms 
of innovation.28 
                                                 
27 Weisburd et al. relied upon the observed data between 1995 and 1998. They excluded 1999 because 
of the timing of the survey and 1995 because the number of cases was relatively small and likely to lead to 
unstable estimates.  In developing an estimated value for the standard deviation unit of the normal curve, 
they compared each year’s frequency between 1995 and 1998 and then took the average estimate gained. 
After defining the normal frequency distribution, Weisburd et al. converted the estimates to a cumulative 
distribution curve. Their prediction is predicated on the works of Arnulf Grubler’s “Diffusion and Long-
Term Patterns and Discontinuities” (1991) and Everett M. Roger’s Diffusion of Innovations (1995). 




Figure 14.   Cumulative Adaptive Curve (Source: Weisburd et al., 2004) 
4. Role of the New York City Police Department in Implementation 
Weisberd et al. found that while departments that implemented CompStat-like 
programs have also visited Los Angeles, New Orleans, or Broward County, Florida, all 
places that have publicized CompStat programs, New York is clearly the site where most 
police agencies go to learn about this innovation. Moreover, the “profound” influence of 
New York City’s promotion of CompStat becomes even more apparent when considering 
the level of familiarity that the surveyed departments claim to have with New York City’s 
CompStat program. 
5. Size of the Department Matters 
As Figure 15 illustrates, there is a direct linear relationship between department 
size and the implementation of CompStat programs. The relationship is strong and 




Figure 15.   Number of Sworn Personnel (Source: Weisburd et al., 2004) 
6. CompStat Departments by Region 
Weisburd et al. found a statistically significant relationship of p=<.05 between 
geographic region and implementation of CompStat-like programs (see Figure 16): 40 
percent of large departments in the South have implemented CompStat. Conversely, 26 
percent of large departments in the Northeast have implemented a CompStat-like 
program. They suggest that this distribution reflects a more general phenomenon in 
American policing over the last decade: while innovation, as in the case of CompStat 
may begin in older police agencies in the East or Central regions of the country, police in 





Figure 16.   Geographic Linkage to CompStat (Source: Weisburd et al., 2004) 
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7. Motivation for Adopting CompStat 
Weisburd et al. found that the dominant motivations for implementing ComStat 
are to secure management control over field operations that will reduce serious crime.  
8. Conclusions  
Weisburd et al. concluded that CompStat had “burst” onto the American policing 
scene. They suggest that CompStat is being differentially implemented in police agencies 
and that large police departments are more likely to adopt CompStat-like programs. 
Weisburd et al. suggest that the adoption of CompStat is “strongly” related to a 
department’s expressed desire to reduce serious crime and increase management control 
over field operations. Moreover, the researchers found that agencies that had adopted 
CompStat programs are much less likely to focus on improving skills and morale of 
street-level officers. The researchers conclude that this suggests that CompStat may 
represent a departure from the priorities of “bubble-up” community-policing programs 
that rely on initiative from street-level officers. 
F. ANALYSIS OF COMPSTAT ADOPTION 
1. The Vision and Reality of CompStat 
Willis, Mastrofski, and Weisburd (2003) assessed how CompStat worked in three 
police Departments –Lowell, Massachusetts (LPD), Minneapolis, Minnesota (MPD), and 
Newark, New Jersey (NPD).29 They offer a thorough, empirical evaluation of how 
CompStat is changing the structure, management, and practices of police organizations. 
They found that the creators and advocates of CompStat present it as a way to transform 
sluggish, unresponsive police organizations into efficient and smart organizations. 
                                                 
29 LPD adopted the nomenclature “CompStat”; MPD uses the term “CODEFOR” for Computerized 
Optimized Deployment-Focus on Results; NPD uses “Comstat” for Command Status Report. For ease of 
communication, this thesis uses the term CompStat for all three departments. Moreover, Willis, Mastrofski, 
and Weisburd selected the three departments because they had implemented CompStat; they differed in 
size, organization, and crime environment; and they were receptive to having a field researcher on site for 
an extended period. LPD’s contingent of 260 sworn officers serves a population of 105,668. MPD’s 919 
police officers serve a population of 386,726; and NPD’s 919 officers serve a population of 275,823. In the 
1980s and 1990s all three departments had undergone significant organizational change upon implementing 
community-oriented policing. Levels of crime differed across sites, but each had recently experienced a 
general decline in its crime rate. In all three sites CompStat coincided with a general crime decrease. 
Notwithstanding, after a decline in crime from 1997 to 2000, LPD experienced an increase in crime.  
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Moreover, CompStat paints a picture of police organizations that are capable of reading 
their work environment, discerning important trends within it, and acting quickly in ways 
that deal with problems efficiently.  
Willis, Mastrofski, and Weisburd found that the alteration to fundamental 
organizational structures that would facilitate these changes were not in place in LPD, 
MPD, and NPD. In each agency, there was a gap between the theory of a highly focused 
organizational mission of crime fighting and the reality of a complex mission with a 
complex set of organizational structures that remained largely at odds with the ostensible 
simplification of the department’s objective.  
They identified six core elements of CompStat—mission clarification, internal 
accountability, geographic organization of operational command, organizational 
flexibility, data-driven analysis of problems and assessment of department’s problem 
solving, and innovative problem-solving tactics—and analyzed each vis-à-vis LPD, 
MPD, and NPD. 
a. Mission Clarification 
Top management is responsible for clarifying and exalting the core 
features of the department’s mission that serve as the overarching reason for the 
organization’s existence. CompStat does help top management convey a powerful 
message about the importance of fighting crime; patrol officers strongly associated 
CompStat with crime fighting. However, the level of officer commitment differed in each 
department. It was strongest in NPD, whose mission statement made no explicit mention 
of crime reduction, and it was weakest in MPD where management had made a concerted 
attempt to foster acceptance of CompStat. 
b. Internal Accountability 
CompStat’s principal element of internal accountability was found in all 
three departments. However, it impacted disproportionately on middle managers and 
particularly district managers; front line supervisors and patrol officers did not feel the 
same pressure to perform.  
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c. Geographic Organization of Operational Command 
Operational command in all three departments had been lowered to middle 
managers. It devolved furthest in MPD where district commanders and sector lieutenants 
exercised twenty-four-hour responsibility for their specific beats.  
d. Organizational Flexibility 
All three departments used a variety of informal and formal mechanisms 
to increase their capacity to shift resources to where they were needed most. For the most 
part, the strategic allocation of resources operated on an ad hoc basis. NPD and MPD had 
established specific organizational structures that facilitated resource allocation. 
Conversely, LPD, a nationally recognized community-policing organization, rejected a 
centralized task force approach to policing in favor of a district-level response.  
e. Data-Driven Problem Identification and Assessment 
All three departments had developed sophisticated information systems 
and formed crime analysis units to assist them in the collection, processing, and analysis 
of timely crime data. Middle managers consistently used data to actively identify 
problems, establish priorities, and decide where to mobilize responses. However, middle 
managers typically bypassed much of the analysis so that they defined problems narrowly 
and responded with traditional methods of policing. 
f. Innovative, Problem-Solving Tactics 
CompStat demands that middle managers do something quickly about 
crime problems through more innovative responses. Willis, Mastrofski, and Weisburd 
found that the pressure of accountability, coupled with any lag time between a crime’s 
occurrence and its presentation at CompStat, limited the utility of follow-up. 
2. CompStat and Other Types of Policing  
Wilis, Mastrofski, and Weisburd conclude that, “what has taken place thus far is 
not a transformation so much as a graft of some elements of progressive management into 
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fundamentally unaltered organizational structure.” In addition they argue that the central 
tenets of CompStat “significantly” affect the existing philosophies, programs, and 
structures of CP. They suggest that the implementation of CompStat and CP often 
conflict. That suggestion warrants examination. White (2007) observes that the diffusion 
of CompStat rivals that of community policing, especially since there is no federal 
CompStat agency like DOJ’s Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) 
that provides federal funding and promotes the strategy.30 
In Chapters II and III of this thesis, an array of policing movements and strategies 
were discussed at length; none of the movements constitutes a singular organizational 
strategy or affords a concrete definition of what it is. Moreover, each movement and 
strategy in its own accord subsumes elements of the others. Bratton (1998) asserts that 
CompStat integrates the principles of conventional policing with CP, POP, and 
accountability; however, he rejects the wholesale adoption of community policing. He 
dismissed the idea that “Officer Friendly,” typically a young police officer, is going to 
solve complex and difficult problems. Giving cops more individual power to make 
decisions is a good idea, but CP as it was originally implemented didn’t focus on crime. 
Bratton assigned precinct commanders complex and difficult problems. 
Henry (2003) characterizes CompStat as a hybrid management style that 
integrates the professional model of policing, CP, and POP. He echoed Bratton’s 
depiction of “Officer Friendly”; it is “absurd” to put a 22-year-old in charge of a beat. 
Peterson (2005) concludes that CP, POP, and Scanning, Analyzing, Responding, 
Assessing (SARA)31 are collaborative and complementary approaches compatible with 
intelligence-led policing (ILP) and are not at odds with policing against terrorism. Carter 
(2009) concludes that CompStat and ILP have fundamental similarities and differences. 
                                                 
30 COPS promotes CP through education, training, and grant funding. COPS fiscal year 2009 funding 
was a component of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 that allocated $1 billion to 
COPS for the COPS Hiring Recovery Program (DOJ, 2010b). While the 2009 funding postdates the 
diffusion of both community policing and CompStat, it does demonstrate motivation for all police agencies 
to adopt community policing. It is further noted that NYPD asserts that it practices community policing and 
is a recipient of COPS funding. 
31 SARA is offered as both an independent process for problem solving and as an integral part of either 
CP or POP. It is a process that identifies and addresses problems in the context of an organization’s 
overarching mission, and particularly its priority objectives.  
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While both are preventive in nature, predicated on analyses, and hold managers 
accountable, CompStat is intrajurisdictional and incident-driven, while ILP is 
multijurisdictional and threat-driven. 
G. COMPSTAT: DIFFUSION BEYOND POLICING 
1. Total Efficiency Management System 
In 1996, the New York City Department of Corrections (NYCDOC) instituted 
Total Efficiency Management System (TEAMS), an adaptation of CompStat to improve 
conditions in NYCDOC. There was a systemic problem with New York City’s prison 
system: inmate-on-inmate violence was rampant, facilities were dirty and in disrepair, 
and employee sick and overtime rates were high. Then NYCDOC First Deputy 
Commissioner Bernard Kerik, who would later serve as NYPD police commissioner, 
implemented management meetings, coordinated strategies, and held managers 
accountable.  
In five years (1995–2000), inmate-on-inmate violence decreased 93 percent, staff 
use of force decreased 76 percent, overtime was reduced 44 percent, and employee sick 
rates dropped 31 percent. In 2000, TEAMS was a finalist for the Harvard University’s 
John F. Kennedy School of Government's Innovations in American Government Award. 
In 2001, Mayor Guliani lauded the success of CompStat and TEAMS and implemented 
the “next generation of CompStat,” the Citywide Accountability Program (CAPSTAT) 
that applied the same principles of CompStat to 18 New York City agencies (New York 
City Office of the Mayor, 2000 and 2001).  
2. CitiStat  
In 1999, the City of Baltimore instituted CitiStat to “make City government more 
responsive, accountable and cost effective.” Modeled after NYPD’s CompStat, CitiStat 
was designed to maximize personnel accountability by performance. Each city agency 
meets biweekly with the office of the mayor to examine substandard performance and 
propose solutions that can be carried out in an efficient manner. In 2004, CitiStat was the 
winner of Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government's Innovations in 
American Government Award. In 2007, the city of Baltimore reported that since its 
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inception, CitiStat had saved the city of Baltimore $350 million. In 2009, 100 city 
governments visited Baltimore’s CitiStat meetings (City of Baltimore, 2010).  
Robert D. Behn (2007) advises mayors who are considering adopting CitiStat: 
As with anything you try to do in your city, the details matter—they 
matter a lot. And these details inevitably depend on other particulars—
everything from what your citizens expect your administration to 
accomplish, to the current capacity of your different city agencies, to your 
own governing style. Consequently, the answers to these questions cannot 
be definitive. You can’t just copy the Baltimore “model.” You will need to 
recognize the core idea contained in each answer and then figure out how 
to make it work in your own city with its own unique problems and 
opportunities.  
H. COMPSTAT AND COUNTERTERRORISM 
1. FedStat 
Heather MacDonald (2003) argues that terrorism should be Compstated. 
MacDonald laments the truncated investigation of Rabi Meir Kahane’s murder in 1990. 
NYPD detectives recovered four cabinets of files from suspect El Sayed Al Nosair’s 
home. The FBI took possession of the files that were written in Arabic and left them 
dormant. Three years later, the FBI discovered that the files “anticipated” the 1993 World 
Trade Center attack. Nosair was convicted of Kahane’s murder and involvement in the 
1993 World Trade Center attack. Edward Norris who led NYPD’s Kahane homicide 
investigation and later served as Baltimore’s police commissioner said that NYPD would 
have translated the documents, because “we had a murder investigation underway.” 
Besides Norris said, “you didn’t need to translate the files to know that they were 
suspicious—the cabinets contained photos of New York City landmarks and terrorist 
manuals” (MacDonald, 2003).  
MacDonald argues that FBI’s anti-terrorism efforts should be “Compstated” in 
every city where the bureau operates: 
Where a Joint Task Force exists, the commanders of the agencies 
represented should meet on a biweekly basis to interrogate task-force 
members about the progress of their investigations. Where JTTFs don’t 
exist, the FBI should assemble comparable meeting with all relevant 
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agency heads. The new Fedstat meetings would have two purposes: to 
ensure that each ongoing investigation is being relentlessly and completely 
pursued, and to share intelligence. The only fail-safe defense against 
terrorism is information, but it must be made available to those who can 
best use it. In many cases that will be local law enforcement. 
2. Train and Subway Counterterrorism Strategy 
NYPD Counterterrorism Inspector Peter A. Winski (2008) argues that the 
principles of CompStat should be applied to train and subway system counterterrorism 
strategies. He concludes that New York City and the United States train and subway 
systems are currently at risk of a conventional improvised explosive attack from terrorists 
like those that have occurred in other cities around the world. Moreover, those systems 
are so porous that “an attack is very difficult to prevent.” Winski concludes that a 
CompStat counterterrorism strategy to protect train and subway systems that combines a 
layered approach and utilizes assets that many cities already have could be replicated 
across the country, “similar to the spread of the crime fighting CompStat strategy.”  
3. CompStat and Counterinsurgency in Iraq 
U.S. Army Major Robert E.Gordon (2007) provides a cogent analogue to pre-
CompStat New York, a city plagued by skyrocketing firearm related homicides and 
extensive fear and disorder: post-war Iraq, a country “inundated with firearms and 
explosives which are used in a continuous cycle of violence in order to achieve political, 
religious, or criminal objectives.”  
The Iraqi Police Service (IPS) is Iraq’s post-war police service that was 
established by the Multinational Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-1). IPS 
performs duties similar to local police in the United States. IPS maintains a contingent of 
135,000 personnel and is responsible for the stability and security of 27 million Iraqis. 
Gordon argues that the goals and indicators of the National Strategy for Victory in Iraq as 
codified in pertinent legislation do not represent the relationship of IPS and the stated 
goals.32 He argues that open-source measures of effectiveness (MOE) used to assess the 
                                                 
32 P.L. 109–148, Department of Defense Emergency Appropriations; P.L. 109-163, National Defense 
Authorization for fiscal year 2006; P.L. 108-106, Emergency Appropriations Act for Iraq; Afghanistan, 
Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense and Reconstruction of Iraq and Afghanistan. 
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capabilities and performance of IPS revolves around internal procedure, not outcome-
based evaluations. Gordon argues that IPS should adopt “certain facets” of NYPD’s 
CompStat process to restore public order in Iraq. Gordon observed that a central premise 
of CompStat is that the police can reduce crime. He concludes that IPS would benefit 
from a similar process based on order-control strategies. Moreover, the most applicable 
NYPD control strategies involve gun control, public space control, control of youth 
violence, and restoration of police organizational integrity.  
Gordon recognizes that IPS faces challenges not encountered by NYPD. “The 
power maintained by tribal and religious leaders in Iraq dwarfs those in similar positions 
in New York. IPS cannot continue to be implicated in the political power struggle.” He 
argues that buy-in from these leaders is essential to restoring order and “a willingness to 
confront those who refuse requires courage beyond that required of a precinct 
commander in New York.” Still, certain underlying conditions that contributed to 
disorder in New York are also extremely disruptive in Iraq. The many firearms and 
explosives left over from the war present daily challenges to the IPS similar to the 
proliferation of guns in pre-1994 New York. In addition both Iraq and pre-1994 New 
York lost control of public spaces, engendering a sense of fear and a cycle of violence. 
Moreover, both Iraq and pre-1994 New York experienced a growing disenfranchised 
youth and suffered from a sense of a lack of organizational integrity.  
Gordon concludes that IPS should adopt four order-control strategies from 
CompStat: firearms/explosives, control of public spaces, youth violence, and 
organizational integrity. Like the data produced in weekly CompStat reports, IPS must:  
• Determine its true effectiveness as it relates to public order on 
firearms/explosive homicides. 
• Regain control of public spaces by increasing security and reporting on 
crimes and attacks committed in these areas.  
• Target the youth population, which represents 40 percent of the 
population. 
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• Develop itself so that it is viewed as a source of stability in the country 
and not part of sectarian violence. 
Finally, IPS can shape police operations toward restoring order through relentless 
follow-up and assessment. Improved measures of effectiveness and measures of 
performance will allow IPS to answer two key questions for restoring order: “Am I doing 
this right?” and “Am I doing the right things?” 
I. THE DIFFUSION OF NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT’S 
INTELLIGENCE ENTERPRISE. 
1. NYPD’s Intelligence Enterprise: Prior, Elemental, and Graft-like 
Implementation and Not Necessarily the Transformation of Existing 
SLTLE Intelligence Programs 
This thesis recognizes that seven plus years have passed since the earliest stages 
of NYPD’s post–September 11, 2001 transformation.33 In that time, with the possible 
exception of LAPD’s intelligence and counterterrorism operations, no SLTLE agency has 
created an NYPD-like intelligence enterprise or adopted more than a sampling of 
NYPD’s intelligence enterprise. Moreover, like the 18 police agencies that stated they 
had implemented elements of CompStat prior to 1994 and NYPD’s implementation of 
CompStat (Weisburd et al. 2004), some SLTLE agencies may have adapted elements of 
NYPD’s intelligence enterprise prior to NYPD’s 2002 restructuring. In addition, as in the 
case of some police departments’ grafting some elements of CompStat rather than 
transforming the organization (Willis, Mastrofski, and Weisburd 2003), what may have 
or will take place with respect to SLTLE agencies’ adaptation of NYPD’s intelligence 
enterprise is and will be a grafting of elements of NYPD’s intelligence enterprise rather 
than a transformation of the organization.  
No quantitative or qualitative data exist to provide further analysis. 
Notwithstanding, this thesis maintains, like Klinger (2003), that an understanding of the 
diffusion of innovation framework enhances understanding of policing and where it 
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might be heading in the future. Christopher Bellavita (2005) maintains that “preventing 
terrorism is a new role for public safety officers. They are used to responding to daily 
emergencies, not stopping acts of war.” He characterizes prevention as “terra incognito 
where we [homeland security practitioners] can make the most progress expanding our 
capability to secure the homeland.”  
This thesis concludes that NYPD has drawn a roadmap for SLTLE agencies to 
traverse homeland security’s terra incognito to secure their hometowns and the nation’s 
homeland.  
2. The New York City Police Department’s Intelligence Enterprise—A 
“Smart Practice”  
Like Behn’s (2007) admonition to city mayors, this thesis counsels SLTLE 
agencies to recognize the core idea central to each element of NYPD’s intelligence 
enterprise and then determine how to make it work in their agency with their own unique 
problems and opportunities. Chapter VII culls the cumulative product of NYPD’s post–
September 11, 2001 interpretation and application of the intelligence function of policing. 
It presents policy options and recommendations for SLTLE agencies to interpret and 
apply the intelligence function of policing in the homeland security era.  
                                                                                                                                                 
33 This thesis assumes that NYPD’s post–September 11, 2001 intelligence and counterterrorism 
program began after the appointment of Police Commissioner Kelly on January 1, 2002.  It is 
acknowledged that NYPD conducted other special-intelligence and counterterrorism operations 
immediately after September 11, 2001 and that those initiatives may have facilitated NYPD’s post–January 
1, 2002 intelligence and counterterrorism operations. 
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A. HOMELAND SECURITY—E PLURIBUS UNUM—A NATIONAL 
STRATEGY  
The events of September 11, 2001 precipitated the homeland security era and 
compelled SLTLE agencies to think and act differently. The National Strategy for 
Homeland Security (Office of Homeland Security 2002) was the nation’s first distinct 
and comprehensive strategy for homeland security. It is an emerging area of governance 
that calls for a national effort to secure the homeland; “it’s our theory for how we’re 
going to cause security for ourselves” (Falkenrath, 2002). The strategy called SLTLE to 
the frontlines in a battle against unconventional and transnational terrorists. Each of the 
nation’s 17,786 SLTLE agencies has a role, and particularly an intelligence role, in the 
nation’s homeland security. Properly juxtaposed and integrated into the national 
intelligence, the intelligence function of SLTLE can provide a formidable enterprise to 1) 
prevent terrorist attacks within the United States; 2) reduce America’s vulnerability to 
terrorism; and 3) minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do occur. 
B. RECOMMENDATION  
SLTLE agencies should adopt tenets of NYPD’s intelligence enterprise 
tailored to their individual realities and needs to secure their jurisdictions and 
bolster the nation’s homeland security. 
The policies and procedures of NYPD’s intelligence enterprise generate the 
requisite intelligence to secure the city and reinforce the nation’s homeland security. 
Likewise, each of the nation’s SLTLE intelligence programs should produce intelligence 
to secure their hometowns and bolster the nation’s homeland security. Collectively, the 
intelligence functions of all SLTLE agencies facilitate the nation’s homeland security.  
SLTLE agencies should comprehend the interdependence of their hometown’s 
and the nation’s homeland security. Subsequent to the events of September 11, 2001, 
NYPD concluded that its security is inextricably linked to the nation’s homeland security. 
NYPD identified its intelligence requirements and determined that the same intelligence 
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that provides for the security of the homeland is essential for the security of New York 
City. To that end, NYPD transformed its organizational structure and business practices 
to acquire its requisite intelligence. In similar fashion, SLTLE agencies should transform 
their organizational structures and develop business practices to fulfill their intelligence 
requirements. 
It is understood that while the vast majority of SLTLE agencies do face similar 
threats and challenges as NYPD, those threats and challenges are not necessarily scalable 
to NYPD and New York City. Moreover, no single SLTLE agency has the same 
resources and capabilities that NYPD has. Accordingly, SLTLE agencies should tailor 
NYPD’s intelligence enterprise in scale to their realities and needs. 
Chapters II and III of this thesis trace the genesis and evolution of policing, in 
particular the intelligence function of policing in America. The police advanced from a 
reactive and mostly parochial institution into an enterprise that counters “the incredible 
broad range of troublesome situations that prompt citizens to turn to the police” 
(Goldstein, 1979). Chapter IV of this thesis depicts NYPD’s innovative counterterrorism-
intelligence program that addressed the current troublesome situation—terrorism—and 
assumed a prominent role in the nation’s homeland security.  
Chapters V and VI of this thesis identified the emergence, evolution, and 
diffusion of CompStat. NYPD wanted to reduce crime and improve the quality of life in 
New York City. It implemented CompStat, a progressive and innovative crime-reduction 
strategy that resulted in unparalleled crime reduction. Police agencies observed CompStat 
and the resultant crime reduction. Over one-half of the nation’s large and one-third of its 
small police departments adopted a CompStat-like program tailored to their realities and 
needs to reduce crime. (Wesiburd et al., 2004). As was the case with CompStat, SLTLE 
agencies should adopt the tenets of NYPD’s intelligence program tailored to their realties 
and needs to counterterrorism. 
CompStat was most replicable in large police departments. Similarly, NYPD’s 
intelligence enterprise is most applicable to large police departments and particularly  
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large municipal police departments. Notwithstanding, while CompStat mostly serves the 
parochial needs of the adopting agency, the tenets of NYPD’s intelligence enterprise have 
ramifications for all SLTLE agencies.  
Intelligence and history demonstrate that large cities are preferred targets for 
terrorists. However, pre-event planning and preparation are typically conducted outside 
the target area and have implications for all SLTLE agencies. The 2009 shootings at Fort 
Hood, Texas, the 1995 bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah federal building in Oklahoma 
City, the 1984 biological attack in The Dalles, Oregon by followers of Bhagwan Shree 
Rajneesh, the proliferation of homegrown terrorism, and the increased cyber threat 
demonstrate that no jurisdiction is immune from terrorism.  
DHS’s “Quadrennial Homeland Security Review Report: A Strategic Framework 
For A Secure Homeland” (2010a) affirms the post–September 11, 2001 homeland 
security “national effort” mantra: “homeland security is widely distributed and diverse—
but unmistakable—a national enterprise.” ISE, FCs, ITACG, JTTFs, and other programs 
and initiatives offer the prospect of a national enterprise that might facilitate the 
intelligence requirements of SLTLE agencies. Notwithstanding, the espoused national 
enterprise is not designed to provide SLTLE agencies with their unqualified intelligence 
needs—intelligence gaps remain. Therefore, SLTLE agencies should cooperate, 
collaborate, and coordinate with FCs and the combined federal programs and initiatives. 
In addition, they should adopt tenets of NYPD’s intelligence program scaled and tailored 
to their realities and needs to fulfill the gaps that are left by external intelligence 
constructs. To those ends, this thesis makes the following recommendations vis-a-vis the 
intelligence cycle.  
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1. Planning and Direction Recommendation 
SLTLE agencies should identify threats with implications for their agency, 
i.e., information that can contribute to and support the SLTLE mission.  
The first step in the intelligence cycle is planning and direction, identifying 
threats, and developing a plan of action to direct intelligence efforts. Colin Powell, 
former Secretary of State and chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said:  
I don’t need news, I don’t need facts. I have a television. I have the 
internet. I have a telephone. People tell me lots of facts. I need to know 
what it means, how important it is, and what you think about it (Fingar, 
2006). 
Powell’s telling description of intelligence affords a method for determining what 
types of raw information are needed to develop a more robust analysis of threats. An 
intelligence gap is missing information that is needed for effective intelligence analysis. 
An intelligence requirement is the information needed to fill the gap, and from the 
intelligence requirements SLTLE agencies should develop a collection plan. Moreover, 
they should identify the role of analysis and the desired intelligence outputs and products. 
SLTLE intelligence planning should ensure that “the right information gets into the hands 
of the right people who can use the information to develop policy and operational 
responses” (Carter, 2009).  
Moreover, it is imperative that SLTLE agencies identify the intelligence function 
of policing and establish and maintain a dedicated intelligence unit. Peterson (2005) 
identifies four levels of intelligence at which SLTLE operate: 
• Level 1 produces tactical and strategic intelligence products that benefit 
their own department and outside agencies. These agencies employ an 
intelligence apparatus that includes managers and analysts. “Probably 





• Level 2 provides tactical and strategic intelligence for internal 
consumption; intelligence generally supports investigations rather than 
operations. These agencies may have dedicated intelligence units. 
“Probably fewer than 500 agencies in the U.S. operate at this level.”  
• Level 3 is the most common level of intelligence function in the U.S. 
These are typically small departments and have limited resources. While 
they may be capable of developing intelligence products, they are likely to 
be dependent on outside agencies.  
• Level 4 comprises most agencies in the U.S. They are typically very small 
departments that do not employ dedicated intelligence personnel. Their 
level of information sharing and intelligence training is generally minimal. 
NYPD defines its intelligence requirements as “information that is comprehensive 
and relevant to the Police Commissioner” (NYPD, 2008a). It acquires its intelligence 
through its own agency and external mechanisms and operates at level 1 of Peterson’s 
intelligence taxonomy. SLTLE agencies should operate at the highest level of intelligence 
commensurate with their intelligence needs. 
2. Collection Recommendation  
SLTLE agencies should, to the best of their ability, collect their own 
intelligence.  
The undertaking of intelligence collection commences with the understanding that 
the collector will likely not gather all extant information and intelligence—intelligence is 
an imperfect practice.  
SLTLE agencies should designate an intelligence unit or officer to coordinate the 
collection process. SLTLE agencies routinely and exceptionally collect criminal and 
other raw information and must continue to do so mindful of the three Cs. Moreover, 
SLTLE agencies must identify and collect information against activities and 




materials and precursor explosives products and literature, unusual licensing requests, 
questionable finance and identity practices, and suspected surveillance of critical 
infrastructure and key resources (CIKR). 
Additionally, SLTLE should use and develop the following external intelligence 
constructs and create new entities to acquire their requisite intelligence.  
a. State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers Recommendation  
SLTLE agencies should make known to FCs their intelligence 
requirements.  
State and Major Area Fusion Centers (FCs) can be formidable intelligence 
constructs. Given proper direction, FCs can facilitate SLTLE intelligence requirements. 
SLTLE agencies should acquire and share information and intelligence that is relevant—
information that fulfils their intelligence requirements. SLTLE agencies should provide 
direction to FC stakeholders and their federal intelligence partners as to their information 
and intelligence needs. Moreover, SLTLE agencies that lack the manpower or resources 
to participate in FCs should partner with neighboring police departments and/or establish 
a liaison with their regional FCs. 
b. Interagency Threat Assessment and Coordination Group 
(ITACG) Recommendation 
SLTLE agencies should participate in and support ITACG’s 
initiatives and should make known their intelligence requirements to the U.S. 
intelligence community (IC) vis-à-vis ITACG.  
The Interagency Threat Assessment and Coordination Group (ITACG) is 
embedded with federal intelligence analysts in the National Counterterrorism Center 
(NCTC) to integrate, analyze, and assist in the dissemination of federally coordinated 
information within the scope of the information-sharing environment (ISE). 
Notwithstanding, ITACG is empowered to “advise” IC on “how to tailor its products to 
satisfy the needs of DHS, FBI, and other federal entities so that they in turn can better 
serve their ‘consumer.’ ” Moreover, the colocation of the National Joint Terrorist Task 
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Force (NJTTF) in NCTC affords ITACG the opportunity to “effect” decisions regarding 
the sanitization and release of information to SLTLE and the private sector (Office of the 
White House, 2007). 
ITACG affords SLTLE agencies a means to present their intelligence 
requirements to IC with the prospect of being granted the prerogative to task IC to collect 
information with implications for SLTLE agencies. Therefore, SLTLE agencies and their 
affiliates and associations, and particularly Global, the International Association of 
Chiefs of Police (IACP), the Major Cities Chiefs Association (MCC), the National 
Sheriffs Association (NSA), and Major Counties Sheriffs Association (MCSA) should 
lend support and affirmation to ITACG’s initiatives.  
c. Joint Terrorist Task Force Recommendation 
SLTLE agencies should make clear their intelligence requirements to 
FBI vis-à-vis JTTFs.  
Nationwide, 84 JTTFs with one attached to each of FBI’s 56 field offices 
provide access to the National JTTF (NJTTF) and FBI headquarters and compound a 
national effort to protect the homeland (FBI, 2004). While JTTFs operate independently 
of FCs, they have overlapping missions and share many of the same customers. The 
recently created DHS and FBI-chaired National Fusion Center Management Group 
should explore opportunities to facilitate the mutual needs of JTTFs and FCs.  
In 2002, NYPD increased its personal detail to NY-JTTF from 
approximately 15 to 130 members of the department to more actively participate in the 
nation’s counterterrorism initiatives. JTTFs offer an affirmative means for SLTLE 
agencies to acquire their requisite intelligence. SLTLE agencies should make known their 
intelligence requirements to FBI via JTTFs.  
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d. Foreign Liaison Officers Against Terrorism (FLOAT) 
Recommendation 
SLTLE agencies should promote, develop, and actualize the Foreign 
Liaison Officers Against Terrorism Program.  
In the past, we were limited by technology and bureaucracy, often to a 
single point of contact between and among police agencies throughout the world. Routine 
requests were routed through INTERPOL, and emergency requests required elaborate 
rationale and persistence to get to the right person overseas. Now, based in part on the 
necessity of immediate and actionable intelligence after the attacks of September 11 and 
July 7, local police have realized that their federal government lacks the ability to provide 
a meaningful and timely link, a cop-to-cop link, between police across the globe (Bratton, 
2007). 
(1) NYPD’s International Liaison Unit. ILU is a formidable 
forward intelligence enterprise that offers unique insights into international terrorism with 
implications for NYPD. The 2008 Mumbai and other missions discussed in Chapter IV 
demonstrate ILU’s efficacy. Nevertheless, most SLTLE agencies lack the resources to 
station personnel overseas for extended periods of time.  
(2) Foreign Liaison Officers Against Terrorism. An alternate 
program, Foreign Liaison Officers Against Terrorism (FLOAT), a coalition approach to 
SLTLE liaison with foreign police departments, has been proposed. FLOAT would 
assign one officer from each department of the coalition to designated foreign police 
departments. Gathered information and intelligence would be shared with the coalition, 
and FLOAT reports would be disseminated throughout the law  
enforcement community. FLOAT has the support of MCC and MCSA and an offer of 
partial funding from the Manhattan Institute’s Center for Policing Terrorism34 (U.S. 
House of Representatives, 2006; Eddy, 2008; Bratton, 2008; Gillespie, 2009).  
                                                 
34 The Manhattan Institute’s Center for Policing Terrorism’s partial funding would be in the form of 
housing the administration of FLOAT at the National Counter-Terrorism Academy that is supported by the 
Ahmanson Foundation, a non-profit organization, and in part by the state of California.  
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FLOAT would facilitate the intelligence requirements of SLTLE 
agencies without undue expense. SLTLE agencies and their associations should do more 
than continue to promote and support the FLOAT proposal; SLTLE agencies should 
actualize FLOAT.  
(3) Opposition to Foreign Liaison Officers Against Terrorism. 
FLOAT is an ambitious project that offers the prospect of global and real-time actionable 
intelligence for SLTLE. However, FLOAT’s authority in the international realm is 
questionable. Its planned initiatives entreat IC and the Department of State’s (DoS) 
foreign intelligence and diplomatic prerogatives respectively. The challenge to FLOAT is 
to gain the acquiescence of all stakeholders. The supporters of FLOAT must convince IC, 
DoS, and DHS that the aim is not to sever or supplant information from federal offices 
but to have a multiplicity of channels of information that will allow chiefs of police to 
make decisions (U.S. House of Representatives, 2006). 
In this instance, NYPD was exceptional and was able to overcome 
those challenges. NYPD requested and was granted liaison relations with foreign police 
departments. The FBI initially opposed the initiative but acquiesced after Director 
Mueller and Commissioner Kelly met formally to resolve FBI-NYPD differences. It is 
further noted that NYPD enjoys special relationships with IC (Donner, 1990; Lardner & 
Reppetto, 2000; Sheehan, 2008; Dickey, 2009a). Moreover, NYPD has participated in 
DoS initiatives and particularly the Civilian Police Program (CIVPOL) that deploys 
American police under the auspices of DoS to foreign countries in support of 
international post-conflict stabilization and redevelopment operations. On January 21, 
2010, DoS’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) 
signed an MOU with NYPD to establish a relationship with NYPD to assist in 
international police training. The MOU provides a framework for NYPD to provide the 
Haitian national police, among other police forces, with training and technical assistance. 
David T. Johnson, Assistant Secretary of INL, said of the MOU:  
It’s important to note that this is the first time we’ve established such a 
memorandum and such a relationship with any state or local police 
department, and we started at the top, if you will, with the NYPD (United 
States Department of State, 2010).  
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Succinctly, NYPD was able to create its intelligence enterprise and 
particularly ILU because it is NYPD and has been recognized as a preeminent police 
department with value to add to the national and international policing enterprise. To that 
end, NYPD has been afforded extraordinary consideration by all concerned. FLOAT 
endeavors to acquire the same consideration, and that is a formidable challenge. The 
supporters of FLOAT should make known to all stakeholders that, like NYPD, they have 
value to add and should be afforded the same prerogatives as NYPD.  
(4) ILU and FLOAT. Former NYPD Police Commissioner 
Bratton acknowledged that NYPD’s intelligence operation is considered the gold 
standard. However, he and others criticize NYPD’s “alleged” refusal to give other law 
enforcement agencies access to the intelligence that it has gathered. Bratton said: 
New York has perfected an array of intelligence-gathering initiatives.… 
My concern is that at the federal level, there are too few dots to connect, 
and in New York, what they collect is not being shared (Miller, 2007).  
Commissioner Kelly (2009a) says NYPD typically shares what it 
learns with the FBI and its law enforcement partners. This thesis cannot and does not 
resolve either claim. It does, however, conclude that the supporters of ILU and FLOAT 
should consider combining forces. The benefits that would accrue to hometown and 
homeland security are significant: each member of an ILU-FLOAT coalition would be 
afforded a cop-to-cop link with foreign police departments; the established network 
would likely grow in size and scope; members would share expenses; and foreign police 
departments would be spared the burden of multiple liaisons, with the added benefit that 
DoS and IC would likely be more amiable to a smaller number of SLTLE representatives 
operating in their heretofore near-exclusive domain.  
e. Public-Private Partnerships Recommendation 
SLTLE agencies should use and develop existing relationships and 
initiate new relationships to foster positive and productive police-community 
relations that would facilitate the collection of information necessary for the police 
intelligence function.  
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Americans of all ages, all stations in life, and all types of dispositions are 
forever forming associations. There are not only commercial and industrial 
associations in which all take part, but others of a thousand different 
types—religious, moral, serious, futile, very general and very limited, 
immensely large and very minute. Americans combine to give fetes, found 
seminaries, build churches, distribute books, and send missionaries to the 
antipodes. Hospitals, prisons, and schools take shape in that way. Finally, 
if they want to proclaim a truth or propagate some feeling by the 
encouragement of a great example, they form an association.  
–Alexis De Tocqueville, Democracy in America (1848/1996)  
De Tocqueville’s observations of nineteenth-century America hold true 
today—Americans have an affinity for associations. NYPD acknowledges this 
phenomenon and engages associations of all types and sizes to accomplish the 
department’s mission. NYPD’s Community Affairs Bureau (CAB) facilitates community 
partnerships and endeavors to achieve a higher level of trust and active citizenship and a 
community that is apt to provide information essential to the safety and security of the 
city. NYPD Shield is an umbrella organization of public-private partnerships that 
recognizes that the private sector is intimately familiar with its own setting and is in the 
best position to distinguish anomalous conditions that deviate from the norm. Information 
collected from NYPD Shield facilitates NYPD’s intelligence enterprise. CAB and NYPD 
Shield programs are inherently reciprocal: the police ask for and receive information 
from the community and the private sector to facilitate NYPD’s missions. In exchange, 
NYPD is able to better inform the community and private sector and alleviate many of 
their concerns.  
Sixty-seven percent of all SLTLE agencies’ mission statements include 
community policing (DOJ, 2004). For the most part, SLTLE need only recognize the 
inherent information-gathering capability of their existing community-policing programs. 
In addition, SLTLE agencies typically partner with the private sector on an ad hoc basis. 
SLTLE should revisit those relationships and explore new ones, particularly CIKR 
sectors.  
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f. Other Collection Mechanisms Recommendation 
SLTLE agencies must consider what, if any, intelligence requirements 
are not met by existing intelligence collection programs and establish independent 
or other means to fulfill the intelligence gap.  
This recommendation is specific to the realities and needs of particular 
SLTLE agencies.  
NYPD and the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) have historically maintained a 
cooperative partnership to protect the waters of the New York metropolitan area. 
Subsequent to the events of September 11, 2001, NYPD and USCG enhanced that 
working relationship, and they maintain intelligence liaisons and conduct joint operations 
during national security and other events. On March 20, 2008, NYPD and USCG 
formalized that relationship in a MOU. The maritime element of the 2008 Mumbai 
attacks underscores the significance of the NYPD-USCG MOU and how specific 
collection efforts can facilitate SLTLE intelligence (Bennis, 2002; NYPD, 2008d and 
2008h). 
Alternately, police departments in jurisdictions that service the dairy-farm 
industry would likely be more concerned with agroterrorism. In 2004, Tommy G. 
Thompson, former secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services, said “I 
can’t, for the life of me, understand why the terrorists have not attacked our food supply, 
because it is so easy to do.” Professor Lawrence W. Wein, Professor of Management 
Science at Stanford University, and coauthor of “Analyzing a bioterror attack on the food 
supply: The case of botulinum toxin in milk” (Wein & Liu, 2005) found that milk was 
particularly vulnerable to an attack. Wein said, “If we didn’t realise what was happening, 
half a million people would drink this milk … most of these would be poisoned, roughly 
half of them would die” (Cox, 2006).  
SLTLE agencies with dairy-farm concerns should collect intelligence 
against the intelligence requirements of agroterrorism. The Strategic Partnership Program 
Agroterrorism (SPPA) initiative is a partnership of FBI, DHS, the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture, and the Food and Drug Administration that assesses the food and agriculture 
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sector in collaboration with private industry. SPPA and other agricultural specific 
associations would likely satisfy many of the informational and intelligence needs of 
police departments whose jurisdictions serve dairy farms. In addition, SLTLE agencies 
with dairy-farm concerns should determine the extent to which SPPA and other existing 
intelligence constructs fulfill their agency-specific intelligence requirements to identify 
remaining gaps and endeavor to fulfill those gaps. 
In like fashion, SLTLE agencies with other sector-specific concerns 
should collect intelligence against those concerns through applicable information and 
intelligence constructs.  
3. Process and Collation Recommendation 
SLTLE agencies should develop an information management system that 
facilitates the appropriate exchange of information internally and externally, de-
conflicts investigations, and ensures privacy and civil rights in accordance with 
applicable law. 
A clear distinction is needed between law enforcement intelligence and national 
security intelligence. While some information can support the goals of both forms of 
intelligence, the competing methodologies and types of information that may be 
maintained in records mandates that the distinction remain clear for purposes of public 
safety, including the apprehension of offenders and the prevention of criminal and/or 
terrorist acts (Carter, 2009). 
NYPD’s intelligence process categorizes information and directs it to a designated 
unit or outside agency. Typically, index crime and petty offenses are processed at 
precinct level, and major and special circumstance crimes are processed by a designated 
specialized unit.35 Moreover, exceptional and ongoing crime and suspected terrorism 
information is forwarded to ID. ID passes suspected terrorism information to NY-JTTF, 
                                                 
35 There are seven index crimes: murder, rape, robbery, assault burglary, grand larceny, and grand 
larceny auto. Major and special circumstance crimes include vice, narcotics, organized auto theft, organized 
crime as it relates to the private carting industry, wholesale markets, and off shore gambling, sexual 
exploitation of children, gang, identity theft, hate crime, bank robbery, corruption of public officials, and 
others.  
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which has the right of first refusal.36 NY-JTTF elects to either assume the lead or return it 
to ID. The multilayered process is designed to do two things: 1) coordinate investigations 
and facilitate the exchange of information both internally and externally, and 2) de-
conflict overlapping inquiries and investigations that might hazard each other.  
In addition, NYPD’s information-management systems include initiatives to 
ensure privacy and compliance with pertinent law. NYPD is governed by the New York 
State criminal procedure law, New York State civil rights law, and other applicable New 
York State law. In addition, NYPD is bound by the Modified Handschu Guidelines, a 
judicial consent decree that provides guidelines for intelligence practices related to 
political organizations. Moreover, members of NYPD seconded to NY-JTTF are bound 
by the Attorney General’s Guidelines and applicable federal law.  
SLTLE agencies routinely and exceptionally collect vast amounts of information 
that is relevant to the intelligence function. SLTLE agencies should develop an 
information-management system that facilitates its intelligence function and protects the 
privacy and civil rights of its constituency. The Law Enforcement Intelligence Unit’s 
Criminal Intelligence File Guidelines (Law Enforcement Intelligence Unit, 2002) and 28 
CFR Part 23, Criminal Intelligence Systems Operating Policy, provide comprehensive 
intelligence guides for SLTLE solicitation and processing of information and are 
commended to SLTLE agencies to those ends. 
Furthermore, SLTLE agencies and personnel must acknowledge the implications 
for intelligence and assent to a level of professionalism commensurate with the inherent 
hazards and ethical requirements of intelligence. SLTLE agencies and personnel must 
avoid what David Gomez, Assistant Special Agent-in Charge of FBI’s Seattle Field 
Office, refers to as “intelligence pornography,” a prurient interest in intelligence (Gomez, 
personal communication, 2010). SLTLE agencies and personnel should comprehend that, 
while information and intelligence serves the police function, each piece of information 
might have consequences for innocent or otherwise protected persons or interests. 
                                                 
36 FBI’s authority is derived from the National Security Act, Executive Order 12333 and other 
executive directives. 
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Information and intelligence, improperly collected or used or disseminated, threatens the 
fabric of democratic society and the integrity of the intelligence function. 
4. Analysis and Production Recommendation 
SLTLE agencies should establish an analytic capability that makes known 
information and intelligence relevant to the organization.  
Analysis describes the process of evaluating data for reliability, validity, 
integrating and analyzing it, and converting the data into a meaningful whole. It is 
imperative that the intelligence consumer understand analysis and that the consumer be 
part of the process (Carter, 2009). 
NYPD established an array of analytic capabilities to make known information 
intelligible to the Department. In this regard, NYPD was especially fortunate to have a 
large and diversified workforce with a prodigious language capability. NYPD leveraged 
its cultural and linguistic resources to create a cyber capability that infiltrates the cyber 
world and analyzes cyber threats. In addition, NYPD actively recruited members of IC, 
military, and recent Ivy League graduate school graduates to serve as intelligence 
analysts alongside veteran street cops. This unique intelligence ensemble was tasked with 
analyzing all-source information with implications for New York City.  
SLTLE agencies should establish an analytic capability that makes known 
information intelligible to the agency. No one knows the realities and intelligence needs 
of a SLTLE agency like the organization itself. SLTLE agencies should take a proprietary 
interest in intelligence; they must make the intelligence relevant to the functionality of 
the agency. Preferably, SLTLE agencies should establish an independent analytic unit or 
establish a relationship with partner agencies/FCs to do so.  
Intelligence, and particularly the analysis element thereof, is facilitated by a 
diverse workforce with language, computer, and intelligence skills. To that end, SLTLE 
agencies should recruit a diversified workforce with those skills. In addition, they should 
provide intelligence personnel with language, cyber, cultural awareness, and advanced 
intelligence training. SLTLE agencies should recruit personnel from the U.S. military 
whose recent history is rich in cyber- and language-enhanced intelligence operations. 
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Moreover, they should recruit current and retired members of major city police 
departments, and in particular NYPD and LAPD, whose post–September 11, 2001 
intelligence operations afford cutting-edge SLTLE knowledge and experience.  
5. Dissemination Recommendation 
SLTLE agencies should routinize information dissemination.  
An intelligence product has virtually no value unless the system is able to get the 
right information to the right people in a time frame that provides value to the report’s 
content (Carter, 2009). 
Dissemination is presenting the intelligence product to the intended audience. 
SLTLE agencies should ensure that appropriate information and intelligence is made 
available to relevant stakeholders in a timely fashion.  
NYPD’s multilayered intelligence enterprise affords information where it counts 
most—to the patrol officer who is most likely to encounter criminals and terrorists. 
Officers need the most current intelligence available to detect, deter, and mitigate crime 
and terrorism. NYPD supplies the patrol officer with information and intelligence via 
daily platoon briefings, bulletins, and special reports and briefings where appropriate. 
Field Intelligence Officers (FIO) provide each command with up-to-date intelligence, and 
particularly information and intelligence that are relevant to the command. Moreover, 
precinct commanders and specialized personnel receive periodic and special intelligence 
briefings from the intelligence division. In addition, NYPD routinely provides the 
community and its law enforcement and public-private partnerships with information that 
respectively facilitates community relations and the information and intelligence 
requirements of the law enforcement community and designated elements of the private 
sector. 
Typically, SLTLE agencies have adequate mechanisms to provide information 
and intelligence to patrol officers. Many SLTLE agencies have implemented the 
Terrorism Liaison Officer (TLO) program that typically disseminates information and 
intelligence gathered from FCs and other sources to elements of their departments. TLOs  
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or other designated parties should examine gathered intelligence for relevance to the 
agency and its communal, law enforcement, and public-private partners and disseminate 
appropriately.  
6. Consumption and Feedback: Recommendations 
Lowenthal (2009) concludes that the policy maker should convey to the analyst 
how the product is used and provide direction to improve future products and define 
intelligence requirements.  
a. Criminal Intelligence Consumption and Feedback 
NYPD’s criminal intelligence process, CompStat, is predicated on 
consumption and feedback. Precinct commanders typically interface with precinct-level 
crime analysts on a daily basis and periodically with specialized unit analysts; 
information and intelligence consumption and feedback is constant. To that point, 
CompStat meetings might be characterized as crackerjack-feedback sessions.  
CompStat and ILP are the dominant forms of SLTLE criminal intelligence 
and typically satisfy consumption and feedback requirements; more importantly, the right 
information gets into the hands of the right people who can use the information to 
develop policy and operational responses. Moreover, SLTLE agencies should consider 
the symbioses of crime and terrorism and that criminal intelligence facilitates the national 
intelligence. SLTLE agencies should, in accordance with law, tender criminal 
intelligence to its intelligence division or, in the absence of such, to its resident state-
police intelligence division for all-source analysis. 
b. National Intelligence Consumption and Feedback  
High-ranking members of NYPD are briefed by ID and others on material 
matters as appropriate. NYPD intelligence products typically bear an originator’s name 
and point of contact that afford the consumer an opportunity to ascertain further details 
and to provide feedback. Moreover, command-level FIOs afford each command a direct 
link to ID and facilitate requests for information and analysis on an ad hoc basis. Finally, 
 142
all members of the department receive counterterrorism and intelligence training 
commensurate with their rank and position in the department. Each member is 
encouraged to participate in the intelligence process and is afforded access to NYPD’s 
intelligence resources on an ad hoc and appropriate basis.  
SLTLE agencies should access the national intelligence vis-à-vis FCs and 
other intelligence constructs as available. The agency’s designated intelligence unit or 
officer should assess the national intelligence for agency and jurisdictional implications. 
SLTLE agencies should understand that the intelligence consumer is part of the process. 
Intelligence analysts should be provided appropriate direction by the consumer, and that 
direction should communicate to the analysts the operating context: “What are the 
conditions? What is happening? What is going on, and who is it going on with? Who are 
we talking to and what are they saying? Does what people say corroborate or conflict 
with reality? And most importantly; how can the analyst facilitate the consumer’s 
mission? In turn, the analyst should tell the consumer, as prescribed by Colin Powell, 
what the analyst knows, doesn’t know, and thinks (Fingar, 2006). 
C. CONCLUSION 
And we are now men, and must accept in the highest mind the same 
transcendent destiny; and not minors and invalids in a protected corner; 
not cowards fleeing before a revolution, but guides, redeemers and 
benefactors, obeying the Almighty effort and advancing on Chaos and the 
Dark. 
–Ralph Waldo Emerson, Self-Reliance (1841) 
The events of Tuesday, September 11, 2001, engendered the homeland security 
era and the realization that transnational terrorists have the motive, capability, and 
wherewithal to strike the American homeland. New York City and NYPD are intimately 
familiar with terrorism. They vowed that those that perished on September 11, 2001, did 
not do so in vain and that all means necessary would be taken to prevent a recurrence of 
that harrowing event. To that end, NYPD assumed a proactive counterterrorism role and 
transformed its organization and business practices to acquire intelligence that might 
prevent future attacks. In effect, NYPD’s efforts bolstered the nation’s homeland 
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security. This thesis concludes that SLTLE agencies should adopt an NYPD intelligence-
like program scaled and tailored to their realities and needs to prevent future attacks to 
their hometowns and in effect to compound a national effort to secure the homeland.  
This thesis found that the national homeland security effort has been and remains 
a top-down federally dominated and coordinated effort. Regardless, the review of past, 
current, and evolving federal initiatives indicates that the U.S. intelligence community, 
and particularly ISE, are trying to develop an information-sharing environment that might 
facilitate the intelligence requirements of SLTLE agencies. Moreover, the FC construct 
continues to evolve, and the prospect of an FC national enterprise would also facilitate 
the intelligence requirements of SLTLE agencies. SLTLE agencies and their associations 
should ensure that those two trends continue. 
Finally, SLTLE agencies should overcome their institutional stasis. As “full and 
trusted partners with the Federal Government in our Nation’s effort to combat terrorism” 
(Office of the White House, 2007), SLTLE agencies should affect their role in homeland 
security. The complexity of issues and multiplicity of actors inherent to homeland 
security need not confound the homeland security enterprise. SLTLE agencies and IC 
should recognize that a national effort for homeland security should be just that—a 
national effort. Achieving that end is the responsibility of SLTLE agencies, IC, and all 
homeland security practitioners. NYPD’s intelligence enterprise is a means to that end.  
D. POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
The status quo SLTLE intelligence enterprise is inadequate for the homeland 
security era.  
Alain Bauer concludes that the challenge is to convince the “cops, the feds, and 
the spooks” that they are fighting against the same enemies and to understand that if 
those enemies cooperate informally, quickly, and easily, the government institutions that 
are up against them have to learn to do the same thing (Dickey, 2009a). Hometown and 
homeland security requires SLTLE agencies to think and act locally, nationally, and 
globally. NYPD’s intelligence enterprise is a smart practice that affords SLTLE agencies 
an array of programs and initiatives that facilitates those objectives.  
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Each of the nation’s 17,786 SLTLE agencies knows its realities, needs, and 
particularly its internal threats best. They should fuse the combined efforts of federal, 
NYPD-like, and other constructs to acquire the intelligence necessary to secure their 
respective hometowns and the nation’s homeland.  
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